Learning and Experimentation in Strategic Bandit Problems by Klein, Nicolas
Learning and Experimentation in Strategic
Bandit Problems
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades Doctor oeconomiae publicae
(Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen
2010
vorgelegt von Nicolas Alexandre Klein
Referent: Prof. Sven Rady, PhD
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Klaus Schmidt
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 17. November 2010
Mu¨ndliche Pru¨fung am 3. November 2010
Berichterstatter:
Prof. Sven Rady, PhD
Prof. Dr. Klaus Schmidt
Prof. Ray Rees
1 Introduction
In my dissertation, I deal with dynamic models of strategic information accumulation and
transmission, meaning that I investigate situations in which strategically interacting agents
seek progressively to garner intelligence, which may potentially help them make better deci-
sions in the future. The canonical framework for the analysis of such questions is provided
by the literature on strategic experimentation on (two-armed) bandits.1 Previous related
work has been done in the papers by Bolton & Harris (1999, 2000), as well as Keller, Rady,
Cripps (2005), and Keller & Rady (2010). These papers investigated the case of several
agents experimenting with replica bandits, with both the players’ actions, as well as the
outcomes of their actions, being perfectly publicly observable to their peers.
This assumption that there is perfect positive correlation across the several players’ ban-
dits is lifted in Chapter 1 of the present dissertation.2 First investigating the case of perfect
negative correlation in a two-player game, we fully characterize the set of equilibria. We find
that there always exists an equilibrium in cutoff strategies, whereas there never exists an
equilibrium in cutoff strategies in the positively correlated benchmark case. Again in marked
contrast to the case of perfect positive correlation, where the probability of never finding out
the true state of the world was always inefficiently large, we find that in any equilibrium, this
probability coincides with the efficient benchmark. Furthermore, using elementary construc-
tive methods, we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in cutoff strategies for all parameter
values for the case of arbitrary negative correlation. These equilibria again exhibit efficient
long-run patterns of learning. We moreover extend our results to three players.
In Chapter 2, I analyze a game of two players operating replica bandits with one safe
arm and two risky arms, the respective types of which are perfectly negatively correlated.3
While the general setup may seem superficially similar to that in Chapter 1, there are no-
table differences, which are shown to be of quite some import to the analysis: Players now
endogenously decide at each “point” in time if they want to investigate a given hypothesis or
its negation. While previous literature has found that there never exists an efficient equilib-
rium, and Chapter 1 has shown that there exists an efficient equilibrium, if, and only if, the
stakes at play are below a certain threshold, I show in Chapter 2 that if players endogenously
choose which risky arm to pull, there exists an efficient equilibrium if, and only if, the stakes
1Throughout this dissertation, I use the term two-armed bandits to refer to bandits with one safe arm
and one risky arm, which some authors are wont to refer to as one-armed bandits. Indeed, the problem is
isomorphic to a stopping problem on a single risky arm.
2Chapter 1 is joint work with my dissertation advisor Sven Rady, and is based on a joint paper entitled
“Negatively Correlated Bandits” (2010).
3Chapter 2 is based on my paper “Strategic Learning in Teams” (2010a).
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exceed a certain threshold. While the technical issues arising from the negative correlation
between the risky arms can, modulo minor details, be solved in a manner mirroring Chapter
1, the actual construction of equilibria requires quite different technical methods: The ex-
tension of players’ action sets renders a full characterization of the equilibrium set elusive;
the construction rather relies on certain linearities, which guarantee the existence of a best
response in the boundary of a player’s action space.
Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 take the structure of agents’ rewards as given, Chapter 3 en-
dogenizes them by analyzing a game between a single principal, who enjoys full commitment
power, and a single agent.4 The principal is interested in knowing if a certain hypothesis is
true or false, yet he cannot conduct the relevant investigation himself, but has to delegate
this task to an agent. In continuous time, the agent in turn can either be honest and actually
investigate the hypothesis, or he can shirk and be lazy, or, unbeknownst to the principal, he
can manipulate the data intimating he has proved the hypothesis. In Chapter 3, I identify
the parameters for which it is possible for the principal to give the agent proper incentives
to investigate the hypothesis, and I construct an optimal mechanism that does so.
In Chapter 4, the agent no longer operates a bandit machine, but can rather be conceived
of as the strategically acting risky arm of a two-armed bandit.5 Specifically, in each period,
a decision maker who faces a sequence of decision problems chooses whether to seek the
advice of an expert. The latter is not interested in the policy decision per se, but rather tries
to maximize the number of periods that his advice is sought. The precision of the expert’s
private information is initially unknown, and is gradually learnt over time. Thus, the expert
may have incentives strategically to bias the cheap-talk relay of his information, in order
favorably to influence the decision maker’s impression of him. Should he choose to do so, he
will gradually accumulate private information about his type. We show that if exogenous
employment costs are low, the expert will be hired with some probability even after he has
revealed himself to be of the bad type. This construction heavily relies on the assumption
that the decision maker has full commitment power. In the absence of commitment power
and low employment costs, we show that any fully revealing equilibrium is dominated by
an equilibrium that allows the expert to accumulate some private information early in the
relationship (probationary period).
4Chapter 3 is based on my paper “The Importance of Being Honest” (2010b).
5Chapter 4 is joint work with Tymofiy Mylovanov of Pennsylvania State University, and is based on our
paper “Expert Experimentation” (2010).
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Abstract
We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits.
Either player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known
payoff or a risky arm whose expected payoff per unit of time is initially unknown. This
payoff can be high or low, and is negatively correlated across players. We characterize
the set of all Markov perfect equilibria in the benchmark case where the risky arms
are known to be of opposite type, and construct equilibria in cutoff strategies for
arbitrary negative correlation. All strategies and payoffs are in closed form. In marked
contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type, there always exists
an equilibrium in cutoff strategies, and there always exists an equilibrium exhibiting
efficient long-run patterns of learning. These results extend to a three-player game
with common knowledge that exactly one risky arm is of the high payoff type.
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1 Introduction
Starting with Rothschild (1974), two-armed bandit models have been used extensively in
economics to formalize the trade-off between experimentation and exploitation in dynamic
decision problems with learning; see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2008) for a survey of this
literature. The use of the two-armed bandit framework as a canonical model of strategic
experimentation in teams is more recent: Bolton and Harris (1999, 2000) analyze the case
of Brownian motion bandits, while Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady
(2010) analyze bandits where payoffs are governed by Poisson processes. These papers
assume perfect positive correlation of the quality of the risky arm across players; all risky
arms generate the same unknown expected payoff per unit of time, so what is good news to
any given player is good news for everybody else.
There are many situations, however, where one man’s boon is the other one’s bane.
Think of a suit at law, for instance: whatever is good news for one party tends to be bad
news for the other. Or consider two firms pursuing research and development under different,
incompatible working hypotheses. One pharmaceutical company, for example, might base
its drug development strategy on the hypothesis that the cause of a particular disease is a
virus, while the other might see a bacterium as the cause. An appropriate model of strategic
experimentation in such a situation must assume negative correlation of the quality of the
risky arm across players. This we propose to do in the present paper.
There are two players in our model, either one facing a continuous-time exponential
bandit as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). One arm is safe, generating a known payoff per
unit of time. The other arm is risky, and can be good or bad. If it is good, it generates lump-
sum payoffs after exponentially distributed random times; if it is bad, it never generates any
payoff. A good risky arm dominates the safe one in terms of expected payoffs per unit of
time, whereas the safe arm dominates a bad risky one. At the start of the game, the players
hold a common belief about the types of the two risky arms. Either player’s actions and
payoffs are perfectly observable to the other player, so any information that a player garners
via experimentation with the risky arm is a public good, and the players’ posterior beliefs
agree at all times.
We first analyze the case of perfect negative correlation, where it is common knowledge
that exactly one risky arm is good. In a lawsuit, for example, this means that there exists
conclusive evidence for one side which, once found, will decide the case in its favor; in the
example of drug development, it means that one of the two mutually exclusive hypotheses
will turn out to be true if explored long enough. The dynamics of posterior beliefs are easy
to describe in this case. If both players play safe, no new information is generated and
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beliefs stay unchanged. If only one player plays risky and he has no success, the posterior
probability that his risky arm is the good one falls gradually over time; if he obtains a lump-
sum payoff, all uncertainty is resolved and beliefs become degenerate at the true state of the
world. If both players play risky, finally, and there is no success on either arm, this is again
uninformative about the state of the world, so beliefs are constant up to the random time
when the first success occurs. It is important to note that a success on one player’s risky
arm is always bad news for the other player, while lack of success gradually makes the other
player more optimistic.
We restrict players to stationary Markov strategies with the common posterior belief
as the state variable. As is well known, this restriction is without loss of generality in the
decision problem of a single agent experimenting in isolation: his optimal policy is given
by a cutoff strategy, i.e. has him play risky at beliefs more optimistic than some threshold,
and safe otherwise. The same structure prevails in the optimization problem of a utilitarian
planner who maximizes the average of the two players’ expected discounted payoffs. In the
non-cooperative experimentation game, the Markov restriction rules out history-dependent
behavior that is familiar from the analysis of infinitely repeated games in discrete time,
yet technically quite difficult to formalize in continuous time (Simon and Stinchcombe 1989,
Bergin 1992, Bergin and McLeod 1993). Imposing Markov perfection allows us to focus on the
experimentation tradeoff that the players face and makes our results directly comparable to
those in the previous literature on strategic experimentation in bandits. Moreover, a simple
numerical evaluation of average payoffs suggests that Markov perfect equilibria are able to
capture a surprisingly high fraction of the welfare gain that the planner’s solution achieves
relative to the safe payoff level.
The implementation of the Markov restriction needs some care in our setting because
the incremental drift in beliefs can change direction as the action profile changes, which may
lead to a differential equation for the state variable that possesses no, two, or a continuum
of solutions. In contrast to Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), where the drift always has
the same sign, this problem cannot be remedied by the imposition of one-sided continuity
requirements and arises even if both players use cutoff strategies. It is therefore impossible to
define the set of a player’s admissible strategies without reference to his opponent’s strategy.1
We confront this problem by calling a pair of strategies admissible if there exists at least
one well-defined solution to the corresponding law of motion of our state variable. If there
are several solutions, we select the one that can be obtained as the limit of a discrete-time
approximation. We set both players’ payoffs to minus infinity on any strategy profile that
1More generally, this problem arises whenever the types of the two risky arms are neither independent
nor perfectly positively correlated. We will see this in the case of imperfect negative correlation below; cf.
the proof of Proposition 11. For the case of imperfect positive correlation, see our concluding remarks.
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is not admissible. A best response to the opponent’s strategy thus necessarily leads to
well-defined dynamics of beliefs and actions.
Before turning to the Markov perfect equilibria of the experimentation game with perfect
negative correlation, we characterize efficient behavior by solving the planner’s optimization
problem. When stakes (as measured by the payoff advantage of a good risky arm over a safe
one) are so low that there exist beliefs at which both players are below their single-agent
optimal thresholds, it is optimal for the planner to let either player apply his respective
single-agent threshold, so that they both behave as if they were experimenting on their own.
In particular, the planner stops all learning once the belief is in the range where both players
are below their single-agent cutoffs. This is efficient because experimentation on player 1’s
bandit, say, can never make the belief jump into a region where experimentation on player
2’s bandit became profitable. When stakes are higher, there exist beliefs at which both
players are above their single-agent cutoffs, and it is optimal for the planner to have both
players simultaneously use the risky arm at some beliefs. In this case, learning is complete,
meaning that posterior beliefs converge to the truth almost surely.
As our first main result, we show that there always exists an equilibrium where both
players use a cutoff strategy. Suppose for example that player 2 follows a cutoff strategy
and player 1’s best response has him play risky at a given belief. Then player 1’s learning
benefit from doing so must outweigh the opportunity costs. At more optimistic beliefs, the
opportunity costs of playing risky are even lower while the learning benefit is at least as high
because the opponent provides either the same amount of free information or less. It must
therefore be optimal for player 1 to play risky at more optimistic beliefs as well, and so he
must be playing a cutoff strategy himself.
If player 1’s optimal cutoff lies in the region where player 2 is playing safe, it must
coincide with the single-agent cutoff because the tradeoff faced by player 1 is exactly the
same as that faced by an agent experimenting in isolation. If player 1’s optimal cutoff lies in
the region where player 2 is playing risky, it must be the same as that applied by a myopic
agent who is just interested in the maximization of current payoffs. Indeed, when player 1
joins player 2 in playing risky, he freezes beliefs and actions until the random time when
the first breakthrough resolves all uncertainty, and his total expected payoff is linear in the
probabilities that he assigns to the two possible states of the world. If player 1 were now
offered the possibility of observing, for a short time interval and at no cost, the payoffs
generated by a replica of his own risky arm, he would be indifferent to the offer because
the resulting mean-preserving spread in beliefs would leave his expected continuation payoff
unchanged. Player 1 thus assigns zero value to the information he gathers when playing
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risky, so his decision to use the risky arm must maximize current payoffs.2
As the myopic cutoff belief is more optimistic than the single-agent cutoff, we obtain
three cases. When stakes are so low that there exist beliefs at which both players are below
their single-agent cutoffs, the unique equilibrium in cutoff strategies is for both players to
behave as if they were single agents. When stakes are so high that there exist beliefs at which
both players are above their myopic cutoffs, the unique equilibrium in cutoff strategies is
for both players to behave as if they were myopic. When stakes are intermediate in size,
finally, there exist beliefs at which either player finds himself in between his single-agent and
his myopic cutoff, and thus optimally plays risky if the opponent plays safe, and safe if the
opponent plays risky. Each such belief can then serve as the common threshold in an MPE
in cutoff strategies.
Our second contribution is a complete characterization of all Markov perfect equilibria of
the two-player game with perfect negative correlation. For low and high stakes, respectively,
the cutoff equilibrium just described is the unique MPE. We prove this by characterizing the
changes in the players’ action profile that may occur in equilibrium, and the beliefs at which
they may occur. Given that the players have dominant actions near subjective certainty (the
player who is very optimistic about his risky arm uses it, the other one plays safe), the proof
reduces to showing that as we vary the belief from one extreme of the state space to the
other, the respective cutoff equilibrium provides the only way for the players to transition
from one profile of dominant actions to the other.
For intermediate stakes, there exist equilibria that are not in cutoff strategies. Over the
range of beliefs where either player’s best response is to play the opposite of his opponent’s
action, it is possible for them to swap roles finitely often. Using the same approach as for low
and high stakes, we characterize the set of all equilibria and show that in every MPE that is
not in cutoff strategies, the players’ payoff functions necessarily have jump discontinuities.
These arise at each belief where players swap roles in a way that implies locally divergent
belief dynamics. Priors arbitrarily close to each other, but on different sides of such a belief
lead to very different paths of beliefs and actions, and hence to payoffs that are bounded
away from each other.
The third main result of the paper concerns the asymptotics of learning. In any MPE
of the two-player game with perfect negative correlation, the probability of learning the
true state in the long run is the same as in the planner’s solution. For low stakes, there is
nothing to show because the unique equilibrium coincides with the planner’s solution. For
2Intuitively, players cannot assign a negative value to public information when, as in the present model,
the only strategic link between them is a positive informational externality. They can do so when they also
exert a payoff externality on each other; see for example Harrington (1995) or Keller and Rady (2003).
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intermediate and high stakes, free-riding leads to an inefficiently small set of beliefs where
both players use the risky arm, yet learning is nevertheless complete in equilibrium, exactly
as the planner would have it. The intuition is straightforward. If players hold common
beliefs and there is perfect negative correlation between the types of the risky arms, it can
never be the case that both players are simultaneously very pessimistic about their respective
prospects; with stakes sufficiently high, this implies that at least one player must be using
the risky arm at any time, and so learning never stops. Thus, whenever society places a lot
of emphasis on uncovering the truth, as one may argue is the case with medical research or
the justice system, our analysis would suggest an adversarial setup was able to achieve this
goal.3
The existence of equilibria in cutoff strategies, the uniqueness of equilibrium for low and
high stakes, and the efficiency of long-run learning outcomes stand in stark contrast to the
case of perfect positive correlation analyzed in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). First, there is
no equilibrium in cutoff strategies when all risky arms are of the same type. It is easy to see
where the intuition given above fails. If player 2 follows a cutoff strategy and player 1’s best
response has him play risky at a given belief, then the learning benefit at more optimistic
beliefs can be lower because the opponent may provide more free information there. So
free-riding on this information may be the better choice.4 Second, the experimentation
game with identical risky arms admits a continuum of equilibria irrespective of the size
of the stakes involved. As the evolution of beliefs is determined by the total number of
risky arms used at a given time, one and the same equilibrium pattern of information can
in fact be generated via many different assignments of the roles of experimenter and free-
rider, respectively. Moreover, there is multiplicity with respect to these equilibrium patterns,
yielding a continuum of average payoff functions. Third, with experimentation stopping too
early, any MPE entails an inefficiently high probability of incomplete learning.
When the quality of the risky arm is perfectly negatively correlated across players, one
side’s failure to produce evidence in its favor means that the other side is more likely to do
so. However, in a lawsuit, for instance, there might not exist one single conclusive piece of
evidence which settled the case once and for all; in the drug development example, the disease
in question might be caused by a genetic defect rather than a virus or a bacterium. In a
second step, therefore, we extend the model to imperfect negative correlation by introducing
a third state of the world in which both risky arms are bad. When one side fails to produce
evidence in its favor, the increase in the other side’s individual optimism is now tempered
3Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) reach a similar conclusion in a moral hazard setting.
4More precisely, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) show that with two players, the player who is supposed
to use the least optimistic cutoff in a purported MPE in cutoff strategies always has an incentive to deviate
to the safe action at the other player’s cutoff belief.
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by an increase in collective pessimism, that is, an increase in the posterior probability that
both sides will remain unsuccessful.
With three states of the world, beliefs are elements of a two-dimensional simplex, and
the players’ payoff functions solve linear partial differential equations. Given a fixed action
profile, the trajectories of beliefs conditional on no breakthrough are straight lines in the
simplex. Along each such line, we can represent the corresponding payoff function in closed
form up to a constant of integration that varies with the slope of the line.
The fourth contribution of the paper is to show constructively that the game with
imperfect negative correlation always admits an equilibrium in cutoff strategies, and to
provide explicit representations for the players’ strategies and payoff functions. As there is
now a dimension of collective pessimism, the probability that learning remains incomplete
in the long run is always positive. In the equilibria that we construct, this probability is the
same as in the planner’s solution.
These insights carry over to a game with three players and common knowledge that
exactly one of them has a good risky arm. Again, there always exists an equilibrium in cutoff
strategies, and the resulting asymptotics of learning are the same as in the planner’s solution.
Moreover, two of our findings for the two-player game with perfect negative correlation
generalize to an arbitrary number of players: for sufficiently small stakes, players behave as
if they were single agents experimenting in isolation, which is efficient; and learning will be
complete in equilibrium if and only if efficiency requires complete learning.
The related literature on strategic experimentation with publicly observable actions and
outcomes has already been addressed. Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2007) and Murto and
Va¨lima¨ki (2009) study strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the players’
actions are publicly observable, but their payoffs are private information. These authors
assume that the decision to stop playing risky is irreversible. In our model, players can
freely switch back and forth between the two arms. Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2010) study a
model with private actions and publicly observable outcomes. Yet, theirs is more a model of
moral hazard in teams than an experimentation model, implying, inter alia, that no player
will ever play risky below his myopic cutoff.
There is a decision-theoretic literature on correlated bandits which analyzes correlation
across different arms of a bandit operated by a single agent; see e.g. Camargo (2007) for a
recent contribution to this literature, or Pastorino (2005) for economic applications. Our
focus here is quite different, though, in that we are concerned with correlation between
different bandits operated by two or more players who interact strategically.
Chatterjee and Evans (2004) analyze an R&D race with two firms and two projects in
9
which it is common knowledge that exactly one of these projects will bear fruit if pursued
long enough, and actions and payoffs are observable. Their discrete-time model differs from
ours in several respects, chief of which is the payoff externality implied by the firms’ choices.
In our model, there is no payoff rivalry between players – strategic interaction arises out
of purely informational concerns. Moreover, Chatterjee and Evans allow firms to change
their projects at any time, so that it is possible for them to explore the same project. Our
analysis, by contrast, presumes that projects of opposite type have been irrevocably assigned
to players at the start of the experimentation game.5 Finally, we allow for imperfect negative
correlation between project types.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the game with
two players and perfect negative correlation between the types of their risky arms. Section
3 solves the planner’s problem. Section 4 characterizes the Markov perfect equilibria of
the non-cooperative game, compares their learning outcomes and average payoffs to the
planner’s solution, and discusses robustness to the introduction of interior intensities of
experimentation, asymmetries between the two players and news events that are not fully
revealing. Section 5 constructs equilibria in the version of the game where the negative
correlation between the types of the two players’ risky arms is imperfect. Section 6 extends
the model to three or more players. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains auxiliary
results on payoff functions. Appendix B characterizes admissible strategy pairs in the game
with perfect negative correlation. Most proofs are provided in Appendix C.
2 The Model
There are two players, 1 and 2, either one of whom faces a two-armed bandit problem in
continuous time. Bandits are of the exponential type studied in Keller, Rady and Cripps
(2005). One arm is safe in that it yields a known payoff flow of s; the other arm is risky in
that it is either good or bad. If it is bad, it never yields any payoff; if it is good, it yields a
lump-sum payoff with probability λdt when used over a length of time dt.6 Let g dt denote
the corresponding expected payoff increment; thus, g is the product of the arrival rate λ
and the average size of a lump-sum payoff. To have an interesting problem, we assume that
the expected payoff of a good risky arm exceeds that of the safe arm, whereas the safe arm
5In the concluding remarks, we briefly report on an extension of our model in which players are given a
sequential once-and-for-all choice of bandit prior to the experimentation game.
6The assumption of a common arrival rate of successes on a good risky arm is crucial to the analytic
tractability of the model, while asymmetries in the other parameters are straightforward to accommodate;
see the discussion in Section 4.6 below.
10
is better than a bad risky arm, i.e. g > s > 0. The time-invariant constants λ > 0 and
g > 0 are common knowledge. Throughout Sections 2–4, we will further assume common
knowledge that exactly one bandit’s risky arm is good.
Player i = 1, 2 chooses actions {ki,t}t≥0 such that ki,t ∈ {0, 1} is measurable with
respect to the information available at time t, with ki,t = 1 indicating use of the risky
arm, and ki,t = 0 use of the safe arm. At the outset of the game, the players hold a
common prior belief about which of the risky arms is good, given by the probabilities with
which nature allocates the good risky arm to either player. Throughout the game, players
perfectly observe each other’s actions and payoffs, and so share a common posterior belief at
all times. We write pt for the players’ probability assessment at time t that player 1’s risky
arm is good. Player 1’s total expected discounted payoff, expressed in per-period units, can
then be written as
E
[∫ ∞
0
r e−r t [k1,tptg + (1− k1,t)s] dt
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the stochastic processes {k1,t} and {pt}, and r > 0 is
the players’ common discount rate. The corresponding payoff of player 2 is
E
[∫ ∞
0
r e−r t [k2,t(1− pt)g + (1− k2,t)s] dt
]
.
The strategic link between the players stems from the impact of their actions on the evolution
of beliefs.
The posterior belief jumps to 1 if there has been a breakthrough on player 1’s bandit,
and to 0 if there has been a breakthrough on player 2’s bandit, where in either case it will
remain ever after. If there has been no breakthrough on either bandit by time t given the
players’ actions {k1,τ}0≤τ≤t and {k2,τ}0≤τ≤t, Bayes’ rule yields
pt =
p0e
−λ
∫ t
0 k1,τ dτ
p0e
−λ
∫ t
0 k1,τ dτ + (1− p0)e
−λ
∫ t
0 k2,τ dτ
.
In particular, the posterior belief evolves continuously up to the time of the first break-
through.
We restrict players to stationary Markov strategies with the common belief as the state
variable and adopt the solution concept of Markov perfect equilibrium. As Markov strategies
of player i = 1, 2, we allow all functions ki : [0, 1] → {0, 1} such that both k
−1
i (0) and k
−1
i (1)
are disjoint unions of a finite number of non-degenerate intervals, with ki(0) = i − 1 and
ki(1) = 2 − i (the dominant actions under subjective certainty). A Markov strategy k1 for
player 1 is called a cutoff strategy with cutoff pˆ1 if k
−1
1 (1) = [pˆ1, 1] or ]pˆ1, 1]. Analogously,
11
a Markov strategy k2 for player 2 is a cutoff strategy with cutoff pˆ2 if k
−1
2 (1) = [0, pˆ2] or
[0, pˆ2[ . The action at the cutoff itself is deliberately left unspecified.
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A pair of Markov strategies (k1, k2) is called symmetric if k1(p) = k2(1−p) at all p. The
pair is called admissible if there exists at least one well-defined solution to the corresponding
law of motion for posterior beliefs. This is the case if and only if for each initial belief p0 in
the unit interval, there is a function t 7→ pt on [0,∞[ that satisfies
pt =
p0e
−λ
∫ t
0 k1(pτ ) dτ
p0e
−λ
∫ t
0 k1(pτ ) dτ + (1− p0)e
−λ
∫ t
0 k2(pτ ) dτ
(1)
at all t ≥ 0. This function then describes a possible time path of beliefs prior to the first
breakthrough on a risky arm. If there are multiple solutions, we select the unique solution
that is consistent with a discrete-time approximation; see Appendix B for details and a
characterization of admissible strategy pairs.8
Each admissible strategy pair (k1, k2) induces a pair of payoff functions u1, u2 : [0, 1] →
[0, g] given by
u1(p|k1, k2) = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
{
k1(pt)ptg + [1− k1(pt)]s
}
dt
∣∣∣∣ p0 = p
]
,
u2(p|k1, k2) = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
{
k2(pt)(1− pt)g + [1− k2(pt)]s
}
dt
∣∣∣∣ p0 = p
]
.
For strategy pairs that are not admissible, we set u1 ≡ u2 ≡ −∞.
Strategy k1 is a best response against strategy k2 if the pair of strategies (k1, k2) is
admissible and u1(p|k1, k2) ≥ u1(p|k˜1, k2) for all p in the unit interval and all admissible
(k˜1, k2). Analogously, strategy k2 is a best response against strategy k1 if (k1, k2) is admissible
and u2(p|k1, k2) ≥ u1(p|k1, k˜2) for all p in the unit interval and all admissible (k1, k˜2). A
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of strategies that are mutually best responses.
On any open interval of beliefs where an admissible pair of strategies (k1, k2) prescribes
constant actions, the posterior belief solves the ordinary differential equation
p˙ = λ [k2(p)− k1(p)] p (1− p) (2)
7We shall see later that there are circumstances where equilibrium requires the players to play safe at the
cutoff belief, and others where equilibrium requires them to play risky.
8If we allowed for degenerate intervals in the interior of the unit interval, there would exist equilibria for
low stakes in which one player would be forced (purely for reasons of admissibility of the strategy pair) to
play risky at a belief where his resulting payoff is less than the safe payoff s. For high stakes, there would
be equilibria in which an interval of beliefs where both players play risky (and achieve a payoff higher than
s) is punctuated by finitely many beliefs at which both play safe. Details are available from the authors
upon request. These equilibria cannot be obtained as limits of equilibria in discrete-time approximations of
the continuous-time game, so we rule them out by insisting that either action must be played on a union of
non-degenerate intervals.
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as long as there is no breakthrough. Since the expected arrival rate of a breakthrough is
k1(p)p λ on player 1’s risky arm, and k2(p)(1− p)λ on player 2’s, standard arguments imply
that player 1’s payoff function solves the ordinary differential equation
ru1(p) = r
{
k1(p)pg + [1− k1(p)]s
}
+ λ
{
k1(p) p [g − u1(p)] + k2(p) (1− p) [s− u1(p)] + [k2(p)− k1(p)] p (1− p)u
′
1(p)
}
on any open interval where the players’ actions do not change. After dividing both sides by
r, we can write this ODE more succinctly as
u1(p) = s + k2(p)β1(p, u1) + k1(p)[b1(p, u1)− c1(p)],
where c1(p) = s − pg is the opportunity cost player 1 has to bear when he plays risky,
b1(p, u1) =
λ
r
p[g − u1(p)− (1− p)u
′
1(p)] is the learning benefit accruing to player 1 when he
plays risky, and β1(p, u1) =
λ
r
(1 − p)[s − u1(p) + pu
′
1(p)] is his learning benefit from player
2’s playing risky. The corresponding equation for player 2’s payoff function is
u2(p) = s + k1(p)β2(p, u2) + k2(p)[b2(p, u2)− c2(p)],
where c2(p) = s− (1− p)g is the opportunity cost player 2 has to bear when he plays risky,
b2(p, u2) =
λ
r
(1− p)[g − u2(p) + pu
′
2(p)] is the learning benefit accruing to player 2 when he
plays risky, and β2(p, u2) =
λ
r
p[s − u2(p) − (1 − p)u
′
2(p)] is his learning benefit from player
1’s playing risky. It is straightforward to obtain closed-form solutions for these differential
equations; see Appendix A for details.
Given a Markov strategy kj of player j, standard arguments imply that on any open
interval where player j’s action is constant, player i’s payoff function from playing a best
response is once continuously differentiable9 and solves the Bellman equation
ui(p) = s + kj(p)βi(p, ui) + max
ki∈{0,1}
ki[bi(p, ui)− ci(p)].
Conversely, a standard verification argument yields the following sufficiency result. Given
the Markov strategy kj, consider the set S(kj) of all Markov strategies of player i that form
an admissible strategy pair with kj. For any belief p, let Ki(p, kj) = {ki(p) : ki ∈ S(kj)};
this is the set of all actions player i can choose at the belief p under the constraint that
his Markov strategy be admissible together with kj. At all those beliefs where player j’s
action does not change, Ki(p, kj) = {0, 1}. At a belief where player j’s action does change,
by contrast, Ki(p, kj) may be a singleton, in which case player i’s action is already pinned
9At a belief where the opponent’s action changes while the best response does not, the payoff function
from this best response typically has a kink. At a belief where both the opponent’s action and the best
response change, the payoff function may possess a jump discontinuity; see Proposition 7 below.
13
down by admissibility.10 Now, strategy ki ∈ S(kj) is a best response if the resulting payoff
function ui satisfies the modified Bellman equation
ui(p) = s + kj(p)βi(p, ui) + max
ki∈Ki(p, kj)
ki[bi(p, ui)− ci(p)]
everywhere on the unit interval. It is understood here that whenever the players’ actions
differ, the right-hand side is evaluated at the one-sided derivative in the direction of the
infinitesimal changes in beliefs implied by the respective strategy pair. When the players’
actions coincide, the terms involving derivatives cancel.
If players were myopic, i.e. merely maximizing current payoffs, player 1 would use the
cutoff pm = s
g
and player 2 the cutoff 1−pm. If they were forward-looking but experimenting
in isolation, player 1 would optimally use the single-agent cutoff computed in Keller, Rady
and Cripps (2005), p∗ = rs
(r+λ)g−λs
< pm, and player 2 the cutoff 1− p∗.
We will find it useful below to distinguish three cases depending on the size of the stakes
involved, i.e. on the value of information as measured by the ratio g
s
, and on the parameters
λ and r that govern the speed of resolution of uncertainty and the player’s impatience,
respectively. We speak of low stakes if g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
, intermediate stakes if 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
< 2, and
high stakes if g
s
> 2. These cases are easily distinguished by the positions of the cutoffs pm
and p∗: stakes are low if and only if p∗ > 1
2
; intermediate if and only if p∗ < 1
2
< pm; and high
if and only if pm < 1
2
. The boundary cases g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
and g
s
= 2 will be treated separately
when needed.
3 The Planner’s Problem
In this section, we examine a utilitarian social planner’s behavior in our setup. The Bellman
equation for the maximization of the average payoff from the two bandits is
u(p) = s + max
(k1,k2)∈{0,1}2
{
k1
[
B1(p, u)−
c1(p)
2
]
+ k2
[
B2(p, u)−
c2(p)
2
]}
,
where B1(p, u) =
λ
r
p[g+s
2
− u(p) − (1 − p)u′(p)] measures the expected learning benefit of
playing risky arm 1, and B2(p, u) =
λ
r
(1−p)[g+s
2
−u(p)+pu′(p)] the expected learning benefit
of playing risky arm 2. The planner’s problem is clearly symmetric with respect to p = 1
2
.
By standard arguments, the corresponding value function is convex; by symmetry, it admits
its global minimum at p = 1
2
.
10We will first encounter this phenomenon when determining best responses to cutoff strategies in Propo-
sition 3 below.
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If it is optimal to set k1 = k2 = 0, the value function works out as u(p) = s. If it is
optimal to set k1 = k2 = 1, the Bellman equation reduces to u(p) =
λ
r
[
g+s
2
− u(p)
]
+ g
2
, and
so u(p) = u11 =
g
2
+ λ
r+λ
s
2
. As one risky arm is good for sure, playing both of them is certain
to generate an expected average payoff of g
2
. At some random time τ , the first success on
the good risky arm causes the planner to switch to the safe arm on the other bandit; his
expected total payoff from that bandit is therefore s
2
times the expectation of e−rτ . As τ is
exponentially distributed with rate parameter λ, this expectation is λ
r+λ
. In the remaining
cases where it is optimal to set k1 = 0 and k2 = 1, or k1 = 1 and k2 = 0, explicit solutions of
the Bellman equation are obtained as the average of the individual payoff functions stated
in Appendix A.
It is clear that (k1, k2) = (1, 0) will be optimal in a neighborhood of p = 1, and (k1, k2) =
(0, 1) in a neighborhood of p = 0. What is optimal at beliefs around p = 1
2
depends on which
of the two possible plateaus s and u11 is higher. This in turn depends on the size of the
stakes involved. In fact, s > u11 if and only if stakes are low, i.e.
g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
. This is the case
we consider first.
Proposition 1 (Planner’s solution for low stakes) If g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
, and hence p∗ > 1
2
, the
planner’s optimum is to apply the single-agent cutoffs p∗ and 1− p∗, respectively, that is, to
set (k1, k2) = (0, 1) on [0, 1− p
∗[, k1 = k2 = 0 on [1− p
∗, p∗], and (k1, k2) = (1, 0) on ]p
∗, 1].
This solution remains optimal in the limiting case where g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
and p∗ = 1
2
.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Thus, when the value of information, as measured by g
s
, is so low that the single-agent
cutoff p∗ exceeds 1
2
, it is optimal for the planner to let the players behave as though they
were solving two separate, completely unconnected, problems.11 The left panel of Figure 1
illustrates the corresponding value function.
Next, we turn to the case where u11 > s, which is obtained for intermediate and high
stakes.
Proposition 2 (Planner’s solution for intermediate and high stakes) If g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
,
and hence p∗ < 1
2
, the planner’s optimum is to apply the cutoffs p¯ = (r+λ)s
(r+λ)g+λs
∈ ]p∗, 1
2
[ and
1 − p¯, respectively, that is, to set (k1, k2) = (0, 1) on [0, p¯[ , k1 = k2 = 1 on [p¯, 1 − p¯], and
11This would be different if playing the risky arm could also lead to “bad news events” that triggered
downward jumps in beliefs. If, starting from p∗, such a jump were large enough to take the belief below
1− p∗, then letting player 1 play risky at beliefs somewhat below p∗ would raise average payoffs.
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Figure 1: The planner’s value function for g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
(left panel) and g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
(right panel).
(k1, k2) = (1, 0) on ]1− p¯, 1]. This solution, with p¯ = p
∗ = 1
2
, remains optimal in the limiting
case where g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
.
Proof: It is straightforward to check that p∗ ≤ p¯ ≤ 1
2
if g
s
≥ 2r+λ
r+λ
. The rest of the proof
proceeds along the same lines as that of Proposition 1 and is therefore omitted.
The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates this result. To understand why the planner has
either player use the risky arm on a smaller interval of beliefs than in the respective single-
agent optimum, consider the effect of player 1’s action on the aggregate payoff when player
2 is playing risky. If the planner is indifferent between player 1’s actions at the belief p¯, it
must be the case that λ
r
p¯[g + s− 2u11] = c1(p¯), with the possibility of a jump in the sum of
the two players’ payoffs from 2u11 to g + s exactly compensating for the opportunity cost of
player 1 using the risky arm. For a player 1 experimenting in isolation, the corresponding
equation reads λ
r
p∗[g − s] = c1(p
∗). When u11 > s, the jump from s to g is larger than the
one from 2u11 to g + s, so we cannot have p¯ = p
∗. That p¯ must be greater than p∗ follows
from the fact that the opportunity cost of using player 1’s risky arm is decreasing in p.
4 Markov Perfect Equilibria
Our next aim is to characterize the Markov perfect equilibria of the experimentation game.
To start out, we shall establish that the best response to certain cutoff strategies is in turn
a cutoff strategy.
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To get a first intuition for the results to come, suppose player 2 follows a cutoff strategy
and player 1 plays a best response. If this response involves playing risky at some belief p,
then the expected benefit of player 1’s experimentation must outweigh its opportunity cost
at p. At a belief p′ > p, the opportunity cost is lower than at p and, since player 2 does
not provide more free information to player 1 at p′ than he does at p, the expected benefit
of player 1’s own experimentation should be at least as high as at p. So player 1 should
also play risky at the belief p′. Thus, k−11 (1) should be an interval with right boundary 1,
implying a cutoff strategy for player 1.
The following proposition confirms this intuition and characterizes best-response cutoffs.
Proposition 3 (Best responses to cutoff strategies) For player 1, a best response to
k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ2[ with pˆ2 ≤ p
∗ is k−11 (1) = ]p
∗, 1]; to k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ2] with pˆ2 ≥ p
m, it is
k−11 (1) = [p
m, 1]; and to k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ2] with p
∗ ≤ pˆ2 < p
m, it is k−11 (1) = [pˆ2, 1].
For player 2, a best response to k−11 (1) = ]pˆ1, 1] with pˆ1 ≥ 1− p
∗ is k−12 (1) = [0, 1− p
∗[ ;
to k−11 (1) = [pˆ1, 1] with pˆ1 ≤ 1 − p
m, it is k−12 (1) = [0, 1 − p
m]; and to k−11 (1) = [pˆ1, 1] with
1− pm < pˆ1 ≤ 1− p
∗, it is k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ1].
Proof: See Appendix C.
While it is intuitive that player 1 should apply the single-agent cutoff p∗ against an
opponent who plays safe, and thus provides no information, at beliefs p ≥ p∗, it is surprising
that the myopic cutoff pm determines player 1’s best response against an opponent who
plays risky. Technically, this result is due to the fact that along player 1’s payoff function
for k1 = k2 = 1, u1(p) = pg + (1− p)
λ
r+λ
s, his learning benefit from playing risky vanishes:
b1(p, u1) =
λ
r
p
[
g −
(
pg + (1− p)
λ
r + λ
s
)
− (1− p)
(
g −
λ
r + λ
s
)]
= 0,
and so k1 = 1 is optimal against k2 = 1 if and only if c1(p) ≤ 0, that is, p ≥ p
m.
Intuitively, this is best understood by recalling the law of motion of beliefs in the absence
of a success on either arm, p˙ = −(k1 − k2)λp(1− p), which tells us that for k1 = k2 = 1, the
state variable, and hence the players’ actions, will not budge until the first success occurs
and all uncertainty is resolved. Conditional on having the good risky arm, player 1 can thus
look forward to a total expected discounted payoff equal to g. Conditional on having the bad
risky arm, his total payoff equals s times the expectation of e−rτ where τ is the exponentially
distributed random time at which player 2 experiences his first success, causing player 1 to
switch to the safe arm irrevocably. Weighting each state with its subjective probability,
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we obtain a payoff function that is linear in p. This means that player 1 is risk neutral
with respect to lotteries over beliefs, so if he were offered the possibility of observing, for a
short time interval and at no cost, the payoffs generated by a replica of his own risky arm,
he would be indifferent to the offer, assigning zero value to this information because the
resulting mean-preserving spread in beliefs would leave his continuation payoff unchanged
on average. But if the value of information is zero, the decision to use the risky arm must
be myopically optimal.
This insight also explains the third part of the proposition. If player 2 uses a cutoff pˆ2
in between player 1’s single-agent cutoff p∗ and myopic cutoff pm, player 1 does not want
to play risky to the left of pˆ2 because doing so is not myopically optimal there. Just to the
right of pˆ2, by contrast, he faces an opponent playing safe, so he views the situation exactly
as a single agent experimenting in isolation would, and plays risky accordingly. Thus, player
1 uses the same cutoff as player 2. At pˆ2 itself, player 1’s behavior is pinned down by the
requirement that his action be part of an admissible strategy pair. If he played safe at pˆ2,
the incremental drift of the state variable p would be positive for p ≤ pˆ2, and negative for
p > pˆ2. As we show in Appendix B, there would then be no solution to the law of motion
of beliefs starting from the prior p0 = pˆ2. So player 1 can only use the risky arm at pˆ2, and
this action is indeed compatible with admissibility.
Using Proposition 3, it is straightforward to draw best-response correspondences in the
space of cutoff pairs (pˆ1, pˆ2) and characterize the resulting MPE in cutoff strategies. The
nature of these equilibria depends on the relative position of the cutoffs p∗, pm, 1 − p∗ and
1 − pm, which, as previously noted, gives us a distinction between low, intermediate, and
high stakes. We defer details to Propositions 4–6 below, each of which covers one of these
three cases. For the moment, we just take note of the following stark contrast to Keller,
Rady, Cripps (2005).
Corollary 1 (Equilibria in cutoff strategies) For any combination of the parameters g,
s, r, and λ, there exists an equilibrium in cutoff strategies.
When investigating whether there exist Markov perfect equilibria beyond those in cutoff
strategies, we shall make use of combinatoric arguments, exploiting the fact that for any
admissible pair of Markov strategies, there can be but finitely many beliefs at which a
change in action profile occurs. Appendix B characterizes the types and possible loci of
these changes, allowing us to determine all manners in which equilibrium play can transition
from the action profile (0, 1) at p = 0 to the profile (1, 0) at p = 1.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium payoff functions for g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
(left panel) and g
s
> 2 (right panel).
The thick solid curve depicts the payoff function of player 1, the thin solid curve that of
player 2, and the dotted curve the players’ average payoff function.
4.1 Low Stakes
Recall that the low-stakes case is defined by the inequality g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
. In this case, 1− pm <
1− p∗ < 1
2
< p∗ < pm.
Proposition 4 (Markov perfect equilibrium for low stakes) When g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
, the
unique Markov perfect equilibrium is symmetric and coincides with the planner’s solution.
That is, player 1 plays risky if and only if p > p∗, and player 2 if and only p < 1−p∗. These
strategies continue to be an equilibrium in the limiting case where g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
and p∗ = 1
2
.
Proof: For 1 − p∗ ≤ p∗, the cutoff strategies k−11 (1) = ]p
∗, 1] and k−12 (1) = [0, 1 − p
∗[ are
mutually best responses by Proposition 3. For 1−p∗ < p∗, uniqueness is proved in Appendix
C.
Why we should have efficiency in this case is intuitively quite clear, as the planner lets
players behave as though they were single players. As p∗ > 1
2
, there is no spillover from a
player behaving like a single agent on the other player’s optimization problem. Hence the
latter’s best response calls for behaving like a single player as well. Thus, there is no conflict
between social and private incentives. The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates this result.
19
4.2 High Stakes
The high-stakes case is defined by the inequality g
s
> 2. In this case, p∗ < pm < 1
2
< 1−pm <
1− p∗.
Proposition 5 (Markov perfect equilibrium for high stakes) When g
s
> 2, the game
has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium, which is symmetric and has both players behave
myopically. That is, player 1 plays risky if and only if p ≥ pm, and player 2 if and only if
p ≤ 1 − pm. These strategies also constitute the unique Markov perfect equilibrium in the
limiting case where g
s
= 2 and pm = 1
2
.
Proof: For pm ≤ 1− pm, the cutoff strategies k−11 (1) = [p
m, 1] and k−12 (1) = [0, 1− p
m] are
mutually best responses by Proposition 3. Uniqueness is proved in Appendix C.
When the stakes are high, the unique equilibrium calls for both players’ behaving my-
opically. This is best understood by recalling from our discussion above that individual
optimality calls for myopic behavior whenever one’s opponent is playing risky. When the
stakes are high, players’ myopic cutoff beliefs are more pessimistic than p = 1
2
, so the relevant
intervals overlap.
The right panel of Figure 2 illustrates this result. Player 1’s payoff function has a kink
at 1 − pm, where player 2 changes action. Symmetrically, player 2’s payoff function has a
kink at pm, where player 1 changes action. As a consequence, the average payoff function
has a kink both at pm and at 1− pm. That it dips below the level u11 close to these kinks is
evidence of the inefficiency of equilibrium.
4.3 Intermediate Stakes
This case is defined by the condition that 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
< 2, or p∗ < 1
2
< pm. Equilibrium is not
unique in this case; to start with, there is a continuum of equilibria in cutoff strategies, as
the following proposition shows.
Proposition 6 (Intermediate stakes, equilibria in cutoff strategies) For 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
<
2, there is a continuum of Markov perfect equilibria in cutoff strategies, each characterized
by a belief pˆ ∈ [max{1− pm, p∗},min{pm, 1− p∗}] such that player 1 plays risky if and only
if p ≥ pˆ, and player 2 if and only if p ≤ pˆ. These strategies, with pˆ = p∗ = 1
2
, continue to be
an equilibrium in the limiting case where g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium payoff functions for 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
< 2. The left panel shows the players’
payoff functions and their average in the unique symmetric equilibrium in cutoff strategies.
The right panel shows the payoff function of player 1 in an equilibrium that is not in cutoff
strategies (see the main text for further details).
Proof: For max{1 − pm, p∗} < pˆ < min{pm, 1 − p∗}, the cutoff strategies k−11 (1) = [pˆ, 1]
and k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ] are mutually best responses by Proposition 3.
Amongst the continuum of equilibria characterized in Proposition 6, there is a unique
symmetric one, given by pˆ = 1
2
. The left panel of Figure 3 illustrates this equilibrium.
Both players’ payoff functions and their average are kinked at p = 1
2
, where both players
change action. At any belief except p = 1
2
, the average payoff function is below the planner’s
solution; if the initial belief is p0 =
1
2
, however, the efficient average payoff u11 is achieved.
For the boundary case where g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
and p∗ = 1
2
, Propositions 4 and 6 imply that
both versions of the planner’s solution are Markov perfect equilibria. Applying the argu-
ments underlying the proof of Proposition 7 below, one easily shows that there are no other
equilibria in this particular case.
All the equilibria exhibited so far share three features: they are in cutoff strategies;
conditional on no breakthrough, posterior beliefs converge to a limit that varies continuously
with the initial belief (we will return to this point in Section 4.4 below); and the players’
payoff functions are continuous. For intermediate stakes, there exist further equilibria that
are not in cutoff strategies. In these, the limit to which beliefs converge in the absence of a
breakthrough depends discontinuously on the initial belief, and the players’ payoff functions
possess jump discontinuities. In combination with Proposition 6, the following result fully
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characterizes the set of Markov perfect equilibria for intermediate stakes.
Proposition 7 (Intermediate stakes, other equilibria) Let 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
< 2, and con-
sider a pair of Markov strategies that are not cutoff strategies. These strategies constitute
an equilibrium if and only if there exists an integer L ≥ 1 and beliefs pˆ(0) < p˜(1) < pˆ(1) <
. . . < pˆ(L−1) < p˜(L) < pˆ(L) in the interval [max{1 − p
m, p∗},min{pm, 1 − p∗}] such that: on
[0, pˆ(0)[ and all intervals ]p˜(ℓ), pˆ(ℓ)[ , the action profile is (0, 1); on all intervals ]pˆ(ℓ−1), p˜(ℓ)[
and ]pˆ(L), 1], the action profile is (1, 0); at all beliefs pˆ(ℓ), the action profile is (1, 1); and at
any belief p˜(ℓ), the action profile is (0, 1) or (1, 0). Both players’ payoff functions have jump
discontinuities at all beliefs p˜(ℓ).
Proof: On the interval [0, p˜(1)[ , the players’ actions and payoffs are the same as in an
equilibrium in cutoff strategies with pˆ = pˆ(0). The same is true for each of the intervals
]p˜(ℓ), p˜(ℓ+1)[ (with pˆ = pˆ(ℓ)) and ]p˜(L), 1] (with pˆ = pˆ(L)). So one only has to verify the mutual
best-response property at the beliefs p˜(ℓ). This is done in Appendix C. We also show there
that payoffs are discontinuous at these beliefs, and that there are no other equilibria.
The right panel of Figure 3 illustrates player 1’s payoff function in an equilibrium with
L = 1. The solid curve is u1, and the dashed line the payoff w1 that player 1 would get if both
players played risky. The dotted curve starting in the lower left corner is the payoff player
1 would receive in a cutoff equilibrium with pˆ = pˆ(0), and the dotted curve starting in the
upper right corner the payoff he would obtain in a cutoff equilibrium with pˆ = pˆ(1). Between
pˆ(0) and p˜(1), beliefs drift downwards as only player 1 plays risky, and they will converge
to pˆ(0) in finite time unless there is a breakthrough on player 1’s risky arm. Between p˜(1)
and pˆ(1), beliefs drift upwards as only player 2 plays risky, and they will converge to pˆ(1) in
finite time unless there is a breakthrough on player 2’s risky arm. Initial beliefs p˜(1) − ǫ and
p˜(1) + ǫ thus imply very different paths of beliefs and actions. As a consequence, payoffs are
discontinuous at p˜(1).
4.4 Asymptotics and Speed of Learning
When stakes are low and players use their single-agent cutoff strategies, the evolution of the
posterior belief in the absence of a success on a risky arm is governed by
p˙ =


λp(1− p) if p < 1− p∗,
0 if 1− p∗ ≤ p ≤ p∗,
−λp(1− p) if p > p∗.
(3)
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The asymptotics of the learning process depend both on the true state of the world and the
initial belief. Let us suppose, for example, that risky arm 1 is good. If the initial belief
p0 is lower than 1 − p
∗, the posterior belief will converge to 1 − p∗ with probability 1 as
there cannot be a breakthrough on risky arm 2. If 1 − p∗ ≤ p0 ≤ p
∗, the belief will remain
unchanged at p0 forever. If p0 > p
∗, the belief will converge either to 1 or to p∗. If t∗ is the
length of time needed for the belief to reach p∗ conditional on there not being a breakthrough
on risky arm 1, the probability that the belief will converge to p∗ is e−λt
∗
. By Bayes’ rule, we
have 1−pt
pt
= 1−p0
p0e−λt
in the absence of a breakthrough, and so e−λt
∗
= 1−p0
p0
p∗
1−p∗
. The belief will
therefore converge to p∗ with probability 1−p0
p0
p∗
1−p∗
, and to 1 with the counter-probability.
Analogous results hold when risky arm 2 is good. For low stakes, therefore, the unique (and
efficient) MPE always entails a positive probability for learning to remain incomplete in the
long run, that is, for the process of posterior beliefs to converge to a limit that assigns a
positive probability to the false state of the world.
When stakes are high, the equilibrium dynamics of beliefs conditional on there not being
a breakthrough are given by
p˙ =


λp(1− p) if p < pm,
0 if pm ≤ p ≤ 1− pm,
−λp(1− p) if p > 1− pm.
(4)
Players shut down incremental learning on the interval [pm, 1 − pm]. Yet they still learn
the true state with probability 1 in the long run because once this interval is reached, both
players use their risky arm until the first success resolves all uncertainty.
When stakes are intermediate and the equilibrium is in cutoff strategies with common
cutoff pˆ, the dynamics are
p˙ =


λp(1− p) if p ∈< pˆ,
0 if p = pˆ,
−λp(1− p) if p > pˆ,
(5)
and players learn the true state with probability 1 in the long run because both play risky
at pˆ. When the equilibrium is not in cutoff strategies, p˙ > 0 on [0, pˆ(0)[ and all intervals
]p˜(ℓ), pˆ(ℓ)[ and possibly at some of the beliefs p˜(ℓ). Similarly, p˙ < 0 on all intervals ]pˆ(ℓ−1), p˜(ℓ)[
and ]pˆ(L), 1] and at the remaining beliefs p˜(ℓ). Finally, p˙ = 0 at all beliefs pˆ(ℓ). Starting from
any prior, therefore, the dynamics conditional on no breakthrough imply convergence in
finite time to some pˆ(ℓ), and as both players play risky there, learning will once more be
complete.
For intermediate and high stakes, learning will thus always be complete in equilibrium,
exactly as it would be in the planner’s solution for which (4) applies with pm and 1 − pm
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replaced by the cutoffs p¯ and 1− p¯, respectively.
We summarize these findings in
Proposition 8 (Asymptotics of learning) In any Markov perfect equilibrium of the ex-
perimentation game, the probability of learning the true state of the world as t → ∞ is the
same as in the planner’s solution. It is smaller than 1 (incomplete learning) for g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
,
and equal to 1 (complete learning) for g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
. For g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
, both complete and incomplete
learning are consistent with efficiency, and both can arise in equilibrium.
Note that these asymptotics only depend on the position of the single-agent cutoffs.
Intuitively, for both players to play safe, neither of them can be more optimistic than his
single-agent cutoff. At any belief in the set [0, 1− p∗[ ∪ ]p∗, 1], therefore, at least one player
must play risky and thus keep the learning process alive. This set is the entire unit interval
if and only if p∗ < 1
2
, that is, g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
.
In Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), where players face risky arms of a common type,
any Markov perfect equilibrium implies an inefficiently small probability of learning the true
state in the long run. As all players become gradually more pessimistic, the incentive to
free-ride makes them give up experimentation earlier than in the planner’s solution. With
risky arms of opposite type, by contrast, it can never be the case that both players are
simultaneously very pessimistic about their individual prospects. Whenever the stakes are
so high that the planner would want both players to experiment at a given belief, therefore,
at least one player is willing to experiment on his own at this belief. Free-riding incentives
can then delay the resolution of uncertainty relative to the social optimum, but not prevent
it. The following proposition derives an upper bound on the expected delay.
Proposition 9 (Speed of learning) For g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
and any initial belief, there exists a
Markov perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies such that the expected delay in the resolution
of uncertainty is less than 1
3
of the expected time by which all uncertainty is resolved in the
planner’s solution.
Proof: See Appendix C.
As we shall see next, the optimality of long-run learning outcomes and the short expected
delay in the resolution of uncertainty are reflected in surprisingly good welfare properties of
the Markov perfect equilibria.
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4.5 Welfare
When stakes are low, the unique MPE has players use their single-agent cutoffs, which
is efficient. For intermediate stakes, an efficient equilibrium outcome can be achieved with
cutoff strategies if and only if the interval of possible equilibrium cutoffs given in Proposition
6 contains the efficient cutoff.
It is straightforward to verify that 1−pm ≤ p¯ and hence max{p∗, 1−pm} ≤ p¯ < 1− p¯ ≤
min{pm, 1− p∗} if 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
≤ 2r+λ
2(r+λ)
+
√
(2r+λ)2
4(r+λ)2
+ λ
r+λ
. Then, if the players’ initial belief is
p0 ≤ p¯, the equilibrium with cutoff pˆ = p¯ achieves the efficient outcome as the only beliefs
that are reached with positive probability under the equilibrium strategies are given by the
set {0, 1}∪ [p0, p¯], and the equilibrium strategies prescribe the efficient actions at all of these
beliefs. Similarly, for p0 ≥ 1 − p¯, the efficient outcome is achieved by the equilibrium with
cutoff pˆ = 1−p¯. Finally, if p¯ < p0 < 1−p¯, the efficient outcome is achieved by the equilibrium
with cutoff pˆ = p0. If
2r+λ
2(r+λ)
+
√
(2r+λ)2
4(r+λ)2
+ λ
r+λ
< g
s
< 2, by contrast, we have p∗ < p¯ < 1−pm
and hence p¯ < max{p∗, 1−pm} < min{pm, 1−p∗} < 1− p¯. In this case, the efficient outcome
can only be achieved for initial beliefs p0 ∈ {0} ∪ [1− p
m, pm] ∪ {1}.
If stakes are high, the unique MPE implies efficient behavior except on the set [p¯, pm[ ∪ ]1−
pm, 1− p¯]. In this case, the efficient outcome arises if and only if p0 ∈ {0}∪ [p
m, 1−pm]∪{1}.
Proposition 10 (Welfare) If g
s
≤ 2r+λ
2(r+λ)
+
√
(2r+λ)2
4(r+λ)2
+ λ
r+λ
, then for each initial belief, there
exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies that achieves the efficient outcome.
If g
s
> 2r+λ
2(r+λ)
+
√
(2r+λ)2
4(r+λ)2
+ λ
r+λ
, there are initial beliefs under which the efficient outcome
cannot be reached in any Markov perfect equilibrium. For any such belief p, there exists an
equilibrium in cutoff strategies such that
u(p)− s
u¯(p)− s
>
1
2
,
where u(p) and u¯(p) are the players’ average payoffs in the equilibrium and the planner’s
solution, respectively.
Proof: The first two statements of the proposition follow directly from the preceding dis-
cussion. The lower bound on average payoffs is established in Appendix C.
The stated lower bound is straightforward to derive from the closed-form solutions for
the players’ payoff functions. This bound is by no means tight, however. In fact, a numerical
evaluation on a grid of pairs ( r
λ
, g
s
) suggests that for 0 < r
λ
≤ 10 and 1 < g
s
≤ 10, there
always exists an MPE in cutoff strategies for which the above ratio exceeds 86%. To put
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this number in perspective, it is worthwhile recalling from Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005)
that in any Markov perfect equilibrium of the experimentation game with risky arms of a
common type, there is a range of beliefs at which all players play safe while the planner
would want all of them to play risky. At these beliefs, the above ratio is zero.
4.6 Discussion
We have restricted attention to what in the literature have been termed “pure strategy
equilibria” (by Bolton and Harris, 1999 and 2000) or “simple equilibria” (by Keller, Rady
and Cripps, 2005, and Keller and Rady, 2010). An extension of the strategy space allowing
players to choose experimentation intensities from the entire unit interval would leave the
planner’s solution unchanged. Moreover, as the intensity of experimentation enters linearly
into a player’s Bellman equation, our simple equilibria are immune against deviations to
interior intensities.
While we have assumed that players are symmetric, it is straightforward to extend our
analysis to those asymmetries between players that preserve a zero value of information when
both players use the risky arm. This is the case if players differ in their discount rates, safe
payoff levels or average sizes of lump-sum payoffs on a good risky arm. If p∗ continues to
denote player 1’s single-agent cutoff, player 2’s single-agent optimum is then to play risky
on an interval [0, q∗[ with q∗ 6= 1 − p∗; similarly, the players’ myopic cutoffs will satisfy
qm 6= 1 − pm whenever players face different stakes. As all that matters for the planner’s
solution, best responses and equilibrium is the relative position of the four cutoffs, all our
results extend readily, the only difference being that typically there will be no symmetric
equilibrium.
Matters become more complicated if player 1, say, has a higher innate ‘ability’ than
player 2, i.e. if the risky arms are characterized by arrival rates λ1 > λ2. In this case, beliefs
satisfy p˙ = [λ2k2(p) − λ1k1(p)] p (1 − p) up to the first breakthrough, which has two major
implications. First, at any transition between the action profiles (0, 1) and (1, 1), player 1
must use the interior intensity of experimentation k1 = λ2/λ1 both in the planner’s solution
and when playing a best response. As in Presman (1990), such an interior allocation is
the only way to obtain a well-defined law of motion for beliefs, and we must broaden our
definition of cutoff strategies accordingly. Second, on any interval of beliefs where both
players use the risky arm, p˙ < 0, which leads to convex payoff functions. So the value of
information is positive and the best response against the opponent’s playing risky is given
by a threshold belief more pessimistic than the myopic cutoff.
If players differ only in the arrival rates of lump-sum payoffs, for example, player 1’s best
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response against player 2’s playing risky is to apply the cutoff pˆ1 =
(r+λ2)s
(r+λ1)λ1h−(λ1−λ2)s
< pm
which is pinned down by smooth pasting of player 1’s payoff function with the linear lower
bound obtained from the constant action profile (λ2/λ1, 1). In the high-stakes scenario
where player 2 plays risky to the right of pˆ1, his best response must then be determined
via an intermediate-value argument that enforces smooth pasting, at a cutoff pˆ2, between
the two functions that describe player 2’s payoffs from the action profiles (1, 1) and (1, 0),
respectively; pˆ2 no longer admits a representation in closed form.
12 Still, it is straightforward
to establish uniqueness and efficiency of Markov perfect equilibrium as well as incomplete
learning for low stakes, and complete learning for intermediate and high stakes.
The same holds true for an extension of our model where, as in Keller and Rady (2010),
even a bad risky arm has a non-zero arrival rate of lump-sum payoffs, implying that when-
ever a risky arm generates a success, beliefs about the quality of this arm jump up to a more
optimistic level, but never to full certainty. Consequently, payoff functions solve differential-
difference equations. These still admit closed-form solutions, yet it is now much harder to
paste them together at those beliefs where the action profile changes. When both players use
the risky arm, for instance, the continuation payoffs after both an upward and a downward
jump of beliefs enter the Bellman equation, so an optimal change of action must be deter-
mined jointly with these continuation payoffs. This yields nonlinear equations for optimal
cutoffs without explicit solutions. As to possible equilibria for intermediate and high stakes,
the best response to an opponent using the risky arm again differs from the myopic cutoff
strategy. This is because the belief held immediately after a success varies with the belief
held immediately before, so that expected payoffs conditional on the true state are no longer
constant over the range of beliefs where both players play risky, once more leading to convex
payoff functions and a positive value of information.
5 Imperfect Negative Correlation
We now extend our model by introducing a third state of the world in which both risky
arms are bad. This means that the quality of the risky arm is no longer perfectly negatively
correlated across players, and introduces a dimension of collective pessimism into the game,
captured by the posterior probability that neither player has a good risky arm.
There are two players, i = 1, 2, and three states, θ = 0, 1, 2, where θ = i ∈ {1, 2}
signifies that player i has the only good risky arm, while θ = 0 means that both risky
12Details on the extensions discussed in this paragraph and the next are available from the authors upon
request.
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arms are bad. This structure is common knowledge. We write pθ for the common posterior
probability assigned to state θ, and use the pair (p1, p2) as the vector of state variables. The
(subjective) correlation coefficient between the types of the two risky arms is
ρ = −
√
p1
1− p1
p2
1− p2
,
which can assume any value in the interval [−1, 0].
Given time paths of actions {ki,τ}0≤τ≤t for i = 1, 2 and no breakthrough by time t, the
posterior beliefs at time t are
pi,t =
pi,0 e
−λ
∫ t
0 ki,τ dτ
1− p1,0 − p2,0 +
∑2
j=1 pj,0 e
−λ
∫ t
0 kj,τ dτ
(i = 1, 2).
The corresponding differential equations are
p˙i = λpi
(
2∑
j=1
pjkj − ki
)
(i = 1, 2).
We note that over any time interval where the action profile (k1, k2) = (1, 1) is played without
a success, the ratio p2
p1
stays constant and the beliefs (p1, p2) move towards the origin along
a straight line, expressing an increase in collective pessimism. Under the action profile
(1, 0), the ratio p2
1−p1−p2
stays constant and the beliefs (p1, p2) move along a straight line
p2 = C (1− p1) with a positive constant C < 1, expressing increases in player 1’s individual
pessimism, player 2’s individual optimism, and both players’ collective pessimism.
Writing P = {(p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : p1 + p2 ≤ 1}, we restrict players to Markov strategies
ki : P → [0, 1] with the following properties: (i) the sets k
−1
i (0) and k
−1
i (1) each have a
connected interior in P ; (ii) the union of the closures of k−1i (0) and k
−1
i (1) is P; (iii) the
intersection of the closures of k−1i (0) and k
−1
i (1) consists of a finite number of differentiable
curves; (iv) along each of these curves, ki varies continuously with beliefs; (v) ki(p1, p2) = 0
if pi = 0, and ki(p1, p2) = 1 if pi = 1. A Markov strategy ki is called a cutoff strategy if
there exists a continuous and piecewise differentiable function hi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that
ki(p1, p2) = 1 for pi > hi(p3−i) and ki(p1, p2) = 0 for pi < hi(p3−i). This function merely
defines the switching boundary where a player changes from one action to the other. The
behavior along the boundary needs to be specified separately so as to ensure a well-defined
evolution of beliefs. In some cases, this will require interior intensities of experimentation.
A pair of Markov strategies is called symmetric if k1(p, q) = k2(q, p) for all (p, q) ∈ P .
For cutoff strategies, symmetry means h1 = h2. The definition of admissibility is analogous
to the benchmark model of perfect negative correlation.
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Player i’s Bellman equation is
ui(p1, p2) = s + k3−i(p1, p2)βi(p1, p2, ui) + max
ki∈[0,1]
ki [bi(p1, p2, ui)− ci(pi)] ,
where bi(p1, p2, ui) =
λ
r
pi[g − ui − (1− pi)
∂ui
∂pi
+ p3−i
∂ui
∂p3−i
], βi(p1, p2, ui) =
λ
r
p3−i[s− ui − (1−
p3−i)
∂ui
∂p3−i
+pi
∂ui
∂pi
] and ci(pi) = s−pig. In Appendix A.3, we use the method of characteristic
curves to derive explicit expressions for the players’ payoffs from the action profiles (1, 1),
(1, 0) and (0, 1). This allows us to derive the following result.
Proposition 11 (Imperfect correlation) There always exists a symmetric Markov per-
fect equilibrium in cutoff strategies.
Proof: The proof is by construction; see the specification of equilibrium strategies below
and the verification of the best-response property in Appendix C.
For g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
, and hence p∗ ≥ 1
2
, the common equilibrium cutoff can be taken to be
constant and equal to the single-agent cutoff p∗, with either player playing safe at the cutoff
itself. This equilibrium is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4, with the labels “00”, “01”
and “10” standing for the action profiles (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 0), respectively. The intuition
for this equilibrium carries over from the case of perfect negative correlation.
For 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
≤ 2, and hence p∗ < 1
2
≤ pm, equilibrium cutoffs can be defined by
the function h(p) = max{p∗, p }. Along the switching boundary, player i plays safe when
pi = p
∗ ≥ p3−i and risky when pi = p3−i > p
∗. This equilibrium is illustrated in the middle
panel of Figure 4. Fix a prior in the interior of the 10 region. If this prior lies below the line
joining the belief (p∗, p∗) with the belief (1, 0), player 1 plays risky until either a breakthrough
occurs or beliefs reach the vertical segment {p∗} × [0, p∗], where player 1 gives up and all
learning stops. In this scenario, the increase in player 2’s optimism as player 1 fails to have
a breakthrough is not enough to entice him to experiment himself. This is different if the
prior lies above the line joining the belief (p∗, p∗) with the belief (1, 0). In the absence of a
breakthrough on player 1’s risky arm, beliefs now move to the 45 degree line, where player 2
joins player 1 in playing risky. From that point on, beliefs move down the 45 degree line and,
in the absence of a breakthrough, become stationary in the point (p∗, p∗) where both players
play safe. Along the part of the 45 degree line where both players play risky, their payoff
functions are kinked and the best-response property follows from the restrictions imposed by
admissibility of the players’ strategies, exactly as in the symmetric MPE in cutoff strategies
under perfect negative correlation (corresponding to the upper right edge of the triangle).
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Figure 4: Cutoff equilibria of the experimentation game with imperfect negative correlation
between the types of the risky arms.
For g
s
> 2, and hence pm < 1
2
, we define p˜ = rs
(r+λ)g−2λs
, which lies between p∗ and pm.
An equilibrium cutoff function is then given by h(p) = max{p∗, p } for p ≤ p˜, and
h(p) =
(r + λp)s
(r + λ)g − λs
for p > p˜. As to the actions chosen along the switching boundary, player i plays safe when
pi = p
∗ ≥ p3−i, plays risky when p
∗ < pi = p3−i ≤ p˜, and sets
ki =
(r + λ)g − λs
g − s
p3−i
r + λp3−i
when pi = h(p3−i) > p˜. This equilibrium is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4. As we
move down along player 2’s switching boundary from the belief (1 − pm, pm) to the belief
(p˜, p˜), player 2’s intensity of experimentation monotonically falls from 1 to s
g−s
.13 This
interior intensity is precisely the one that keeps posterior beliefs on the boundary as long as
no breakthrough occurs. The boundary itself is pinned down by the requirement that given
k1 = 1, player 2 must have b2 > c2 above the boundary and b2 < c2 below it.
14 Once a belief
on the diagonal line segment between (p∗, p∗) and (p˜, p˜) is reached, the evolution of beliefs
and actions is the same as in the MPE for intermediate stakes.
For low stakes, the equilibrium described above is efficient. For intermediate and high
stakes, the planner’s solution is given by the cutoff function
h(p) = max
{
p∗,
(r + λp)s
(r + λ)g
}
.
13In this and the following figure, boundaries along which some player uses an interior intensity of exper-
imentation are shown as dashed lines.
14See Lemmas A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
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The increasing part of player 2’s efficient switching boundary is thus a straight line joining the
beliefs (p∗, p∗) and (1− p¯, p¯), where p¯ is the efficient cutoff for perfect negative correlation.15
For intermediate and high stakes, therefore, the equilibria that we constructed are inefficient
in that the set of beliefs at which both players use the risky arm is smaller than in the
planner’s solution. The set of beliefs at which learning stops is the same as in the planner’s
solution, though. This yields the following counterpart to Proposition 8.
Proposition 12 (Imperfect correlation, asymptotics of learning) There always exists
a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the probability of learning the true state of the world
as t→∞ is the same as in the planner’s solution.
Proof: As the equilibrium constructed for g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
is efficient, we can assume that g
s
>
2r+λ
r+λ
and hence p∗ < 1
2
. By symmetry of the planner’s solution and the above equilibria
in cutoff strategies, we can restrict ourselves to initial beliefs (p1,0, p2,0) with p1,0 ≥ p2,0.
By Proposition 8, we can further assume that p1,0 + p2,0 < 1. If this initial belief satisfies
p1,0 ≤ p
∗ or p2,0 ≤
p∗
1−p∗
(1−p1,0), the equilibrium outcome is the same as the efficient outcome.
Suppose therefore that p1,0 > p
∗ and p2,0 >
p∗
1−p∗
(1− p1,0). In the absence of a breakthrough,
both the efficient and the equilibrium paths of play then lead to the posterior belief (p∗, p∗)
in finite time.
Consider any time paths of actions {ki,τ}0≤τ≤t for i = 1, 2 that in the absence of a
breakthrough lead to the belief (p∗, p∗) by time t. Bayes’ law then implies
p∗ =
pi,0 e
−λ
∫ t
0 ki,τ dτ
1− p1,0 − p2,0 +
∑2
j=1 pj,0 e
−λ
∫ t
0 kj,τ dτ
for i = 1, 2. This is a system of two linear equations in Pi = e
−λ
∫ t
0 ki,τ dτ that is easily seen to
have a unique solution (P1, P2) for p
∗ 6= 1
2
. As Pi is the probability of no breakthrough on
player i’s risky arm up to time t conditional on this arm being good, the efficient and the
equilibrium paths of play imply the same conditional probability of a breakthrough before
all learning stops, and hence the same conditional probability of learning the true state.
As in the case of perfect negative correlation, therefore, strategic interaction between
the players need not lead to an inefficiently high probability of incomplete learning.
15The derivation of the planner’s solution is very similar to the construction of the high-stakes MPE, and
can be based on straightforward adaptations of Lemmas A.2 and A.3.
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6 More Than Two Players
The last extension that we explore has N ≥ 3 players, i = 1, . . . , N , each playing a bandit
of the exponential type. It is common knowledge that exactly one of them has a good risky
arm. We write pi for the common posterior probability that player i’s risky arm is the good
one.
The three-player case is easiest to visualize, and its analysis very similar to that of the
two-player game with imperfect negative correlation, so we focus on this case, returning to
general N only briefly at the end of the section. With N = 3, we can again use the pair
(p1, p2) as the vector of state variables. Markov and cutoff strategies can be defined along
the same lines as in the previous section.
Player i’s Bellman equation is now
ui(p1, p2) = s +
∑
j 6=i
kjβij(p1, p2, ui) + max
ki∈{0,1}
ki[bi(p1, p2, ui)− ci(p1, p2)].
Here, the learning benefits from a player’s own experimentation are bi(p1, p2, ui) =
λ
r
pi[g−ui−
(1− pi)
∂ui
∂pi
+ p3−i
∂ui
∂p3−i
] for i = 1, 2 and b3(p1, p2, u3) =
λ
r
(1− p1− p2)[g− u3 + p1
∂u3
∂p1
+ p2
∂u3
∂p2
].
The learning benefits that accrue to player i when player j 6= i uses the risky arm are
βij(p1, p2, ui) =
λ
r
pj[s − ui − (1 − pj)
∂ui
∂pj
+ p3−j
∂ui
∂p3−j
] for j = 1, 2 and βi3(p1, p2, ui) =
λ
r
(1 −
p1−p2)[s−ui+p1
∂ui
∂p1
+p2
∂ui
∂p2
]. The opportunity costs of experimentation are ci(p1, p2) = s−pig
for i = 1, 2, and c3(p1, p2) = s− (1− p1 − p2)g.
If the prevailing action profile is (0, 0, 0), each player’s payoff function equals ui = s. If
(1, 1, 1) prevails, the payoff functions are linear, exactly as in the two-player model: ui =
pig + (1− pi)
λ
r+λ
s. Explicit expressions for the players’ payoffs from all other action profiles
can again be derived as in Appendix A.3. An equilibrium transition between the action
profiles (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0) is easily seen to require p1 = p
∗, while a transition between
(1, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 1) requires p1 = p
m; the intuition for these findings is exactly the same as
in the two-player model with perfect negative correlation.
For g
s
< 3r+λ
r+λ
, and hence p∗ > 1
3
, the equilibria that we constructed for the two-player
game with imperfect negative correlation translate one-to-one into equilibria of the three-
player game. To see this, consider the triangle T with the corners (1
3
, 1
3
), (1
2
, 1
2
) and (1, 0)
in the (p1, p2)-plane; in the three-player game, this corresponds to the set of all beliefs such
that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3. On T , let players 1 and 2 play the same strategies as in the two-player
MPE constructed in the previous section, and let player 3 play safe. Given a prior belief in
T , posterior beliefs then remain in T unless there is a success on player 1’s or, if he gets
to experiment at all, player 2’s risky arm. As player 3 never experiments, players 1 and 2
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are facing exactly the same situation as in a two-player game between them, and thus are
playing best responses. Player 3’s payoff on T is u3 = s, so b3 < c3 if and only if p3 < p
∗,
which is obviously the case here because the inequalities p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3 imply p3 ≤
1
3
. There
is now a unique way to extend the players’ strategies on T to a symmetric strategy profile
on the entire state space; this strategy profile clearly constitutes an equilibrium.
For the following proposition, therefore, only parameter constellations such that g
s
≥
3r+λ
r+λ
, and hence p∗ ≤ 1
3
, require further work.
Proposition 13 (Three players) There always exists a symmetric Markov perfect equi-
librium in cutoff strategies.
Proof: The proof is again by construction. Equilibrium strategies for g
s
≥ 3r+λ
r+λ
are illus-
trated in Figure 5 below. The verification of the best-response property proceeds along the
same lines as in the proof of Proposition 11. Details are available from the authors upon
request.
Figure 5 illustrates equilibrium strategies in the four cases that need to be distinguished
when p∗ ≤ 1
3
. To emphasize the symmetry of these equilibria, beliefs are represented as
elements of a standard 2-simplex. Its vertices correspond to the three possible degenerate
beliefs about the state of the world; the vertex marked “1”, for instance, corresponds to
subjective certainty that player 1 has the good risky arm. The probability pi that player
i has the good risky arm is constant along any line running parallel to the edge that lies
opposite vertex “i”.
In each of the four panels of Figure 5, all players use the risky arm at the center of the
simplex, where p1 = p2 = p3 =
1
3
. When g
s
≤ 3, and hence pm ≥ 1
3
, this is the only belief
at which the action profile (1, 1, 1) is played; when g
s
> 3, and hence pm < 1
3
, this profile is
played at all beliefs such that min{p1, p2, p3} ≥ p
m.
As to the solid lines that end in the center of the simplex in the upper two panels of
Figure 5, the two players who experiment individually on either side of such a line, experiment
jointly along it. In the lower left panel, the action profile along any such line is the same
as in the region from where the line emanates, so that just one player experiments along it.
The same goes, in the lower right panel, for the solid lines ending in the triangle where the
profile (1, 1, 1) is played. In each case, the verification of the best-response property along a
solid line rests on restrictions imposed by admissibility of the players’ strategies.
The dashed lines in the upper right and the two lower panels are switching boundaries
of exactly the same type as in the high-stakes MPE of the two-player game with imperfect
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Figure 5: Cutoff equilibria of the experimentation game with three players when p∗ ≤ 1
3
.
negative correlation. The player who plays safe on one side of the boundary, and risky on
the other, chooses an interior intensity of experimentation at the boundary itself, making
posterior beliefs move along it as long as no breakthrough occurs.
Clearly, learning will be complete in any of the equilibria depicted in Figure 5. For
p∗ ≤ 1
3
, complete learning is also efficient because the action profile (1, 1, 1) weakly dominates
the profile (0, 0, 0) in terms of the three players’ expected average payoff, so the planner has
no reason ever to stop learning. For p∗ > 1
3
, we can exploit symmetry of our equilibria as well
as of the planner’s solution and restrict our attention to beliefs in the set T defined above.
On this set, the planner asks player 3 to use the safe arm, and players 1 and 2 to follow
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the strategies that are efficient in the two-player game with imperfect negative correlation.
Invoking Proposition 12, we thus obtain
Proposition 14 (Three players, asymptotics of learning) There always exists a Markov
perfect equilibrium in which the probability of learning the true state of the world as t→∞
is the same as in the planner’s solution.
While the construction of Markov perfect equilibria becomes increasingly complex as
the number of players grows, it is clear that for g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
, and hence p∗ ≥ 1
2
, the planner’s
solution remains an equilibrium for arbitrary N ; as before, it lets all players use the single-
agent cutoff and implies incomplete learning. More generally, a necessary condition for all N
players to play safe on some non-empty open set of beliefs, be it in the planner’s solution or
in equilibrium, is that all elements of this set satisfy max{p1, . . . , pN} ≤ p
∗. For g
s
> Nr+λ
r+λ
,
and hence p∗ < 1
N
, this means that the planner’s solution as well as any MPE must lead to
complete learning. For 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
≤ Nr+λ
r+λ
, it is optimal for the planner to let all N players use
the safe arm if and only if max{p1, . . . , pN} ≤ p
∗. We conjecture that there exist equilibria
in which learning stops on the exact same set of beliefs.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed games of strategic experimentation in continuous time where players’
expected risky payoffs are negatively correlated. Our first set of results concerns a game
with two players and common knowledge that exactly one of them has a bandit with a good
risky arm. In sharp contrast to the situation where players face risky arms of a common
quality, this game always admits equilibria of the cutoff type, and equilibrium is unique and
symmetric in two subsets of the parameter space. When the stakes are low, players behave
as if they were single players experimenting in isolation, and this is efficient. When the
stakes are high, players behave as if they were myopic. Finally, learning will be complete in
equilibrium if and only if efficiency requires complete learning.
This analysis naturally raises the question under what circumstances two players would
choose to play a strategic experimentation game with bandits of opposite, rather than com-
mon, type. To analyze this question, we can extend our model by letting players first decide
sequentially whether they want to experiment with risky arm 1, whose prior probability of
being good is p0, or with risky arm 2, whose corresponding probability is 1− p0. They then
play the strategic experimentation game with either perfectly positively or perfectly nega-
tively correlated bandits, as the case might be. Using the fact that in the experimentation
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game in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), no player can obtain an equilibrium payoff higher
than twice the planner’s solution minus the single-agent solution, it is straightforward to
derive a condition on the model parameters under which equilibrium of the extended game
uniquely predicts that players choose different risky arms for all priors p0 in a neighborhood
of 1
2
. It is easy to find parameter combinations that satisfy this condition; for instance, r
λ
= 2
and g
s
= 3 will do. Given any r and λ, moreover, the condition will always be fulfilled if the
stakes g
s
are large enough.
While this extension of the model with perfect negative correlation merely allows for
one irreversible project choice, Chapter 2 analyzes a variant of this setup where, akin to
Chatterjee and Evans (2004), both players have access to both risky arms and can switch
between them at will. This requires the players to solve identical three-armed bandit prob-
lems with a safe arm and two risky arms that are known to be of opposite types. In contrast
to our setting, where the planner’s solution is incentive-compatible if and only if the stakes
are low enough, he finds that the planner’s solution is incentive-compatible if and only if the
stakes are high enough. This is because for sufficiently high stakes, the safe arm becomes
so unattractive that the players are willing to explore the risky arm that momentarily ap-
pears more promising given that the opponent also explores the arm, which is exactly what
efficiency requires.
Our second set of results concerns experimentation games with imperfect negative corre-
lation of the type of risky arm across players. In the model with two players and a third state
of the world in which neither has a good risky arm, there always exists a symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies. Although the state space is a two-dimensional sim-
plex and the players’ payoff functions solve partial differential equations, we have been able
to compute players’ equilibrium strategies and payoffs in closed form. Imperfect correlation
introduces a dimension of collective pessimism into the model, captured by the posterior
probability that both risky arms are bad. As a consequence, the planner’s solution involves
a set of beliefs where both players use the safe arm, so efficient learning is necessarily in-
complete. In the equilibria we construct, the set of beliefs where both players play safe is
the same as in the planner’s solution, so learning does not stop inefficiently early; in fact,
the probability of learning the true state of the world in the long run is the same as in the
planner’s solution. Even with imperfect negative correlation, therefore, strategic interaction
does not make learning inefficient in the long run. We obtain quite similar results in a
three-player game in which it is common knowledge that exactly one player has a good risky
arm.
In our setting, the definition of admissible strategies turned out to be more involved
than in the case of perfect positive correlation. As a matter of fact, this difficulty arises
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as soon as the (binary) type of the risky arm is not perfectly positively correlated across
players, that is, as soon as there is a positive probability that they might have risky arms
of opposite type. To see this in a two-player setting, consider the four possible states of the
world: θ = 0 (no player has a good risky arm), θ = 1 (player 1 has the only good risky
arm), θ = 2 (player 2 has the only good risky arm), and θ = 3 (both players have a good
risky arm), and write pθ for the probability that the players assign to state θ. As long as
there is no breakthrough, we then have p˙3 = −λp3 {(1− p3)(k1 + k2)− p1k1 − p2k2} ≤ 0; for
p1 = p2 = 0, this reduces to the dynamics in Keller, Rady & Cripps (2005), where each pair
of strategies that are left-continuous in p3 is admissible. For i = 1, 2, on the other hand, we
have p˙i = λpi {piki + p3−ik3−i − ki + p3(k1 + k2)}; for p3 = 0, this reduces to the dynamics
in the imperfect-correlation version of our model. In particular, p˙1 = −λp1(1−p1−p3) when
the action profile is (k1, k2) = (1, 0), p˙1 = λp1(p2 + p3) when the action profile is (0, 1), and
similarly for p˙2. Whenever pi > 0, therefore, the sign of p˙i depends on the action profile,
which means that, as in our model, player i’s admissible strategies cannot be defined without
reference to the other player’s strategy. This also applies to a scenario of imperfect positive
correlation obtained for p1 and p2 positive but small. Thus, the admissibility issues showing
up in our model are the “generic” phenomenon, while the case of perfect positive correlation
is truly exceptional because it is one of only two cases in which the space of admissible
strategy pairs is a product set, the other being the trivial case of independent types.
Throughout our analysis, we have maintained the assumption that both actions and
outcomes were publicly observable at all times. Bonatti & Ho¨rner (2010) investigate varying
correlations of bandit types between players under the assumption of private actions and
publicly observable outcomes, but in their setup everybody switches to playing safe at the
myopic cutoff. The effect of allowing for private actions when there is an incentive to play
risky beyond the myopic cutoff has not been investigated yet. One of our main conclusions
appears robust to such an extension of our model: for sufficiently high stakes, it cannot
be common knowledge that all players have stopped using the risky arm, so there must be
complete learning in equilibrium. We leave a full analysis of such a model to future work.
37
Appendix
A Payoff Functions
For p ∈ [0, 1], we define
w1(p) = pg + (1− p)
λ
r + λ
s and w2(p) = (1− p)g + p
λ
r + λ
s = w1(1− p).
These are the players’ payoff functions when both are playing risky. For the explicit representation
of other payoff functions, it will be convenient to define
u0(p) = (1− p)
(
1− p
p
) r
λ
.
Note that
u′0(p) = −
r
λ
+ p
p(1− p)
u0(p)
and u′′0 > 0.
A.1 Explicit Solutions for Perfect Negative Correlation
On any open interval where k1(p) = 1 and k2(p) = 0, u1 and u2 satisfy the ODEs
λp(1− p)u′1(p) + (r + λp)u1(p) = (r + λ)pg,
λp(1− p)u′2(p) + (r + λp)u2(p) = (r + λp)s,
which have the solutions u1(p) = pg+C1u0(p) and u2(p) = s+C2u0(p) with constants C1 and C2.
Finally, on any open interval where k1(p) = 0 and k2(p) = 1, u1 and u2 solve
λp(1− p)u′1(p)− [r + λ(1− p)]u1(p) = −[r + λ(1− p)]s,
λp(1− p)u′2(p)− [r + λ(1− p)]u2(p) = −(r + λ)(1− p)g,
hence u1(p) = s + D1u0(1− p) and u2(p) = (1− p)g + D2u0(1− p) with constants D1 and D2.
Note that each of the above closed-form solutions is the sum of one term that expresses the
expected payoff from committing to a particular action and another term that captures the option
value of being able to switch to the other action.
A.2 An Auxiliary Result for Perfect Negative Correlation
The following lemma will be useful in the proofs of Lemma B.4 and Proposition 3.
Lemma A.1 On any open interval of beliefs where the payoff function of player i satisfies ui(p) =
s + βi(p, ui), the sign of bi(p, ui)− ci(p) coincides with the sign of wi(p)− ui(p).
Proof: We first note that bi(p, ui) + βi(p, ui) =
λ
r
[ui(p)− ui(p)] where u1(p) = pg + (1− p)s and
u2(p) = u1(1 − p) are the players’ expected full-information payoffs. As βi(p, ui) = ui(p) − s, this
implies bi(p, ui)− ci(p) =
λ
r
[ui(p)− ui(p)]− ui(p) + s− ci(p) =
r+λ
r
[wi(p)− ui(p)].
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A.3 Explicit Solutions in the Three-State Model
The laws of motion for p1 and p2 under the action profile (1, 0) are p˙1 = −λp1(1−p1) and p˙2 = λp1p2.
The resulting partial differential equation for player 1’s payoff function is
λp1(1− p1)
∂u1
∂p1
− λp1p2
∂u1
∂p2
+ (r + λp1)u1 = (r + λ)p1g.
A particular solution is u(p1, p2) = p1g, that is, the payoff from committing to (1, 0) forever.
We look for solutions to the homogeneous PDE of the form u1(p1, p2) = (1 − p1)v(p1, p2), so
that v must solve the PDE
λp1(1− p1)
∂v
∂p1
− λp1p2
∂v
∂p2
+ rv = 0.
Along a trajectory (p1,t, p2,t)t≥0, this implies
d
dt
v(p1,t, p2,t) = rv(p1,t, p2,t)
and hence
v(p1,t, p2,t) = e
rtv(p1,0, p2,0).
We now note that under the action profile (1, 0), the posterior probability for player 1’s arm being
good in the absence of a breakthrough is
p1,t =
p1,0e
−λt
p1,0e−λt + 1− p1,0
,
implying
ert =
(
1− p1,0
p1,0
)− r
λ
(
1− p1,t
p1,t
) r
λ
.
Therefore,
v(p1,t, p2,t)
(
1− p1,t
p1,t
)− r
λ
is constant along the trajectory. As each trajectory is uniquely described by its slope p21−p1 , we thus
have
v(p1, p2) = f
1
10
(
p2
1− p1
)(
1− p1
p1
) r
λ
with some differentiable univariate function f110. This yields the following general form for player
1’s payoff function under (1, 0):
u1(p1, p2) = p1g + f
1
10
(
p2
1− p1
)
u0(p1).
Player 2’s payoff function under the action profile (1, 0) satisfies
λp1(1− p1)
∂u2
∂p1
− λp1p2
∂u2
∂p2
+ (r + λp1)u2 = (r + λp1)s,
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for which the same steps as above yield the general solution
u2(p1, p2) = s + f
2
10
(
p2
1− p1
)
u0(p1).
Straightforward computations show that the corresponding benefit of experimentation is
b2(p1, p2, u2) =
λ
r
p2 (g − s)
−
[
r + λ
r
p2
1− p1
f210
(
p2
1− p1
)
+
λ
r
p2 (1− p1 − p2)
(1− p1)2
(f210)
′
(
p2
1− p1
)]
u0(p1).
Under the action profile (1, 1), the PDE for player i’s payoff function,
λpi(1− p1 − p2)
∂ui
∂pi
+ λp3−i(1− p1 − p2)
∂ui
∂p3−i
+ (r + λ(p1 + p2))ui = (r + λ)pig + λp3−is,
has the general solution
ui(p1, p2) = pig + p3−i
λ
λ + r
s + f i11
(
p2
p1
)
u0(p1 + p2).
Here, one finds
b2(p1, p2, u2) =
[
p2
p1 + p2
f211
(
p2
p1
)
−
λ
r
p2
p1
(f211)
′
(
p2
p1
)]
u0(p1 + p2).
A.4 Auxiliary Results for the Three-State Model
The following lemma will be helpful in constructing Markov perfect equilibria in cutoff strategies.
It is a simple consequence of value matching.
Lemma A.2 Consider an interval I = ]pℓ, pr[ with 0 < pℓ < pr < 1 and a differentiable function
h: → ]0, 1[ with h(p1) < 1− p1 and −
h(p1)
1−p1
≤ h′(p1) ≤
h(p1)
p1
. Assume that at any belief (p1, p2) on
the graph H of h, player 1 sets k1 = 1 while player 2 chooses
k2(p1) =
p1
h(p1)
h(p1) + (1− p1)h
′(p1)
1− h(p1) + p1h′(p1)
.
Starting at a belief (p1, p2) ∈ H, posterior beliefs move along H until either a breakthrough occurs
or the belief (pℓ, h(pℓ)) is reached; fixing a continuation payoff at that belief, let U(p1) be player
2’s resulting payoff. For small ǫ > 0, let u↑2 be the solution to the equation u2 = s + β2 on
{(p1, p2): pℓ < p1 < pr, p2 < h(p1) + ǫ} with u
↑
2(p1, h(p1)) = U(p1) on I, and u
↓
2 the solution to the
equation u2 = s+β2 + b2− c2 on {(p1, p2): pℓ < p1 < pr, p2 > h(p1)− ǫ} with u
↓
2(p1, h(p1)) = U(p1)
on I. Then,
k2(p1)
[
b2(p1, h(p1), u
↑
2)− c2(h(p1))
]
= [1− k2(p1)]
[
b2(p1, h(p1), u
↓
2)− c2(h(p1))
]
= 0
on I.
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Proof: We suppress the argument p1 whenever this is expedient. The bounds on h
′ ensure that
0 ≤ k2 ≤ 1. Moreover,
p˙2 = λp2[p1 + p2k2 − k2] = h
′λp1[p1 + p2k2 − 1] = h
′p˙1,
which means that starting from (p1, p2) ∈ H, the action profile (1, k2) makes posterior beliefs move
along H until a breakthrough occurs or the left endpoint of H is reached.
On I, the payoff U satisfies the ODE
rU = r{k2hg + [1− k2]s}+ λp1[s− U ] + λk2h[g − U ]− λp1[1− p1 − k2h]U
′.
As U(p1) = u
↑
2(p1, h(p1)) on I, we have
U ′(p1) =
∂u↑2
∂p1
(p1, h(p1)) +
∂u↑2
∂p2
(p1, h(p1))h
′(p1).
Suppressing the argument (p1, h(p1)) in u
↑
2 and its derivatives, we can thus rewrite the ODE for U
as
ru↑2 = r{k2hg + [1− k2]s}+ λp1[s− u
↑
2] + λk2h[g − u
↑
2]− λp1[1− p1 − k2h]
(
∂u↑2
∂p1
+
∂u↑2
∂p2
h′
)
.
As p1[1− p1 − k2h]h
′ = h[(1− h)k2 − p1], the previous equation is easily seen to transform into
u↑2(p1, h(p1)) = s + β2(p1, h(p1), u
↑
2) + k2(p1)
[
b2(p1, h(p1), u
↑
2)− c2(h(p1))
]
.
For p2 < h(p1), however, u
↑
2(p1, p2) = s+β2(p1, p2, u
↑
2). Continuity of u
↑
2 and its derivatives implies
k1(p1)
[
b2(p1, h(p1), u
↑
2)− c2(h(p1))
]
= 0.
Arguing exactly as above, one also shows that
u↓2(p1, h(p1)) = s + β2(p1, h(p1), u
↓
2) + k2(p1)
[
b2(p1, h(p1), u
↓
2)− c2(h(p1))
]
.
For p2 > h(p1), we now have u
↓
2(p1, p2) = s + β2(p1, p2, u
↓
2) + b2(p1, h(p1), u
↓
2) − c2(h(p1)). So
continuity of u↓2 and its derivatives implies [1− k2(p2)]
[
b2(p1, h(p1), u
↓
2)− c2(h(p1))
]
= 0.
While the previous result applies to all possible switching boundaries, the next lemma uses
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality to derive constraints on the location of such a
boundary in equilibrium.
Lemma A.3 Let the players use an admissible strategy pair, giving player 2 the payoff function
u2. Fix a belief (pˆ1, pˆ2) with pˆ1 > 0, pˆ2 > 0 and 0 < pˆ1 + pˆ2 < 1, and define the rays R11 ={
(p1, p2): pˆ1 < p1 <
pˆ1
pˆ1+pˆ2
, p2 =
pˆ2
pˆ1
p1
}
and R10 =
{
(p1, p2): pˆ1 < p1 < 1, p2 =
pˆ2
1−pˆ1
(1− p1)
}
.
(1) Suppose that both players use the risky arm on R11, and that b2(p1, p2, u2) converges to
c2(pˆ2) as (p1, p2) approaches (pˆ1, pˆ2) along R11. Then player 2 is playing a best response on R11 if
and only if pˆ2 ≥
(r+λpˆ1)s
(r+λ)g−λs .
(2) Suppose that player 1 uses the risky arm, and player 2 the safe arm, on R10, and that
b2(p1, p2, u2) converges to c2(pˆ2) as (p1, p2) approaches (pˆ1, pˆ2) along R10. Then player 2 is playing
a best response on R10 if and only if pˆ2 ≤
(r+λpˆ1)s
(r+λ)g−λs .
41
Proof: (1) Writing γ = pˆ2
pˆ1
, we have
b2(p1, p2, u2) =
[
γ
1 + γ
f211(γ)−
λγ
r
(f211)
′(γ)
]
u0([1 + γ]p1)
on R11. By assumption, this converges to c2(pˆ2) as p1 ↓ pˆ1, so we have
b2(p1, p2, u2) =
c2(pˆ2)
u0(pˆ1 + pˆ2)
u0([1 + γ]p1)
on R11. If pˆ2 < p
m, and hence c2(pˆ2) > 0, convexity of u0([1 + γ]p1) and linearity of c2(γp1) imply
that b2 ≥ c2 on R11 if and only if
c2(pˆ2)
u0(pˆ1 + pˆ2)
u′0(pˆ1 + pˆ2)[1 + γ] ≥ −γg.
This condition is easily seen to be equivalent to the inequality pˆ2 ≥
(r+λpˆ1)s
(r+λ)g−λs . If pˆ2 ≥ p
m, then
b2 is constant or increasing in p1 along R11, whereas c2 is decreasing, which implies b2 ≥ c2. We
complete the proof by noting that (r+λpˆ1)s(r+λ)g−λs < p
m for all pˆ1 < 1− p
m.
(2) Writing η = pˆ21−pˆ1 , we have
b2(p1, p2, u2) =
λη
r
(g − s) (1− p1)− η
[
r + λ
r
f210(η) +
λ
r
(1− η) (f210)
′(η)
]
u0(p1)
on R10. By assumption, this converges to c2(pˆ2) as p1 ↓ pˆ1, so we have
b2(p1, p2, u2) =
λη
r
(g − s) (1− p1) +
[
c2(pˆ2)−
λ
r
(g − s) pˆ2
]
u0(p1)
u0(pˆ1)
on R10. If pˆ2 > p
∗, we have c2(pˆ2) <
λ
r
(g − s) pˆ2, so convexity of u0 and linearity of c2 imply that
b2 ≤ c2 on R10 if and only if
−
λη
r
(g − s) +
[
c2(pˆ2)−
λ
r
(g − s) pˆ2
]
u′0(pˆ1)
u0(pˆ1)
≤ ηg.
This is easily seen to be equivalent to the inequality pˆ2 ≤
(r+λpˆ1)s
(r+λ)g−λs . If pˆ2 ≤ p
∗, we have c2(pˆ2) ≥
λ
r
(g− s) pˆ2, so b2 is constant or decreasing in p1 along R10, whereas c2 is increasing, which implies
b2 ≤ c2. We complete the proof by noting that
(r+λpˆ1)s
(r+λ)g−λs > p
∗ for all pˆ1 > 0.
B Admissible Pairs of Markov Strategies
We start with three examples.
Example 1: Suppose that player 1 plays risky at all beliefs p > 12 and safe otherwise, while player
2 plays risky at all beliefs p ≤ 12 and safe otherwise. Then there is no continuous function t 7→ pt
with p0 =
1
2 that satisfies equation (1) at all t ≥ 0. Suppose to the contrary that there exists such
a solution. If there is a time t such that pt > p0, then continuity implies that there exists a t
′ < t
such that 12 < pt′ < pt and pτ >
1
2 for all τ in [t
′, t]. Yet, k1(pτ ) = 1 and k2(pτ ) = 0 on [t
′, t], so (1)
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implies pt < pt′ , a contradiction. The symmetric argument rules out the existence of a time t such
that pt < p0. So the only candidate for a solution to (1) is the constant function pt ≡
1
2 . With
this function, k1(pt) = 0 and k2(pt) = 1 at all t, but then pt must be increasing by (1), another
contradiction. Starting from the prior belief p0 =
1
2 , therefore, there is no solution to the law of
motion for beliefs consistent with the above strategies, which means that these strategies do not
pin down the players’ actions.
Example 2: Suppose that player 1 plays risky whenever 14 ≤ p <
1
2 and safe whenever
1
2 ≤ p ≤
3
4 ;
his behavior at other beliefs is irrelevant for this example. Player 2 always plays safe. For each
T ∈ [0,∞], the continuous function t 7→ pt given by
pt =


1
2 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
e−λ(t−T )
e−λ(t−T )+1
for t > T
then satisfies (1) up to the time T + τ at which it reaches the belief 14 . This means that the given
Markov strategies are consistent with a continuum of different solutions to the law of motion of
beliefs in continuous time. If we discretize time with fixed increment ∆t > 0 and approximate (2)
by
pt+∆t − pt = λ [k2(pt)− k1(pt)] pt (1− pt)∆t
for t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , however, there is a unique solution with p0 =
1
2 , namely pt =
1
2 for all
t = n∆t. The only continuous-time solution that can be approximated by the discrete-time solution
as ∆t ↓ 0 is the constant function pt ≡
1
2 , corresponding to T = ∞.
Example 3: Suppose that player 1 plays risky and player 2 plays safe whenever 14 ≤ p <
1
2 , while
player 1 plays safe and player 2 plays risky whenever 12 ≤ p ≤
3
4 . Behavior at other beliefs is again
irrelevant. Then there are two different solutions to (1) starting in p0 =
1
2 ,
pt =
e−λt
e−λt + 1
and pt =
eλt
eλt + 1
.
Only the latter is consistent with a discrete-time approximation as in Example 2.
In Examples 1 and 2, existence and uniqueness of solutions to the law of motion of beliefs
in a neighborhood of 12 can be restored by imposing specific one-sided continuity requirements on
the players’ strategies. In the first example, it suffices to make player 1’s strategy right-continuous
at the belief 12 , and in the second example, left-continuous. The appropriate one-sided continuity
requirement in these examples thus depends on the opponent’s strategy. In Example 3, moreover,
no combination of one-sided continuity requirements on the two players’ strategies can ensure
uniqueness. We therefore do not require uniqueness of the law of motion of beliefs in our definition
of admissible strategy pairs. Instead, whenever there are multiple continuous-time solutions, we
shall select the solution that is obtained in the limit of discrete-time approximations.
The following result shows that the problem of non-existence of solutions to the law of motion
of beliefs in continuous time would arise even if we were to restrict the space of strategies to less
complex functions such as cutoff strategies. It also establishes that the set of admissible strategy
pairs is not a product set.
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Lemma B.1 There exist admissible pairs of cutoff strategies (k1, k2) and (k˜1, k˜2) such that (k1, k˜2)
is inadmissible.
Proof: We take k−11 (1) = [
1
4 , 1], k
−1
2 (1) = [0,
3
4 ], k˜
−1
1 (1) = ]
2
3 , 1], and k˜
−1
2 (1) = [0,
1
3 [ . Then each
of the pairs (k1, k2) and (k˜1, k˜2) implies a unique solution to the law of motion of beliefs from any
starting point, whereas for (k1, k˜2), non-existence of a solution starting from p0 =
1
3 follows exactly
as in Example 1.
B.1 Admissible Transitions
We say that the transition (k−1 , k
−
2 )—(k1, k2)—(k
+
1 , k
+
2 ) occurs at the belief pˆ ∈ ]0, 1[ if
limp↑pˆ(k1(p), k2(p)) = (k
−
1 , k
−
2 ), (k1(pˆ), k2(pˆ)) = (k1, k2), limp↓pˆ(k1(p), k2(p)) = (k
+
1 , k
+
2 ), and at
least one of the sets {k−1 , k1, k
+
1 } and {k
−
2 , k2, k
+
2 } contains more than one element. Given our def-
inition of strategies, each MPE has a finite number of transitions. We call a transition admissible
if it can arise under an admissible pair of Markov strategies.
We can rewrite (1) as
pt =
[
1 +
1− p0
p0
e−λ
∫ t
0 ∆(pτ ) dτ
]−1
, (B.1)
with ∆(p) = k2(p)−k1(p). For any belief pˆ in the open unit interval, we define ∆(pˆ−) = limp↑pˆ ∆(p)
and ∆(pˆ+) = limp↓pˆ ∆(p). For the purposes of this section, we shall consider two transitions at
the beliefs pˆ and p˜ as equivalent if ∆(pˆ−) = ∆(p˜−), ∆(pˆ) = ∆(p˜), and ∆(pˆ+) = ∆(p˜+). For
the remainder of this section, we shall only be concerned with the so defined equivalence classes
of transitions which we denote by triplets (∆(pˆ−),∆(pˆ),∆(pˆ+)). Since ∆(p) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all
p ∈ [0, 1], there are 27 such triplets. Two of them, (−1,−1,−1) and (1, 1, 1), do not correspond
to any change in action profile. A third one, (0, 0, 0), corresponds to a transition if and only if
players switch between (1, 1) and (0, 0); the associated dynamics are trivial. A further eight classes,
(1, 0, 1), (1,−1, 1), (1,−1, 0), (0, 1,−1), (0,−1, 1), (−1, 1, 0), (−1, 1,−1) and (−1, 0,−1), are ruled
out by our requirement that both k−1i (0) and k
−1
i (1) be disjoint unions of a finite number of non-
degenerate intervals. For each of the remaining classes, we are interested in solutions to (B.1) with
initial condition p0 = pˆ (the belief at which the transition occurs).
No Solution
Arguing as in Example 1, it is straightforward to establish that there is no solution to (B.1) with
p0 = pˆ for the following classes:
• (1, 1,−1), (1,−1,−1), (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0,−1, 0), (0,−1,−1).
A Continuum of Solutions
As in Example 2, there exists a continuum of solutions to (B.1) with p0 = pˆ for each of the following
classes:
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• (0, 0, 1), (−1, 0, 1), (−1, 0, 0).
We select the constant solution pt ≡ pˆ because this is the one obtained as the limit of any discrete-
time approximation.
Exactly Two Solutions
The logic of Example 3 applies to both the following classes:
• (−1, 1, 1) and (−1,−1, 1).
Consistency with a discrete-time approximation leads us to select the solution pt =
[
1 + 1−pˆ
pˆ
e−λt
]−1
for (−1, 1, 1) and the solution pt =
[
1 + 1−pˆ
pˆ
eλt
]−1
for (−1,−1, 1).
A Unique Solution
Each of the remaining five classes implies a unique continuous-time solution to the law of motion
of beliefs (equal to the limit of any discrete-time approximation) in a neighborhood of pˆ:
• (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (−1,−1, 0), (0, 0,−1), (1, 0,−1).
Admissible Classes and Transitions
The following table lists the admissible classes and the transitions that they represent.
Class Transitions
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 1), (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0)
(1, 0,−1) (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(1, 0), (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0)
(0, 1, 1) (0, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1), (1, 1)—(0, 1)—(0, 1)
(0, 0, 1) (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 1), (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 1)
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 1), (0, 0)—(1, 1)—(1, 1),
(1, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0), (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 0)
(0, 0,−1) (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 0), (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0)
(−1, 1, 1) (1, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1)
(−1, 0, 1) (1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 1), (1, 0)—(1, 1)—(0, 1)
(−1, 0, 0) (1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 0), (1, 0)—(1, 1)—(1, 1)
(−1,−1, 1) (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 1)
(−1,−1, 0) (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 0), (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(1, 1)
Table 1: Admissible transitions
This table yields the following characterization of admissible strategy pairs.
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Lemma B.2 A pair of Markov strategies (k1, k2) is admissible if and only if all its finitely many
transitions appear in Table 1. Starting from a prior belief p0 equal to a transition point pˆ, the evolu-
tion of beliefs is fully determined by ∆(pˆ) = k2(pˆ)−k1(pˆ): pt ≡ pˆ if ∆(pˆ) = 0; pt =
[
1 + 1−pˆ
pˆ
e−λt
]−1
if ∆(pˆ) = 1; and pt =
[
1 + 1−pˆ
pˆ
eλt
]−1
if ∆(pˆ) = −1. These solutions are valid as long as there is
no breakthrough on a risky arm and no other transition is reached.
Remarks
The six classes that do not admit a solution in continuous time would either lead to a short “blip”
in discrete time before reaching an absorbing state, as is the case with the classes (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0),
(0,−1, 0) and (0,−1,−1)), or to an oscillating solution, which, as we reduce period length, leads
to stasis in the limit, as is the case with the classes (1, 1,−1) and (1,−1,−1). While we rule these
classes out, the limits of their discrete-time solutions are still available through other admissible
strategy pairs. The continuous-time limit of the discrete-time solutions associated with the class
(1, 1, 0), for instance, is captured by the admissible class (1, 0, 0). Similarly, the limit of the discrete-
time oscillations implied by the classes (1, 1,−1) or (1,−1,−1) is captured by the admissible class
(1, 0,−1).
Each inadmissible strategy pair has but a finite number of inadmissible transitions. Each of
these can be made admissible by changing one player’s action at the belief where the transition
occurs. This means that for each inadmissible strategy pair (k1, k2), there exists an admissible pair
(k˜1, k˜2) such that k˜i differs from ki at finitely many points.
B.2 Locating Admissible Transitions
We first consider those admissible transitions in which one player’s action remains fixed.
Lemma B.3 The following statements hold for all Markov perfect equilibria:
(i) (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) can only occur at the belief p∗; (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 0) and (1, 0)—(0, 0)—
(0, 0) can only occur if g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ and only at beliefs in [1− p
∗, p∗[ .
(ii) (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0) can only occur at the belief 1 − p∗; (0, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and (0, 0)—
(0, 0)—(0, 1) can only occur if g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ and only at beliefs in ]1− p
∗, p∗].
(iii) (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 1) can only occur at the belief pm; (1, 1)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and (1, 1)—(1, 1)—
(0, 1) can only occur if g
s
> 2 and only at beliefs in ]pm, 1− pm].
(iv) (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) can only occur at the belief 1 − pm; (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(1, 1) and (1, 0)—
(1, 1)—(1, 1) can only occur if g
s
> 2 and only at beliefs in [pm, 1− pm[ .
Proof: Suppose the transition (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) occurs at pˆ. Starting to the immediate right
of pˆ, the dynamics of beliefs in the absence of a breakthrough converge to pˆ, so u1 is continuous at
this belief. If pˆ > p∗, then u1 = s implies b1 > c1 to the immediate left of pˆ , so player 1 would
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deviate to playing risky there. If pˆ < p∗, then the solution to the ODE u1 = s + b1 − c1 with
u1(pˆ) = s has u
′
1(pˆ+) < 0, so player 1 would deviate to playing safe to the immediate right of pˆ.
So we must have pˆ = p∗.
Now, suppose the transition (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 0) occurs at pˆ. If pˆ ≥ p∗, then u1 = s implies
b1 > c1 to the immediate right of pˆ , so player 1 would deviate to playing risky there. If pˆ < 1− p
∗,
then u2 = s implies b2 > c2 to the immediate right of pˆ , so player 2 would deviate to playing risky
there. So we must have 1− p∗ ≤ pˆ < p∗, which requires p∗ > 12 , that is,
g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ .
The same arguments apply to the transition (1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 0). This proves part (i). Part
(ii) is the mirror image of part (i) with the players’ roles reversed.
As to part (iii), suppose the transition (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 1) occurs at pˆ. Starting to the
immediate left of pˆ, the dynamics of beliefs in the absence of a breakthrough converge to pˆ, so
u1 is continuous at this belief. If pˆ < p
m, then u1 = w1 implies b1 = 0 < c1 to the immediate right
of pˆ, so player 1 would deviate to playing safe there. If pˆ > pm, then the solution to the ODE
u1 = s + β1 with u1(pˆ) = w1(pˆ) has u
′
1(pˆ−) > w
′
1(pˆ−), so player 1 would deviate to playing risky
to the immediate left of pˆ. So we must have pˆ = pm (with smooth pasting).
Next, suppose the transition (1, 1)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) occurs at pˆ. If pˆ ≤ pm, then u1 = w1 implies
b1 = 0 < c1 to the immediate left of pˆ , so player 1 would deviate to playing safe there. If pˆ > 1−p
m,
then u2 = w2 implies b2 = 0 < c2 to the immediate left of pˆ , so player 2 would deviate to playing
safe there. So we must have pm < pˆ ≤ 1− pm, which requires pm < 12 , that is,
g
s
> 2.
The same arguments apply to the transition (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 1). This proves part (iii) and,
by symmetry, part (iv).
Next, we pin down the conditions under which the admissible transitions in the classes
(1, 0,−1) and (−1, 0, 1) may occur in equilibrium.
Lemma B.4 The following statements hold for all Markov perfect equilibria. (i) The transi-
tion (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) can only occur if g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ and only at belief
1
2 . (ii) The transition
(0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) can only occur if 2r+λ
r+λ ≤
g
s
≤ 2 and only at beliefs in [max{1 − pm, p∗},
min{pm, 1− p∗}]. (iii) The transition (1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 1) can only occur if g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ and only at
beliefs in [1− p∗, p∗]. (iv) The transition (1, 0)—(1, 1)—(0, 1) can only occur if g
s
≥ 2 and only at
beliefs in [pm, 1− pm].
Proof: Suppose the transition (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) occurs at belief pˆ. As the dynamics of beliefs
are convergent, the players’ payoff functions are continuous at pˆ with u1(pˆ) = u2(pˆ) = s. If pˆ < p
∗,
then the solution to the ODE u1 = s + b1 − c1 with u1(pˆ) = s has u
′
1(pˆ+) < 0, so player 1 would
deviate to playing safe to the immediate right of pˆ. So we must have pˆ ≥ p∗. Immediately to the
left of pˆ, u1 ≥ w1 by Lemma A.1. If pˆ > p
∗, continuity implies u1(pˆ) ≥ w1(pˆ) > s, which is a
contradiction. This shows that pˆ = p∗. The analogous steps for player 2 establish that pˆ = 1− p∗.
So we must have p∗ = 1− p∗ = 12 , which requires
g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ . This proves statement (i).
Suppose now that the transition (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) occurs at belief pˆ. As the dynamics of
beliefs are convergent, the players’ payoff functions are continuous at pˆ with ui(pˆ) = wi(pˆ). If
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pˆ > pm, then the solution to the ODE u1 = s + β1 with u1(pˆ) = w1(pˆ) has u
′
1(pˆ−) > w
′
1(pˆ), so
player 1 would deviate to playing risky to the immediate left of pˆ. If pˆ < p∗, then w1(pˆ) < s and,
by continuity, u1 < s to the immediate right of pˆ, so player 1 would deviate to playing safe there.
This shows that p∗ ≤ pˆ ≤ pm. The analogous steps for player 2 establish that 1− pm ≤ pˆ ≤ 1− p∗.
So we must have p∗ ≤ 1 − p∗, which requires p∗ ≤ 12 , that is,
g
s
≥ 2r+λ
r+λ . On the other hand, we
must have 1− pm ≤ pm, which requires pm > 12 , that is,
g
s
< 2. This proves statement (ii).
Next, suppose the transition (1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 1) occurs at belief pˆ. This implies u1(pˆ) =
u2(pˆ) = s. Starting close to pˆ, the dynamics of beliefs in the absence of a breakthrough are
divergent, so u1 and u2 need not be continuous at this belief. We can establish one-sided continuity,
though. If u1(pˆ−) > s, player 1 would deviate to playing risky at pˆ (note that this deviation yields
an admissible transition again). If u1(pˆ−) < s, player 1 would deviate to playing safe immediately
to the left of pˆ. So u1 must be left-continuous at this belief. By symmetry, u2 must be right-
continuous. Now, if pˆ > p∗, then the solution to the ODE u1 = s + b1 − c1 with u1(pˆ) = s has
u′1(pˆ−) > 0, so player 1 would deviate to playing safe to the immediate left of pˆ. This implies
pˆ ≤ p∗. The analogous argument for player 2 yields pˆ ≥ 1 − p∗. So we must have p∗ ≥ 12 , that is,
g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ . This proves statement (iii).
Finally, suppose the transition (1, 0)—(1, 1)—(0, 1) occurs at belief pˆ, so that u1(pˆ) = w1(pˆ)
and u2(pˆ) = w2(pˆ). If we had u1(pˆ+) > w1(pˆ), player 1 would deviate to playing safe at pˆ (yielding
another admissible transition again), so we must have u1(pˆ+) ≤ w1(pˆ). But play of (0, 1) to the
immediate right of pˆ requires u1 ≥ w1 there by Lemma A.1, hence u1(pˆ+) ≤ w1(pˆ). So u1 is
right-continuous at pˆ, and u2 left-continuous by symmetry. Now, if pˆ < p
m, then the solution to
the ODE u1 = s+β1 with u1(pˆ) = w1(pˆ) has u
′
1(pˆ+) < w
′
1(pˆ), so player 1 would deviate to playing
risky to the immediate right of pˆ. This implies pˆ ≥ pm. The analogous argument for player 2 yields
pˆ ≤ 1− pm. So we must have pm ≤ 12 , that is,
g
s
≥ 2. This proves statement (iv).
Finally, we show that transitions in the class (0, 0, 0) cannot arise in equilibrium.
Lemma B.5 The transitions (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 1), (0, 0)—(1, 1)—(1, 1), (1, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0) and
(1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 0) do not occur in any Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof: By symmetry, it is enough to establish the claim for the transitions (1, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0)
and (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 0). Suppose that the former occurs at pˆ, so that u1(pˆ) = w1(pˆ) and u2(pˆ) =
w2(pˆ). If pˆ > p
∗, then w1(pˆ) > s and player 1 has an incentive to deviate to playing risky at
pˆ (which yields an admissible transition again). If pˆ < p∗, then w1(pˆ) < s and player 1 has an
incentive to deviate to playing safe immediately to the left of pˆ. So we must have pˆ = p∗. But then
player 1 has an incentive to deviate to playing risky immediately to the right of pˆ. An analogous
argument rules out the transition (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 0).
The only admissible transitions that Lemmas B.3–B.5 do not cover are (1, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1)
and (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 1). We shall see in the proofs of Propositions 4–7 that they can only occur
in those equilibria for intermediate stakes that involve jump discontinuities in the players’ value
functions.
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C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The policy (k1, k2) implies a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The planner’s payoff
function from this policy is
u(p) =


1
2
[
s + (1− p)g + (s− p∗g) u0(1−p)
u0(1−p∗)
]
if p ≤ 1− p∗,
s if 1− p∗ ≤ p ≤ p∗,
1
2
[
s + pg + (s− p∗g) u0(p)
u0(p∗)
]
if p ≥ p∗.
This function satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p∗ and 1− p∗, hence is of class C1. It
is decreasing on [0, 1− p∗] and increasing on [p∗, 1]. Moreover, u = s+B2 −
c2
2 on [0, 1− p
∗], u = s
on [1− p∗, p∗], and u = s + B1 −
c1
2 on [p
∗, 1] (we drop the arguments for simplicity).
To show that u and the policy (k1, k2) solve the planner’s Bellman equation, and hence that
(k1, k2) is optimal, it is enough to establish that B1 <
c1
2 and B2 >
c2
2 on ]0, 1 − p
∗[ , B1 <
c1
2
and B2 <
c2
2 on ]1 − p
∗, p∗[ , and B1 >
c1
2 and B2 <
c2
2 on ]p
∗, 1[ . Consider this last interval.
There, u = s + B1 −
c1
2 and u > s (by monotonicity of u) immediately imply B1 >
c1
2 . Next,
B2 =
λ
r
[g+s2 −u]−B1 =
λ
r
[g+s2 −u]−u+ s−
c1
2 ; this is smaller than
c2
2 if and only if u > u11, which
holds here since u > s and s > u11. The other two intervals are treated in a similar way.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ2[ with pˆ2 ≤ p
∗. Then, player 1’s payoff from the strategy k−11 (1) = ]p
∗, 1] is
his single-agent payoff u1 = u
∗
1, that is, u1 = s on [0, p
∗] and u1 = s+b1−c1 on [p
∗, 1]. To show that
u1 and the policy k1 solve player 1’s Bellman equation given player 2’s strategy k2, and hence that
k1 is a best response to k2, it is enough to establish that b1 < c1 on ]0, p
∗[ and b1 > c1 on ]p
∗, 1[ . On
this last interval, u1 = s+b1−c1 and u1 > s (by monotonicity of u1 = u
∗
1) immediately imply b1 > c1.
On ]0, p∗[ , we have u1 = s and u
′
1 = 0, hence b1 − c1 =
λ
r
p(g − s)− (s− pg) = (r+λ)g−λs
r
p− s < 0.
Next, suppose k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ2] with pˆ2 ≥ p
m. Then, player 1’s payoff from the strategy
k−11 (1) = [p
m, 1] is given by
u1(p) =


s + (1− pm) λ
r+λs
u0(1−p)
u0(1−pm)
if p ≤ pm,
pg + (1− p) λ
r+λs if p
m ≤ p ≤ pˆ2,
pg + (1− pˆ2)
λ
r+λs
u0(p)
u0(pˆ2)
if p ≥ pˆ2.
We note that u1 is of class C
1 except at pˆ2, where its first derivative jumps downward; moreover,
u1 is increasing and satisfies u1 = s + β1 on [0, p
m[, u1 = s + β1 + b1 − c1 = w1 on [p
m, pˆ2], and
u1 = s + b1 − c1 on ]pˆ2, 1]. On ]0, p
m[ , it is easily verified that u1 > w1, so Lemma A.1 implies
b1 < c1. At p
m, we have b1 = 0 = c1. On ]p
m, pˆ2[ , we have b1 = 0 > c1. On ]pˆ2, 1[ , u1 = s+ b1− c1
and u1 > s (by monotonicity of u1) also imply b1 > c1. To complete the proof that k1 is a best
response to k2, it suffices to note that there are no admissible strategy pairs (k˜1, k2) for which
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k˜1(pˆ2) = 0. In fact, any strategy k˜1 with k˜1(pˆ2) = 0 would give rise to a transition in a class
(∆(pˆ2−), 1,∆(pˆ2+)) with ∆(pˆ2+) ∈ {−1, 0}, and none of these is admissible.
Finally, suppose k−12 (1) = [0, pˆ2] with p
∗ < pˆ2 ≤ p
m. Then player 1’s payoff from playing
k−11 (1) = [pˆ2, 1] is given by
u1(p) =

 s +
[
pˆ2g + (1− pˆ2)
λ
r+λs− s
]
u0(1−p)
u0(1−pˆ2)
if p ≤ pˆ2,
pg + (1− pˆ2)
λ
r+λs
u0(p)
u0(pˆ2)
if p ≥ pˆ2.
The function u1 is of class C
1 except at pˆ2, where its derivative jumps downward; moreover, it is
increasing and satisfies u1 = s + β1 on [0, pˆ2[, u1(pˆ2) = w1(pˆ2) and u1 = s + b1 − c1 on ]pˆ2, 1]. As
u1 > w1 on [0, pˆ2[, we have b1 < c1 on this interval by Lemma A.1. On ]pˆ2, 1], we have u1 > s,
hence b1 > c1. At the belief pˆ2 itself, the same argument as in the previous paragraph establishes
that there are no admissible strategy pairs (k˜1, k2) for which k˜1(pˆ2) = 0.
Analogous arguments apply to player 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
It remains to prove uniqueness of the equilibrium for g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ . Of the transitions covered by
Lemmas B.3–B.4, the following nine could occur: (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) at p∗; (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 0)
and (1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 0) in [1 − p∗, p∗[ ; (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0) at 1 − p∗; (0, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and
(0, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 1) in ]1 − p∗, p∗]; (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 1) at pm; (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) at 1 − pm;
(1, 0)—(0, 0)—(0, 1) in [1 − p∗, p∗]. In addition, the transitions (1, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and (1, 0)—
(1, 0)—(0, 1) could potentially arise. Moving from left to right along the unit interval, we consider
possible sequences of transitions leading from (k1(0), k2(0)) = (0, 1) to (k1(1), k2(1)) = (1, 0).
Players have two ways to transition out of (k1(0), k2(0)) = (0, 1): either into (1, 1) at p
m, or
into (0, 0) at 1− p∗. The former is incompatible with (k1(1), k2(1)) = (1, 0) as there is no possible
transition out of (1, 1) to the right of pm. So players have to transition from (0, 1) to (0, 0) at 1−p∗.
The available transitions out of (0, 0) lead to (0, 1) or (1, 0). The only transition out of (0, 1)
available to the right of 1−p∗ would lead to (1, 1) at pm, which we have already ruled out. Therefore,
players must transition out of (0, 0) into (1, 0) at p∗.
To the right of p∗, the only available transitions out of (1, 0) lead into (0, 1), and the only
available transition out of (0, 1) leads into (1, 1), which we have ruled out before. So there cannot
be any further transition to the right of p∗.
Proof of Proposition 5
For uniqueness when g
s
≥ 2, we note that of the transitions covered in Lemmas B.3–B.4, the
following nine might occur: (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) at p∗; (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0) at 1 − p∗; (0, 1)—
(1, 1)—(1, 1) at pm; (1, 1)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(0, 1) in ]pm, 1 − pm]; (1, 1)—(1, 1)—
(1, 0) at 1− pm; (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(1, 1) and (1, 0)—(1, 1)—(1, 1) in [pm, 1− pm[ ; (1, 0)—(1, 1)—(0, 1)
in [pm, 1 − pm]. In addition, the transitions (1, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 1) could
potentially arise.
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Players have two ways to transition out of (k1(0), k2(0)) = (0, 1): either into (0, 0) at 1 − p
∗,
or into (1, 1) at pm. The former is incompatible with (k1(1), k2(1)) = (1, 0) as there is no possible
transition out of (0, 0) to the right of 1 − p∗. Therefore, players have to transition from (0, 1) to
(1, 1) at pm.
The available transitions out of (1, 1) lead to (0, 1) or (1, 0). The only transition out of (0, 1)
available to the right of pm would lead to (0, 0) at 1 − p∗, which we have already ruled out. So
players must transition out of (1, 1) into (1, 0) at 1− pm.
To the right of 1− pm, the only available transitions out of (1, 0) lead into (0, 1), and the only
available transition out of (0, 1) leads into (0, 0), which we have ruled out before. So there cannot
be any further transition to the right of 1− pm.
Proof of Proposition 7
We fix one of the beliefs p˜(ℓ) and introduce two auxiliary functions. Let y : [pˆ(ℓ−1), 1] → [s, g] be
the unique solution of the ODE y(p) = s+ b1(p, y)− c1(p) with initial value y(pˆ(ℓ−1)) = w1(pˆ(ℓ−1)),
and z : [0, pˆ(ℓ)] → [s, g] the unique solution of the ODE z(p) = s + β1(p, z) with terminal value
z(pˆ(ℓ)) = w1(pˆ(ℓ)). As y(p) = pg + Cu0(p) and z(p) = s + Du0(1 − p) for some positive constants
C and D, both functions are strictly increasing and strictly convex. As y(1) = g = w1(1) and
z(0) = s > w1(0), convexity implies y < w1 on ]pˆ(ℓ−1), 1[ and z > w1 on ]0, pˆ(ℓ)[ . Player
1’s payoff function satisfies u1 = y on [pˆ(ℓ−1), p˜(ℓ)[ and u1 = z on ]p˜(ℓ), pˆ(ℓ)]. This implies that
u1(p˜(ℓ)−) = y(p˜(ℓ)) < w1(p˜(ℓ)) < z(p˜(ℓ)) = u1(p˜(ℓ)+), so u1 has a jump discontinuity at p˜(ℓ).
If the action profile played at p˜(ℓ) is (0, 1), then u1(p˜(ℓ)) = z(p˜(ℓ)) > w1(p˜(ℓ)), and player 1
has no incentive to deviate since the action profile (1, 1) would give him the payoff w1(p˜(ℓ)). If the
action profile played at p˜(ℓ) is (1, 0), then u1(p˜(ℓ)) = y(p˜(ℓ)) > s, and player 1 has no incentive to
deviate since the action profile (0, 0) would give him the payoff s. In either case, player 1 thus plays
a best response.
Analogous arguments apply to player 2. This establishes that the strategy pairs described in
the proposition constitute Markov perfect equilibria and that both players’ payoffs jump at each of
the beliefs p˜(ℓ).
To see that there are no other equilibria, we note that of the transitions covered by Lemmas
B.3–B.4 the following five could occur: (0, 0)—(0, 0)—(1, 0) at p∗; (0, 1)—(0, 0)—(0, 0) at 1 − p∗;
(0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 1) at pm; (1, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) at 1 − pm; (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) in I = [max{1 −
pm, p∗},min{pm, 1−p∗}]. In addition, the transitions (1, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) and (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 1)
could potentially arise.
Players have three ways to transition out of (k1(0), k2(0)) = (0, 1): either into (0, 0) at 1− p
∗,
or into (1, 1) at pm, or into (1, 0) at some belief in I. The transition into (0, 0) is incompatible
with (k1(1), k2(1)) = (1, 0) as there is no possible transition out of (0, 0) to the right of 1 − p
∗.
The transition into (1, 1) is also incompatible with (k1(1), k2(1)) = (1, 0) as there is no possible
transition out of (1, 1) to the right of pm. Therefore, there must be a belief pˆmin ∈ I such that the
action profile (0, 1) is played on [0, pˆmin[ and the transition (0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) occurs at pˆmin.
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By the same sequence of arguments started at (k1(1), k2(1)) = (1, 0), there must also exist a
belief pˆmax ≥ pˆmin in I such that the action profile (1, 0) is played on ]pˆmax, 1] and the transition
(0, 1)—(1, 1)—(1, 0) occurs at pˆmax. If pˆmin < pˆmax, finally, any two “adjacent” transitions (0, 1)—
(1, 1)—(1, 0) must be separated by one transition (1, 0)—(0, 1)—(0, 1) or (1, 0)—(1, 0)—(0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 9
When stakes are high, the expected delay will be maximal for p0 = 1 − p because this yields the
largest possible interval of beliefs on which equilibrium play differs from the efficient solution, and at
the same time minimizes the expected time until uncertainty is resolved in the efficient solution. At
the belief 1− p, the planner will play the good risky arm for sure until it produces a breakthrough;
the corresponding expected time to breakthrough is tˆ = 1
λ
. The expected equilibrium time to
breakthrough is t˜ = (1 − p)tˆ + p(δ + tˆ) = tˆ + pδ, where δ is the time needed to slide from 1 − p
to 1 − pm, conditional on risky arm 2 being good. Bayes’ rule for the action profile (1, 0) implies
δ = 1
λ
[
ln 1−p
p
− ln 1−p
m
pm
]
. Writing x = g
s
, we therefore have
t˜− tˆ
tˆ
= p
[
ln
1− p
p
− ln
1− pm
pm
]
=
r + λ
(r + λ)x + λ
ln
(
1 +
λ
r + λ
1
x− 1
)
.
As this decreases in x, an upper bound on the relative delay for high stakes is obtained by setting
x = 2, so that
t˜− tˆ
tˆ
≤
r + λ
2r + 3λ
ln
(
1 +
λ
r + λ
)
≤
λ
2r + 3λ
<
1
3
by the fact that ln(1 + y) ≤ y for all y ≥ 0.
Turning to intermediate stakes, we may assume that pm < 1 − p, for otherwise there exists
an equilibrium that achieves the efficient outcome (see the discussion leading up to Proposition 10
in Section 4.5). We now calculate the delay that arises for p0 = 1 − p in the equilibrium in cutoff
strategies defined by pˆ = pm, that is, the worst possible delay in the best possible equilibrium.
Proceeding as above, we find
t˜− tˆ
tˆ
= p
[
ln
1− p
p
− ln
pm
1− pm
]
=
r + λ
(r + λ)x + λ
ln
(
x−
r
r + λ
)
.
Using the fact that ln z ≤ z − 1 for all z > 0, we obtain
t˜− tˆ
tˆ
≤
r + λ
(r + λ)x + λ
(
x−
2r + λ
r + λ
)
.
As the right-hand side increases in x, and x < 2 for intermediate stakes, this yields the same upper
bound as for high stakes.
Proof of Proposition 10
For high stakes, the players’ average equilibrium payoff function u is strictly below the planner’s
value function on ]1 − pm, 1[ . To the right of 1 − p¯, the two functions differ only with respect to
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the constant that premultiplies the solution u0(p) of the homogenous ODE for the action profile
(1, 0); in particular, both functions and their difference are monotonic there. The minimum of the
average payoff is therefore attained at some belief p˘ strictly in between 1− pm and 1− p¯, and the
quotient (u(p˘)− s)/(u11 − s) is the minimum over all beliefs of our relative welfare measure.
For p ≥ 1− pm, we have u(p) = (s + pg)/2 + Cu0(p) with some positive constant C, and so
u′(p˘) =
g
2
− C
µ + p˘
p˘(1− p˘)
u0(p˘) = 0,
where µ = r
λ
. Solving for Cu0(p˘), we obtain
u(p˘) =
s + p˘g
2
+
p˘(1− p˘)
µ + p˘
g
2
,
which is easily seen to be increasing in p˘. As p˘ > 1− pm, we thus have
u(p˘) >
s + (1− pm)g
2
+
pm(1− pm)
µ + 1− pm
g
2
=
g
2
+
(g − s)s
2[(µ + 1)g − s]
and, with x = g
s
≥ 2 denoting the stakes involved,
u(p˘)− s
u11 − s
>
x + x−1(µ+1)x−1 − 2
x + 1
µ+1 − 2
= 1−
µ
(µ + 1)2(x− 1)2 − µ2
≥ 1−
µ
(µ + 1)2 − µ2
.
The last term on the right-hand side decreases in µ and approaches the limit 12 as µ→∞.
For intermediate stakes, we only need to cover the case where pm < 1− p, so that the efficient
outcome cannot be achieved for initial beliefs below 1−pm or above pm. By symmetry, it is enough
to consider the latter scenario. Given a prior above pm, the players’ average payoff function u in
the MPE in cutoff strategies defined by pˆ = pm is strictly below the planner’s value function on
]pm, 1[ . Arguing as above and exploiting the fact that p˘ > pm, we now find
u(p˘) >
s + pmg
2
+
pm(1− pm)
µ + pm
g
2
= s +
(g − s)s
2(µg + s)
and, writing x = g
s
again,
u(p˘)− s
u11 − s
>
x−1
µx+1
x + 1
µ+1 − 2
.
As pm < 1− p, we have µx + 1 < (µ + 1)(x− 1)x, and so
u(p˘)− s
u11 − s
>
1
[(µ + 1)(x− 2) + 1]x
.
The right-hand side exceeds 12 since
2µ+1
µ+1 < x < 2, and hence 0 < (µ + 1)(x − 2) + 1 < 1, for
intermediate stakes.
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Proof of Proposition 11
Low stakes. Let g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ , so that p
∗ ≥ 12 . If players behave as described in the main text,
their payoff functions coincide with the respective single-agent value functions, and either player is
trivially playing a best response.
Intermediate stakes. Let 2r+λ
r+λ <
g
s
≤ 2, so that p∗ < 12 ≤ p
m. It suffices to construct the players’
payoff functions and verify the mutual best-response property on the set of beliefs where p1 ≥ p2.
At all such beliefs with p1 ≤ p
∗, we trivially have u1 = u2 = s, and both players are clearly playing
a best response there.
Starting from a prior belief in the interior of the triangle with corners (p∗, 0), (p∗, p∗) and
(1, 0), the action profile (1, 0) makes posterior beliefs move up a ray p2 = x (1− p1) with x ≤
p∗
1−p∗
until either player 1 experiences a breakthrough or all experimentation stops at p1 = p
∗. So player
2 will never use his risky arm and earns a sure payoff of s; as p2 < p
∗, he is playing a best response.
Player 1 achieves a payoff equal to the single-agent optimum, hence is playing a best response as
well.
For p ∈ ]p∗, 12 ], we have
u1(p, p) = u2(p, p) = p
[
g +
λ
r + λ
s
]
+ C∗u0(2p),
where
C∗u0(2p
∗) = s− p∗
[
g +
λ
r + λ
s
]
=
λ
r
p∗
[
g −
2r + λ
r + λ
s
]
> 0.
This implies that the above payoff is a strictly convex function of p. As p tends to p∗ from above,
moreover, this payoff reaches the level s with a slope of zero. As a consequence, it is increasing in
p on ]p∗, 12 ] and exceeds s there.
For p1 > max{p
∗, p2}, we write p2 = x (1 − p1) with x >
p∗
1−p∗ . We recall the general form
of the players’ payoff functions from Appendix A.3 and determine f i10(x) by value matching along
the diagonal line segment where the action profile (1, 1) is played. For given x, the corresponding
point on this line segment is ( x
x+1 ,
x
x+1), and the players’ common payoff at this point is
x
x + 1
[
g +
λ
r + λ
s
]
+ C∗u0
(
2x
x + 1
)
.
Equating this with player 1’s payoff from the action profile (1, 0) at the belief ( x
x+1 ,
x
x+1),
x
x + 1
g + f110(x)u0
(
x
x + 1
)
,
yields
f110(x) =
{
x
x + 1
λ
r + λ
s + C∗u0
(
2x
x + 1
)}/
u0
(
x
x + 1
)
=
λ
r + λ
s x
r+λ
λ + C∗2−
r
λ (1− x)
r+λ
λ .
For player 2, we find
f210(x) =
(
x
[
g −
r
r + λ
s
]
− s
)
x
r
λ + C∗2−
r
λ (1− x)
r+λ
λ .
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To verify that player 1 is playing a best response when p1 > max{p
∗, p2}, we note that
u1 = s+ b1 − c1, so we only need to prove that u1 > s. As u1 > s when p1 = p2 > p
∗, it suffices to
show that p1g + f
1
10(x)u0(p1) is increasing in p1 for p1 >
x
x+1 . By convexity of u0, it is enough to
show that g + f110(x)u
′
0(p1) ≥ 0 at p1 =
x
x+1 or, equivalently,{
λ
r + λ
s + C∗
x + 1
x
u0
(
2x
x + 1
)}(
r
λ
+
r + λ
λ
x
)
≤ g.
As 2p∗ < 2x
x+1 ≤ 1 and u0(1) = 0, convexity of u0 implies
u0
(
2x
x + 1
)
≤
1− 2x
x+1
1− 2p∗
u0(2p
∗).
Using the definition of C∗ and the fact that 1− 2p∗ = r+λ
rs
p∗
(
g − 2r+λ
r+λ s
)
, we thus find that it is
enough to show that (
r
r + λ
1
x
+ 1
)
s ≤ g.
The left-hand side of this inequality is obviously decreasing in x, and is easily seen to assume the
value g at x = p
∗
1−p∗ =
r
r+λ
s
g−s . The inequality thus holds for all x in the relevant range. This
completes the proof that player 1 is playing a best response at all beliefs such that p1 > max{p
∗, p2}.
To establish that player 2 is also playing a best response at these beliefs, we can invoke Lemmas
A.2 and A.3. The former implies that b2 tends to c2 as we approach the diagonal p2 = p1 from
below, while part (2) of the latter implies that b2 < c2 below the diagonal. In fact, p2 = p1 implies
p2 ≤
(r+λp1)s
(r+λ)g−λs for intermediate stakes.
Finally, given player 2’s strategy, admissibility rules out any strategy k1 for player 1 such
that k1(p, p) < 1 for some p ∈ ]p
∗, 12 ]. To see this, we note that any such strategy would imply
p˙2 = λp[pk1(p, p) + p − 1] < 0 in the point (p, p). For p2 < p1, however, k2(p1, p2) = 0 implies
p˙2 = λp2p1k1(p1, p2) ≥ 0. Starting in (p, p), therefore, there is no solution to the law of motion for
beliefs unless k1(p, p) = 1. The symmetric argument applies to player 2.
High stakes. Let g
s
> 2, so that pm < 12 . At all beliefs such that p2 ≤ p1 ≤ p˜ or p2 ≤
p˜
1−p˜ p2 ≤ p˜,
the players’ actions and payoffs coincide with those in the MPE for intermediate stakes, so both
players are playing a best response there.
For p1 > p˜ and p2 >
p˜
1−p˜ p1, Lemma A.2 implies that b2 tends to c2 as we approach player
2’s switching boundary, so Lemma A.3 implies that b2 < c2 whenever player 1 alone is playing
risky, and b2 > c2 whenever both players play risky. By symmetry, this also means that b1 > c1
whenever both players play risky. The verification of the best-response property is thus complete
if we can show that player 1 plays a best response when p1 > p˜ and
p˜
1−p˜ p1 < p2 <
(r+λp1)s
(r+λ)g−s . As
u1 = s + b1 − c1 at these beliefs, we only need to show that u1 > s. This step is similar to the
intermediate-stakes case and therefore omitted.
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Chapter 2: Strategic Learning in Teams∗
Nicolas Klein†
Abstract
This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed
exponential bandits in continuous time. Players face replica bandits, with one arm
that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky
arms’ yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. It is common knowledge that the
types of the two risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated. I show that the efficient
policy is incentive-compatible if, and only if, the stakes are high enough. Moreover,
learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium with continuous value
functions if, and only if, the stakes exceed a certain threshold.
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1 Introduction
Instances abound where economic agents have to decide whether to use their current infor-
mation optimally, or whether to forgo current payoffs in order to gather information which
might potentially be parlayed into higher payoffs come tomorrow. Often, though, economic
agents do not make these decisions in isolation; rather, the production of information is a
public good. Think, for instance, of firms exploring neighboring oil fields, or a research team
investigating a certain hypothesis, where it is not possible to assign credit to the individ-
ual researcher actually responsible for the decisive breakthrough. The canonical framework
to analyze these questions involving purely informational externalities is provided by the
literature on strategic experimentation with bandits.1
As information is a public good, one’s first intuition may be that, on account of free-
riding, there will always be inefficiently little experimentation in equilibrium. Indeed, the
previous literature on strategic experimentation with bandits shows that, with positively
correlated two-armed bandits,2 there never exists an efficient equilibrium; with negatively
correlated bandits,3 there exists an efficient equilibrium if, and only if, stakes are below a
certain threshold. In his canonical Moral Hazard in Teams paper, Holmstro¨m (1982) shows
that a team cannot produce efficiently in the absence of a budget-breaking principal, on
account of payoff externalities between team members. Surprisingly, though, my analysis
shows that, in a model with purely informational externalities in which players can choose
whether to investigate a given hypothesis or its negation, the efficient solution becomes
incentive compatible if the stakes at play exceed a certain threshold. The extension of
players’ action sets to include how they go about investigating a given hypothesis thus
matters greatly for the results.
Specifically, I consider two players operating replica three-armed exponential bandits in
continuous time.4 One arm is safe in that it yields a known flow payoff, whereas the other two
arms are risky, i.e. they can be either good or bad. As the risky arms are meant to symbolize
two mutually incompatible hypotheses, I assume that it is common knowledge that exactly
one of the risky arms is good. The bad risky arm never yields a positive payoff, whereas a
good risky arm yields positive payoffs after exponentially distributed times. As the expected
1See e.g. Chapter 1, of this dissertation, Bolton & Harris (1999, 2000), Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005), Keller
& Rady (2010); for an overview of the bandit literature, consult Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2008).
2See the papers by Bolton & Harris (1999, 2000), Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005), Keller & Rady (2010).
3See Chapter 1.
4The single-agent two-armed exponential model has first been analyzed by Presman (1990); Keller, Rady,
Cripps (2005) have introduced strategic interaction into the model; Klein & Rady (2010) have then introduced
negative correlation into the strategic model, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
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payoff of a good risky arm exceeds that of the safe arm, players will want to know which risky
arm is good. As either player’s actions, as well as the outcomes of his experimentation, are
perfectly publicly observable, there is an incentive for players to free-ride on the information
the other player is providing; information is a public good. Moreover, observability, together
with a common prior, implies that the players’ beliefs agree at all times. As only a good
risky arm can ever yield a positive payoff, all the uncertainty is resolved as soon as either
player has a breakthrough on a risky arm of his and beliefs become degenerate at the true
state of the world. In the absence of such a breakthrough, players incrementally become
more pessimistic about that risky arm that is more heavily utilized. As all the payoff-
relevant strategic interaction is captured by the players’ common belief process, I restrict
players to using stationary Markov strategies with their common posterior belief as the
state variable, thus making my results directly comparable to those in the previous strategic
experimentation literature.
In the game with positively correlated two-armed bandits, Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005)
find two dimensions of inefficiency in any equilibrium: The overall amount of the resource
devoted over time to the risky arm conditional on there not having been a breakthrough,
the so-called experimentation amount, is too low, as is the intensity of experimentation, i.e.
the resources devoted to the risky arm at a given instant t. Analyzing negatively correlated
two-armed bandits, we find in Chapter 1 that, while the experimentation intensity may be
inefficient, the experimentation amount is always at efficient levels. In particular, learning
will be complete, i.e. beliefs will almost surely eventually become degenerate at the true
state of the world in any equilibrium, if, and only if, efficiency so requires. Here, I show that
learning will be complete in any equilibrium with continuous value functions for exactly the
same parameter range as is the case in Chapter 1. In the present model, however, complete
learning is efficient for a wider set of parameters, as both players can reap the benefits of a
breakthrough, while in Chapter 1 one player will be stuck with the losing project.
There are two distinct effects at play that make players in the three-armed setup perform
better than in the two-armed model. The first effect is also apparent in the comparison of
the planner’s solutions, and is based on a strictly positive option value to both players’
having access to the initially less auspicious approach. The second effect is less obvious,
and purely strategic: Indeed, while even the lower appertaining planner’s solution is not
compatible with equilibrium in the two-armed model,5 the higher planner’s solution can be
achieved in equilibrium with three arms, if the stakes are high enough. The reason for this
is that with the stakes high enough, the safe option of doing essentially nothing becomes
5As already mentioned, the negatively correlated case with low stakes provides a notable exception, cf.
Chapter 1.
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so unattractive that it can be completely disregarded. But then, since there are no payoff
rivalries or switching costs in my model, given an opponent behaves in the same fashion,
a player is willing to go for the project that looks momentarily more promising, which is
exactly what efficiency requires. In Chapter 1, by contrast, players will always choose the
safe option if their assigned task looks sufficiently hopeless.
Having characterized the single-agent and the utilitarian planner’s solutions, which are
both symmetric, I construct a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium with the players’ com-
mon posterior belief as the state variable for all parameter values. For those parameters
where learning is incomplete in equilibrium, I find that the experimentation amount, as
well as the intensity, are inefficiently low. This obtains because, as in Keller, Rady, Cripps
(2005), there is no encouragement effect in these equilibria,6 and hence experimentation will
stop at the single-agent cutoff rather than the more pessimistic efficient cutoff, which takes
into account that both players benefit from finding out which project is good. Indeed, as is
characteristic of the team production paradigm, individual players do not take into account
that their efforts are also benefiting their partner.
The planner’s and the single agent’s solutions, as well as the equilibria I construct, all
exhibit continuous value functions. While I do not provide a full characterization of the
equilibrium set, I show in section 4 that learning will be complete in any equilibrium with
continuous value functions, provided the stakes at play exceed a certain threshold.
The present paper is related to a fast-growing strand of literature on bandits. Whereas
the introduction of strategic interaction into the model is due to Bolton & Harris (1999),
the use of bandit models in economics harks back to the discrete-time model of Rothschild
(1974).7 While the first papers analyzing strategic interaction featured a Brownian motion
model (Bolton & Harris, 1999, 2000), the exponential framework I use has proved itself to
be more tractable (cf. Keller, Rady, Cripps, 2005, Keller & Rady, 2010, Chapter 1). These
previous papers analyzed variants of the two-armed positively correlated model, with the
exception of Chapter 1, who introduced negative correlation into the literature.
While the afore-mentioned papers, as well as the present one, assume both actions and
outcomes to be public information, there has been one recent contribution by Bonatti &
6The encouragement effect was first identified in the Brownian motion model of Bolton & Harris (1999).
It makes players experiment at beliefs that are more pessimistic than their single-agent cutoff, because they
will have a success with a non-zero probability, which will make the other players more optimistic also,
thus inducing them to provide more experimentation, from which the first player can then benefit. With
fully revealing breakthroughs as in this model, as well as in Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) and in Chapter
1, however, a player could not care less what others might do after a breakthrough, as there will not be
anything left to learn. Therefore, there is no encouragement effect in these models.
7Bandit models have been analyzed as early as the 1950s; see e.g. Bradt, Johnson, Karlin (1956).
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Ho¨rner (2010) analyzing strategic interaction under the assumption that only outcomes are
publicly observable, while actions are private information.8 Rosenberg, Solan, Vieille (2007),
as well as Murto & Va¨lima¨ki (2006), analyze the two-armed problem of public actions and
private outcomes in discrete time, assuming action choices are irreversible.9
Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (1996, 2000) analyze strategic experimentation in buyer-seller
setups. In their 1996 model, they investigate the case of a single buyer facing multiple firms
offering a product of differing, and initially unknown, quality, and show that experimentation
is efficient in any Markov perfect equilibrium in this setting. With multiple buyers and two
firms, one of which offers a product of known quality, whereas the other firm’s product quality
is initially unknown, equilibrium results in excessive experimentation.10 The reason for this is
that price competition leads the “risky” firm to subsidize experimentation beyond efficient
levels. If there are many different markets, though, with each having its own, separate,
incumbent firm, while the same “risky” firm is active in all the markets, incumbents price
more aggressively as they also benefit from the experimentation being performed in other
markets. Indeed, Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2000) show that as the number of markets grows
large, experimentation tends toward efficient levels.
Manso (2010) analyzes the case of a single worker, who can either shirk, or take risks
and innovate, or produce in an established, safe, manner. In a simple two-period model, he
shows that, in order to induce risk taking, the principal will optimally be very tolerant of, or
even reward, early failure and long-term success. In a related fully dynamic continuous-time
model, Chapter 3 also shows that incentives are optimally provided through continuation
values after breakthroughs. I furthermore show there that there is no agency loss stemming
from the delegation of the project to an agent. Chatterjee & Evans (2004) analyze an R
& D race also involving payoff externalities in discrete time, where it is common knowledge
that exactly one of several projects is good. As in my model, they allow players to switch
projects at any point in time.
Recently, there has also been an effort at generalization of existing results in the decision-
theoretic bandit literature. For example, Bank & Fo¨llmer (2003), as well as Cohen & Solan
(2009), analyze the single-agent problem when the underlying process is a general Le´vy
process, while Camargo (2007) analyzes the effects of correlation between the arms of a
two-armed bandit operated by a single decision maker.
8Bonatti & Ho¨rner’s (2010) is not a full-blown experimentation model, though; indeed, their game stops
as soon as there has been a breakthrough, implying that there is no positive value of information. Therefore,
no player will ever play risky below his myopic cutoff.
9In my model, by contrast, players can switch between bandit arms at any time completely free of costs.
10cf. Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2000).
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; section 3
analyzes the benchmarks provided by the single agent’s and the utilitarian planner’s prob-
lems; section 4 analyzes some long-run properties of equilibrium learning; section 5 analyzes
the non-cooperative game, giving a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for all parameter
values, and a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium;
section 6 concludes. Proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model
I consider a model of two players, either of whom operates a replica three-armed bandit
in continuous time. Bandits are of the exponential type as studied e.g. in Keller, Rady &
Cripps (2005). One arm is safe in that it yields a known flow payoff of s; both other arms,
A and B, are risky, and, as in Chapter 1, it is commonly known that exactly one of these
risky arms is good and one is bad. The bad risky arm never yields any payoff; the good
risky arm yields a positive payoff with a probability of λ dt if played over a time interval of
length dt; the appertaining expected payoff increment amounts to g dt. The constants λ and
g are assumed to be common knowledge between the players. In order for the problem to
be interesting, we assume that a good risky arm is better than a safe arm, which is better
than a bad risky arm, i.e. g > s > 0.
The objective of both players is to maximize their expected discounted payoffs by choos-
ing the fraction of their flow resource they want to allocate to either risky arm. Specifically,
either player i chooses a stochastic process {(ki,A, ki,B)(t)}0≤t which is measurable with re-
spect to the information filtration that is generated by the observations available up to time
t, with (ki,A, ki,B)(t) ∈ {(a, b) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : a + b ≤ 1} for all t; ki,A(t) and ki,B(t)) denote the
fraction of the resource devoted by player i at time t to risky arms A and B, respectively.
Throughout the game, either player’s actions and payoffs are perfectly observable to the
other player. At the outset of the game, the players share a common prior belief that risky
arm A is the good one, which I denote by p0. Thus, players share a common posterior pt
at all times t. Thus, specifically, player i seeks to maximize his total expected discounted
payoff
E
[∫ ∞
0
r e−r t [(1− ki,A(t)− ki,B(t))s+ (ki,A(t)pt + ki,B(t)(1− pt)) g] dt
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the processes {pt}t∈R+ and {(ki,A, ki,B)(t)}t∈R+ .
As can immediately be seen from this objective function, there are no payoff externalities
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between the players; the only channel through which the presence of the other player may
impact a given player is via his belief pt, i.e. via the information that the other player is
generating. Thus, ours is a game of purely informational externalities.
As only a good risky arm can ever yield a lump sum, breakthroughs are fully revealing.
Thus, if there is a lump sum on risky arm A (B) at time τ , then pt = 1 (pt = 0) at all t > τ .
If there has not been a breakthrough by time τ , Bayes’ Rule yields
pτ =
p0e
−λ
∫ τ
0
KA,t dt
p0e
−λ
∫ τ
0
KA,t dt + (1− p0)e
−λ
∫ τ
0
KB,t dt
,
where KA,t := k1,A(t) + k2,A(t) and KB,t := k1,B(t) + k2,B(t). Thus, conditional on no
breakthrough having occurred, the process {pt}t∈R+ will evolve according to the law of motion
p˙t = −(KA,t −KB,t)λpt(1− pt)
almost everywhere.
As all payoff-relevant strategic interaction is captured by the players’ common posterior
beliefs {pt}t∈R+ , it seems quite natural to focus on Markov perfect equilibria with the players’
common posterior belief pt as the state variable. As is well known, this restriction is without
loss of generality in the single agent’s and the planner’s problems, which are studied in
Section 3. In the non-cooperative game, the restriction rules out history-dependent play
that is familiar from discrete-time models.11 A Markov strategy for player i is any piecewise
continuous function (ki,A, ki,B) : [0, 1] → {(a, b) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : a + b ≤ 1}, pt 7→ (ki,A, ki,B)(pt),
implying that ki,B(p) − ki,A(p) exhibits a finite number of jumps. However, this definition
does not guarantee the existence, and even less the uniqueness, of a solution to Bayes’ Rule,
which now amounts to
pτ =
p0e
−λ
∫ τ
0
KA(pt) dt
p0e
−λ
∫ τ
0
KA(pt) dt + (1− p0)e
−λ
∫ τ
0
KB(pt) dt
,
if there has not been a breakthrough by time τ , with KA(pt) := k1,A(pt) + k2,A(pt) and
KB(pt) := k1,B(pt) + k2,B(pt). Further restrictions on the players’ strategy spaces are hence
needed to ensure that their actions and payoffs be well-defined and uniquely pinned down. I
shall call admissible all strategy pairs for which Bayes’ rule admits of a solution that coincides
with the limit of the unique discrete-time solution. This in effect boils down to ruling out
those strategy pairs for which there either is no solution in continuous time, or for which the
solution is different from the discrete-time limit.
All that matters for the admissibility of a given strategy pair is the behavior of the
function ∆(p) := sgn{KB(p)−KA(p)} at those beliefs p
‡ where a change in sign occurs, i.e.
11See e.g. Bergin & McLeod (1993) for appropriate continuous-time concepts.
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where it is not the case that limp↑p‡ ∆(p) = ∆(p
‡) = limp↓p‡ ∆(p). Given our definition of
strategies, there are only finitely many such beliefs p‡, and hence both one-sided limits will
exist. By proceeding as in Chapter 1, one can show that admissibility has to be defined for
pairs of strategies, i.e. it is impossible to define a player’s set of admissible strategies without
reference to his opponent’s action. Now, a pair of strategies is admissible if, and only if, it
either exhibits no change in sign, or only changes in sign (limp↑p‡ ∆(p),∆(p
‡), limp↓p‡ ∆(p)) of
the following types: (1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1), (−1, 0, 1), (−1, 0, 0), (−1, 0,−1), (−1, 1, 1), (−1,−1, 1),
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 0,−1), (−1,−1, 0), (1, 0,−1).12
Each strategy pair (k1, k2) = ((k1,A, k1,B), (k2,A, k2,B)) induces a pair of payoff functions
(u1, u2) with ui given by
ui(p|k1, k2) =
1adm.E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt
{
(ki,A(pt)pt + ki,B(pt)(1− pt))g + [1− ki,A(pt)− ki,B(pt)]s
}
dt
∣∣∣∣ p0 = p
]
for each i ∈ {1, 2}, where 1adm. is an indicator function that is 1 whenever the strategy pair
is admissible. Thus, non-admissible strategy pairs lead to payoffs of u1 = u2 = 0.
In the subsequent analysis, it will prove useful to make case distinctions based on the
stakes at play, as measured by the ratio of the expected payoff of a good risky arm over
that of a safe arm (g
s
), the players’ impatience (as measured by the discount rate r), and the
Poisson arrival rate of a good risky arm λ, which can be interpreted as the players’ innate
ability at finding out the truth: I say that the stakes are high if g
s
≥ 4(r+λ)
2r+3λ
; stakes are
intermediate if 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
<
4(r+λ)
2r+3λ
; stakes are low if g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
; they are very low if g
s
<
2(r+λ)
r+2λ
.
3 Two Benchmarks
3.1 The Single-Agent Problem
I denote by kA and kB the fraction of the resource that the single agent dedicates to risky
arms A and B, respectively. The law of motion for the state variable is then given by the
following expression:
p˙t = −(kA(pt)− kB(pt))λpt(1− pt), for a.a. t.
12The list of admissible changes in sign differs somewhat from the corresponding list in Chapter 1: (1, 0, 1)
and (−1, 0,−1) are ruled out in Chapter 1 by the requirement imposed there that the region on which a
player uses his risky arm be the union of non-degenerate intervals. Furthermore, (0, 0, 0) does not correspond
to a change in sign according to my definition here; however, it can correspond to a transition in Chapter 1.
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Straightforward computations show the Bellman equation to be given by13
u(p) = s+ max
{(kA,kB)∈[0,1]2:kA+kB≤1}
{kA[BA(p, u)− cA(p)] + kB[BB(p, u)− cB(p)]} ,
where cA(p) := s − pg and cB(p) := s − (1 − p)g measure the myopic opportunity costs
of playing risky arm A (risky arm B) rather than the safe arm; BA(p, u) :=
λ
r
p[g − u(p) −
(1− p)u′(p)] and BB(p, u) :=
λ
r
(1− p)[g − u(p) + pu′(p)], by contrast, measure the value of
information gleaned from playing risky arm A (or risky arm B, respectively).14
Playing risky arm A, e.g., would yield an expected instantaneous payoff of pg rather
than s. Thus, a myopic agent, i.e. one who was only interested in maximizing his current
payoff, would prefer risky arm A over the safe arm if, and only if, p > pm, where pm = s
g
is defined by cA(p
m) = 0. By the same token, he would prefer risky arm B over the safe
arm, if, and only if, p < 1 − pm. A far-sighted agent, however, derives a learning benefit
over and above the myopic benefit from using either risky arm. Indeed, as the uncertainty
is about the distribution underlying the risky arms, the only way for the agent to learn is
to play a risky arm. Conceptually, while 1
r
measures the discounting, pλ[g − u(p)] measures
the expected value of a potential jump, as λ is the Poisson arrival rate of a breakthrough on
risky arm A given that the arm is good while p is the probability that it is good; g is the
value the agent jumps to in case of a success, while u(p) is the value he jumps from. The
second component, −λp(1− p)u′(p) = u′(p) dp, captures the incremental change in value as
a result of the infinitesimal movement in beliefs that is brought about by the agent’s playing
risky if there is no breakthrough.
As the Bellman equation is linear in the agent’s choice variables, it is without loss of
generality for me to restrict my attention to corner solutions, for which it is straightforward
to derive closed-form solutions for the value function:
If the agent sets (kA, kB)(p) = (0, 0), then u(p) = s.
If he sets (kA, kB)(p) = (1, 0), then his value function satisfies the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p) + (r + λp)u(p) = (r + λ)pg,
which is solved by
u(p) = pg + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
λ ,
where C is some constant of integration, and Ω(p) := 1−p
p
is the odds ratio.
13By standard arguments, if a continuously differentiable function solves the Bellman equation, it is the
value function; see also Chapter 1.
14By the standard principle of smooth pasting, the agent’s payoff function from playing an optimal policy
is once continuously differentiable.
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If he sets (kA, kB)(p) = (0, 1), then his value function satisfies the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p)− (r + λ(1− p))u(p) = −(r + λ)(1− p)g,
which is solved by
u(p) = (1− p)g + CpΩ(p)−
r
λ .
If at some belief p both (kA, kB)(p) = (1, 0) and (kA, kB)(p) = (0, 1) are optimal, then
so is (kA, kB)(p) = (
1
2
, 1
2
), and the agent’s value amounts to u(p) = r+λ
2r+λ
g =: u˜11.
The optimal policy for the single agent depends on whether the stakes at play, as
measured by the ratio g
s
, exceed the threshold of 2r+λ
r+λ
or not. Note that g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
if and
only if p∗1 ≥
1
2
, where p∗1 ≡
rs
(r+λ)g−λs
denotes the optimal single-agent cutoff in the standard
two-armed problem with one safe and one risky arm A, and 1 − p∗1 is the corresponding
threshold for the two-armed problem with one safe arm and one risky arm B.15
Proposition 3.1 (Single-Agent Solution for Low Stakes) If g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
, the single agent
will optimally play his risky arm B in [0, 1 − p∗1[, his safe arm in [1 − p
∗
1, p
∗
1], and his risky
arm A in ]p∗1, 1]. His value function is given by
u(p) =


(1− p)g +
λp∗
1
λp∗
1
+r
(Ω(p)Ω(p∗1))
− r
λ pg if p ≤ 1− p∗1
s if 1− p∗1 ≤ p ≤ p
∗
1
pg +
λp∗
1
λp∗
1
+r
(
Ω(p)
Ω(p∗
1
)
) r
λ
(1− p)g if p ≥ p∗1.
This solution continues to be optimal if g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
.
The result is illustrated in figure 1. The agent thus optimally behaves as though he
was operating a two-armed bandit with one safe arm and one risky arm of that type that
is initially more likely to be good. With low enough stakes, therefore, the option value of
having an additional risky arm is 0.
As is easily verified, the optimal solution implies incomplete learning. Indeed, let us
suppose that it is risky arm A that is good. Then, if the initial prior p0 is in [0, 1− p
∗
1[, then
limt→∞ pt = 1 − p
∗
1 with probability 1. If p0 ∈ [1 − p
∗
1, p
∗
1], then pt = p0 for all t, since the
agent will always play safe. If p0 ∈]p
∗
1, 1], it is straightforward to show that the belief will
converge to p∗1 with probability
Ω(p0)
Ω(p∗
1
)
, while the truth will be found out (i.e. the belief will
jump to 1) with the counter-probability.
If g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
, which is the case if and only if u˜11 > s, the single agent will never avail
himself of the option to play safe. Specifically, we have the following proposition:
15cf. Proposition 3.1. in Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005).
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0
g
1−p∗1 1
2
p∗1 1
Figure 1: The single-agent value function for g
s
< 2r+λ
r+λ
.
Proposition 3.2 (Single-Agent Solution for Intermediate and High Stakes) If g
s
>
2r+λ
r+λ
, the agent will play his risky arm B at all beliefs p < 1
2
and his risky arm A at all beliefs
p > 1
2
. At p = 1
2
, he will split his resources equally between his risky arms. His value function
is given by
u(p) =
{
(1− p)g + pΩ(p)−
r
λ
λ
2r+λ
g if p ≤ 1
2
pg + (1− p)Ω(p)
r
λ
λ
2r+λ
g if p ≥ 1
2
.
This solution continues to be optimal if g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
.
The result is illustrated in figure 2.
Thus, there now is an option value to having access to the alternative risky project,
as for any p ∈ [0, 1], there is now a positive probability of the agent’s ending up at p = 1
2
,
and thus using the project that initially looked less promising. The single agent’s behavior
at p = 1
2
is dictated by the need to ensure a well-defined time path for the belief.16 Note
that whenever stakes exceed the threshold of 2r+λ
r+λ
, the single agent will make sure learning
is complete, i.e. the truth will be found out with probability 1.
3.2 The Planner’s Problem
I now turn to the investigation of a benevolent utilitarian planner’s solution to the two-
player problem at hand. As the planner does not care about the distribution of surplus,
16cf. also Presman (1990).
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su˜11
0
g
1
2
1
Figure 2: The single agent’s value function for g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
.
and both players are equally apt at finding out the truth, all that matters to him is the
sum of resources devoted to both risky arms of type A (B), which I denote by KA (KB).
Straightforward computations show that the planner’s Bellman equation is given by
u(p) = s+ max
{(KA,KB)∈[0,2]2:KA+KB≤2}
{
KA
[
BA(p, u)−
cA(p)
2
]
+KB
[
BB(p, u)−
cB(p)
2
]}
.
Again, the planner’s problem is linear in the choice variables, and we can therefore
without loss of generality restrict our attention to corner solutions.
If KA = KB = 0 is optimal, u(p) = s.
If KA = 2 and KB = 0 is optimal, the Bellman equation is tantamount to the following
ODE:
2λp(1− p)u′(p) + (2λp+ r)u(p) = (2λ+ r)pg,
which is solved by
u(p) = pg + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
2λ ,
where C is again some constant of integration.
If KA = 0 and KB = 2 is optimal, the Bellman equation amounts to the following ODE:
−2λ(1− p)pu′(p) + (2λ(1− p) + r)u(p) = (1− p)(r + 2λ)g,
which is solved by
u(p) = (1− p)g + CpΩ(p)−
r
2λ .
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If (2, 0) and (0, 2), and therefore also (1, 1), are optimal, the planner’s value satisfies
u(p) =
r + 2λ
2(r + λ)
g =: u11.
Which policy is optimal will again depend on the stakes at play, though this time the
relevant threshold is different from the single agent’s problem, namely 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
. Note that
g
s
≤ 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
if and only if p∗2 ≥
1
2
, where p∗2 ≡
rs
(r+2λ)(g−s)+rs
.
Proposition 3.3 (Planner’s Solution for Very Low Stakes) If g
s
<
2(r+λ)
r+2λ
, the plan-
ner will play the same arm on both bandits at all beliefs. Specifically, he will play arm A on
]p∗2, 1], arm B on [0, 1 − p
∗
2[, and safe on [1 − p
∗
2, p
∗
2]. The corresponding payoff function is
given by
u(p) =


(1− p)g +
2λp∗
2
2λp∗
2
+r
p (Ω(p)Ω(p∗2))
− r
2λ g if p ≤ 1− p∗2,
s if 1− p∗2 ≤ p ≤ p
∗
2,
pg +
2λp∗
2
2λp∗
2
+r
(1− p)
(
Ω(p)
Ω(p∗
2
)
) r
2λ
g if p ≥ p∗2.
This solution continues to be optimal if g
s
= 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
.
The planner’s solution thus has pretty much the same structure as the single agent’s
solution for low stakes; as the latter, it implies incomplete learning. However, it is a different
cutoff, namely p∗2, that is relevant now. p
∗
2 is always strictly less than p
∗
1, and is familiar
from the two-player two-armed bandit problem with perfect positive correlation,17 where
the utilitarian planner will apply the cutoff p∗2. As in the low-stakes single-agent problem,
the value of the risky project that is less likely to be good is so low that it does not play
a role in the optimization problem. The planner is more reluctant, though, completely to
forsake the less auspicious project, simply because, in case of a success, he gets twice the
goodies, so information is more valuable to him than it is to the single agent. This effect is
absent in the negatively correlated two-armed bandit case, which is why in Chapter 1 the
relevant cutoff continues to be p∗1 for the planner.
Proposition 3.4 (Planner’s Solution for Stakes that Are Not Very Low) If g
s
>
2(r+λ)
r+2λ
,
the planner will play the same arm on both bandits at almost all beliefs. Specifically, he will
play arm A on ]1
2
, 1] and arm B on [0, 1
2
[. At p = 1
2
, he will split his resources equally between
the risky arms. The corresponding payoff function is given by
u(p) =
{
(1− p)g + λ
r+λ
pΩ(p)−
r
2λ g if p ≤ 1
2
,
pg + λ
λ+r
(1− p)Ω(p)
r
2λ g if p ≥ 1
2
.
17cf. Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005)
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This solution continues to be optimal if g
s
= 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
.
At the knife-edge case of g
s
= 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
, the planner is indifferent over all three arms at
p = 1
2
. Yet, in order to ensure a well-defined time path of beliefs, he has to set KA(
1
2
) =
KB(
1
2
) ∈ [0, 1].
Note that if the stakes at play are not very low, the planner’s solution implies complete
learning, i.e. he will make sure the truth will eventually be found out with probability 1. As a
matter of fact, the solution is quite intuitive: As the planner does not care which of the risky
arms is good, the solution is symmetric around p = 1
2
. Furthermore, it is straightforward to
verify that as g
s
≥ 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
, playing risky always dominates the safe arm as u11 ≥ s. However,
on account of the linear structure in the Bellman equation, it is always the case that either
(2, 0) or (0, 2) dominates (1, 1). Therefore, the only candidate for a solution has the planner
switch at p = 1
2
. At the switch point p = 1
2
itself, the planner’s actions are pinned down by
the need to ensure a well-defined law of motion of the state variable.
4 Long-Run Equilibrium Learning
Previous literature has noted that with perfectly positively correlated two-armed bandits,
learning is always incomplete, i.e. there is a positive probability that the truth will never
be found out. As a matter of fact, Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) find that, on account of
free-riding incentives, the overall amount of experimentation performed over time is ineffi-
ciently low in any equilibrium. On the other hand, we find in Chapter 1 that with perfectly
negatively correlated bandits, the amount of experimentation is at efficient levels in any equi-
librium; in particular, learning will be complete in any equilibrium if and only if efficiency
so requires.
The purpose of this section is to derive conditions under which, in our framework,
learning will be complete in any equilibrium in which players’ value functions are continuous.
To this end, I define as u∗1 the value function of a single agent operating a bandit with only
a safe arm and a risky arm A, while I denote by u∗2 the value function of a single agent
operating a bandit with only a safe arm and a risky arm B. It is straightforward to verify
that u∗2(p) = u
∗
1(1− p) for all p and that
18
u∗1(p) =


s if p ≤ p∗1,
pg +
λp∗
1
λp∗
1
+r
(
Ω(p)
Ω(p∗
1
)
) r
λ
(1− p)g if p ≥ p∗1
.
18cf. Prop.3.1 in Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005)
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The following lemma tells us that u∗1 and u
∗
2 are both lower bounds on players’ value functions
in any equilibrium with continuous value functions.
Lemma 4.1 (Lower Bound on Equilibrium Payoffs) Let u ∈ C0 be a player’s value
function. Then, u(p) ≥ max{u∗1(p), u
∗
2(p)} for all p ∈ [0, 1].
The intuition for this result is very straightforward. Indeed, there are only informational
externalities, no payoff externalities, in our model. Thus, intuitively, a player can only benefit
from any information his opponent provides him for free; therefore, he should be expected
to do at least as well as if he were by himself, forgoing the use of one of his risky arms to
boot.
Now, if g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
, then p∗1 <
1
2
< 1 − p∗1, so at any belief p, we have that u
∗
1(p) > s or
u∗2(p) > s or both. Thus, there cannot exist a p such that (k1,A, k1,B)(p) = (k2,A, k2,B)(p) =
(0, 0) be mutually best responses as this would mean u1(p) = u2(p) = s. This proves the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.2 (Complete learning) If g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
, learning will be complete in any
Markov perfect equilibrium with continuous value functions.
It is the same threshold 2r+λ
r+λ
above which complete learning is efficient, and prevails
in any equilibrium, in the perfectly negatively correlated two-armed bandit case.19 In our
setting, however, complete learning is efficient for a larger set of parameters, as we saw in
Proposition 3.4.
Moreover, the planner’s solution is an obvious upper bound on players’ average equilib-
rium payoffs. If g
s
<
2(r+λ)
r+2λ
, we know from Proposition 3.4 that the planner’s value is s on
the non-degenerate interval [1 − p∗2, p
∗
2]. Since there cannot be an open interval on which a
player’s value is less than s, it will be s almost everywhere on [1−p∗2, p
∗
2]. Since either player
can always guarantee himself a payoff of s by playing safe forever, so that s is an obvious
lower bound on either player’s equilibrium payoffs, this means both players’ value must be s
on [1− p∗2, p
∗
2] in any equilibrium. Therefore, in any equilibrium, both players uniquely play
safe almost everywhere in [1− p∗2, p
∗
2], implying the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3 (Incomplete Learning) If g
s
<
2(r+λ)
r+2λ
, learning will be incomplete in
any equilibrium.
19cf. Chapter 1
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5 Strategic Problem
Proceeding as before, I find that the Bellman equation for player i (i 6= j) is given by20
ui(p) = s+ kj,ABA(p, ui) + kj,BBB(p, ui)
+ max
{(ki,A,ki,B)∈[0,1]2:ki,A+ki,B≤1}
{ki,A [BA(p, ui)− cA(p)] + ki,B [BB(p, ui)− cB(p)]} .
As players are perfectly symmetric in that they are operating two replicas of the same
bandit, the Bellman equation for player j looks exactly the same. It is noteworthy that a
player only has to bear the opportunity costs of his own experimentation, while the benefits
accrue to both, which indicates the presence of free-riding incentives.
On account of the linear structure of the optimization problem, we can restrict our
attention to the nine pure strategy profiles, along with three indifference cases per player.
Each of these cases leads to a first-order ordinary differential equation (ODE). Details, as
well as closed-form solutions, are provided in Appendix A.
5.1 Necessary Conditions for Best Responses
The linearity of the problem provides us with a powerful tool to derive necessary conditions
for a certain strategy combination ((k1,A, k1,B), (k2,A, k2,B)) to be consistent with mutually
best responses on an open set of beliefs.21 As an example, suppose player 2 is playing (1, 0).
If player 1’s best response is given by (1, 0), it follows immediately from the Bellman equation
that it must be the case that BA(p, u1) ≥ cA(p) and BA(p, u1) − BB(p, u1) ≥ cA(p) − cB(p)
for all p in the open interval in question. Moreover, we know that on the open interval in
question, the player’s value function satisfies
2λp(1− p)u′1(p) + (2λp+ r)u1(p) = (2λ+ r)pg,
20By the smooth pasting principle, player i’s payoff function from playing a best response is once contin-
uously differentiable on any open interval on which (kj,A, kj,B)(p) in continuous. If (kj,A, kj,B)(p) exhibits a
jump at p, u′i(p), which is contained in the definitions of BA and BB , is to be understood as the one-sided
derivative in the direction implied by the motion of beliefs. In either instance, standard results imply that
if for a certain fixed (kj,A, kj,B), the payoff function generated by the policy (ki,A, ki,B) solves the Bellman
equation, then (ki,A, ki,B) is a best response to (kj,A, kj,B).
21As we keep player j’s strategy (kj,A, kj,B) fixed on an open interval of beliefs, player i’s value function
ui (i 6= j) is of class C
1 on that open interval. Therefore, by standard arguments, ui solves the Bellman
equation on the open interval in question.
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which can be plugged into the two inequalities above, yielding a necessary condition for
(k1,A, k1,B) = (1, 0) to be a best response to (k2,A, k2,B) = (1, 0). Proceeding in this manner
for the possible pure-strategy combinations gives us necessary conditions for a certain pure-
strategy combination to be consistent with mutually best responses on an open interval of
beliefs, which I report as an auxiliary result in Appendix A.
5.2 Efficiency
Inefficiency because of free-riding has hitherto been a staple result of the literature on strate-
gic experimentation (cf. Bolton & Harris, 1999, 2000, Keller, Rady, Cripps, 2005, Keller &
Rady, 2010). Introducing negative correlation into the strategic experimentation literature,
in Chapter 1, we find that efficient behavior is incentive-compatible if and only if the stakes
are low enough. The essential reason for this is as follows: With the stakes low enough,
it is clear that the more pessimistic player will never play risky; therefore, the more opti-
mistic player, not having an opportunity to free-ride on his opponent’s efforts, will behave
efficiently. As a matter of fact, in Chapter 1, the efficient equilibrium disappears as soon
as the players’ single-agent cutoffs overlap, and free-riding incentives come into play again.
Here, though, the opposite result prevails: The efficient solution is incentive-compatible if,
and only if, the stakes are high enough, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5.1 (Efficient Equilibrium) There exists an efficient equilibrium if and only
if g
s
≥ 4(r+λ)
2r+3λ
.
Indeed, the mechanism ensuring existence of an efficient equilibrium for low stakes
in Chapter 1 cannot be at work here, since both players are operating replica bandits.
Therefore, if one player has an incentive to experiment given the other player abstains from
experimentation, then so does the other player, and free-riding motives enter the picture, no
matter how low the stakes might be. One possible intuition for why we here obtain efficiency
for high stakes is as follows: For high enough stakes, players would never consider the safe
option. Moreover, the efficient policy coincides with the single-agent policy, namely, either
implies both players’ playing risky, at full throttle, on the arm that is more likely to be good.
Therefore, for a player to deviate from this policy in equilibrium, he has to be given special
incentives to do so; in the absence of such incentives, e.g. when the other player sticks to
the efficient policy, a player’s best response calls for his doing the efficient thing also, i.e.
there exists an efficient equilibrium. However, for free-riding incentives to be totally eclipsed,
stakes have to exceed a threshold that is higher than the one making sure a single agent
would never play safe. Indeed, as we have seen, stakes higher than this latter threshold
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only ensure that learning will be complete in any equilibrium, i.e. while the experimentation
amount is at efficient levels, the intensity does not reach efficient levels as long as g
s
<
4(r+λ)
2r+3λ
.
While it is not surprising that the utilitarian planner, who now has more options, should
always be doing better than the planner in Chapter 1, who could not transfer resources
between the two types of risky arm, it may seem somewhat surprising that the players
should now be able to achieve even this higher efficient benchmark, while they could not
achieve the lower benchmark in the negatively correlated two-armed model in Chapter 1.
Indeed, with the stakes high enough, free-riding incentives can be overcome completely in
non-cooperative equilibrium.
5.3 Symmetric Equilibrium for Low And Intermediate Stakes
The purpose of this section is to construct a symmetric equilibrium for those parameter
values for which there does not exist an efficient equilibrium. I define symmetry in keeping
with Bolton & Harris (1999) as well as Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005):
Definition An equilibrium is said to be symmetric if equilibrium strategies ((k1,A, k1,B), (k2,A, k2,B))
satisfy (k1,A, k1,B)(p) = (k2,A, k2,B)(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
As a matter of course, in any symmetric equilibrium, u1(p) = u2(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. I
shall denote the players’ common value function by u.
5.3.1 Low Stakes
Recall that the stakes are low if, and only if, the single-agent cutoffs for the two risky arms
do not overlap. It can be shown that in this case the symmetric equilibrium in Keller, Rady,
and Cripps (Prop. 5.1, 2005) will survive in the sense that there exists an equilibrium that
is essentially two copies of the Keller, Rady, and Cripps equilibrium, mirrored at the p = 1
2
axis. Specifically, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2 (Symmetric MPE for Low Stakes) If g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
, there exists a sym-
metric equilibrium where both players exclusively use the safe arm on [1 − p∗1, p
∗
1], the risky
arm A above the belief pˆ > p∗1, and the risky arm B at beliefs below 1− pˆ, where pˆ is defined
implicitly by
Ω(pm)−1 − Ω(pˆ)−1 =
r + λ
λ
[
1
1− pˆ
−
1
1− p∗1
− Ω(p∗1)
−1 ln
(
Ω(p∗1)
Ω(pˆ)
)]
.
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In [p∗1, pˆ], the fraction kA(p) =
u(p)−s
cA(p)
is allocated to risky arm A, while 1− kA(p) is allocated
to the safe arm; in [1 − pˆ, 1 − p∗1], the fraction kB(p) =
u(p)−s
cB(p)
is allocated to risky arm B,
while 1− kB(p) is allocated to the safe arm.
Let Vh(p) := pg + Ch(1 − p)Ω(p)
r
2λ , and Vl(p) := (1 − p)g + ClpΩ(p)
− r
2λ . Then, the
players’ value function is given by u(p) = W (p) if 1− pˆ ≤ p ≤ pˆ, where W (p) is defined by
W (p) :=


s+ r
λ
s
[
Ω(p∗1)
−1
(
1− p
p∗
1
)
− p ln
(
Ω(p)
Ω(p∗
1
)
)]
if 1− pˆ ≤ p ≤ 1− p∗1
s if 1− p∗1 ≤ p ≤ p
∗
1
s+ r
λ
s
[
Ω(p∗1)
(
1− 1−p
1−p∗
1
)
− (1− p) ln
(
Ω(p∗
1
)
Ω(p)
)]
if p∗1 ≤ p ≤ pˆ
;
u(p) = Vh(p) if pˆ ≤ p, while u(p) = Vl(p) if p ≤ 1− pˆ, where the constants of integration Ch
and Cl are determined by Vh(pˆ) = W (pˆ) and Vl(1− pˆ) = W (1− pˆ), respectively.
Thus, in this equilibrium, even though either player knows that one of his risky arms
is good, whenever the uncertainty is greatest, the safe option is attractive to the point that
he cannot be bothered to find out which one it is. When players are relatively certain which
risky arm is good, they invest all their resources in that arm. When the uncertainty is
of medium intensity, the equilibrium has the flavor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, with
players devoting a uniquely determined fraction of their resources to the risky arm they
deem more likely to be good, with the rest being invested in the safe option. As a matter
of fact, the experimentation intensity decreases continuously from kA(pˆ) = 1 to kA(p
∗
1) = 0
(from kB(1− pˆ) = 1 to kB(1−p
∗
1) = 0). Even though players’ Bellman equations are linear in
the strategy variable, the equilibrium requires them to use interior levels of experimentation.
Intuitively, the situation is very much reminiscent of the classical Battle of the Sexes game:
If a player’s partner experiments, he would like to free-ride on his efforts; if his partner plays
safe, though, he would rather do the experimentation himself than give up on finding out the
truth. Now, in symmetric equilibrium, the experimentation intensities are chosen in exactly
such a manner as to render the other player indifferent between experimenting and playing
safe, thus making him willing to mix over both his options.
Having seen that there exists an equilibrium implying incomplete learning, and exhibit-
ing continuous value functions, for g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
, we are now in a position to strengthen our
result on complete learning:
Corollary 5.3 (Complete Learning) Learning will be complete in any Markov Perfect
equilibrium with continuous value functions if and only if g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ
.
In Chapter 1, we found that with the possible exception of the knife-edge case where
g
s
= 2r+λ
r+λ
, learning was going to be complete in any equilibrium if and only if complete
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learning was efficient. While complete learning obtains in any equilibrium with continuous
value functions for the exact same parameter set in both models, here, by contrast, we find
that if 2(r+λ)
r+2λ
< g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ
, efficiency uniquely calls for complete learning, yet there exists
an equilibrium entailing incomplete learning. This is because with three-armed bandits
information is more valuable to the planner, as in case of a success he gets the full payoff
of a good risky arm. With negatively correlated two-armed bandits, however, the planner
cannot shift resources between the two types of risky arm; thus, his payoff in case of a success
is just g+s
2
.
5.3.2 Intermediate Stakes
For intermediate stakes, the equilibrium I construct is essentially of the same structure as
the previous one: It is symmetric and it requires players to mix on some interval of beliefs.
However, there does not exist an interval where both players play safe, so that players will
always eventually find out the true state of the world, even though they do so inefficiently
slowly.
Proposition 5.4 (Symmetric MPE for Intermediate Stakes) If 2r+λ
r+λ
< g
s
<
4(r+λ)
2r+3λ
,
there exists a symmetric equilibrium. Let pˇ := λ+r
λ
(2pm − 1), and W(p) be defined by
W(p) :=
{
s+ r+λ
λ
(g − s)− r
λ
ps (2 + ln(Ω(p))) if p ≤ 1
2
s+ r+λ
λ
(g − s)− r
λ
(1− p)s (2− ln(Ω(p))) if p ≥ 1
2
Now, let p
†
1 >
1
2
and p
†
2 >
1
2
be defined by W(p†1) =
λ+r(1−p†
1
)
λ+r
g and W(p†2) = 2s − p
†
2g,
respectively. Then, let p† ≡ p†1 if p
†
1 ≥ pˇ; otherwise, let p
† ≡ p†2.
In equilibrium, both players will exclusively use their risky arm A in [p†, 1], and their
risky arm B in [0, 1 − p†]. In ]1
2
, p†], the fraction kA(p) =
W(p)−s
cA(p)
is allocated to risky arm
A, while 1 − kA(p) is allocated to the safe arm; in [p
†, 1
2
[, the fraction kB(p) =
W(p)−s
cB(p)
is
allocated to risky arm B, while 1−kB(p) is allocated to the safe arm. At p =
1
2
, a fraction of
kA(
1
2
) = kB(
1
2
) = (λ+r)g−(2r+λ)s
λ(2s−g)
is allocated to either risky arm, with the rest being allocated
to the safe arm.
Let Vh(p) := pg + Ch(1 − p)Ω(p)
r
2λ , and Vl(p) := (1 − p)g + ClpΩ(p)
− r
2λ . Then, the
players’ value function is given by u(p) =W(p) in [1− p†, p†], by u(p) = Vh(p) in [p
†, 1], and
u(p) = Vl(p) in [0, 1 − p
†], with the constants of integration Ch and Cl being determined by
Vh(p
†) =W(p†) and Vl(1− p
†) =W(1− p†).
Thus, no matter what initial prior players start out from, there is a positive probability
beliefs will end up at p = 1
2
, and hence they will try the risky project that looked initially
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less auspicious. Therefore, in contrast to the equilibrium for low stakes, there is a positive
value attached to the option of having access to the second risky project.
6 Conclusion
I have analyzed a game of strategic experimentation with three-armed bandits, where the two
risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated. In so doing, I have constructed a symmetric
equilibrium for all parameter values. Furthermore, we have seen that any equilibrium is inef-
ficient if stakes are below a certain threshold, and that any equilibrium with continuous value
functions involves complete learning if stakes are above a certain threshold. In particular, if
the stakes are high, there exists an efficient equilibrium and learning will be complete in any
equilibrium with continuous value functions. If stakes are intermediate in size, all equilibria
are inefficient, though they involve complete learning (provided there are no discontinuities
in the value functions), as required by efficiency. If the stakes are low but not very low, all
equilibria are inefficient; there exists an equilibrium that involves incomplete learning, while
efficiency requires complete learning. If the stakes are very low, the efficient solution implies
incomplete learning; all equilibria involve incomplete learning and are inefficient.
The present paper is merely a first foray into the analysis of strategic experimentation
on bandits with more than two arms. The underlying stochastic process was assumed to
be Poisson, with a bad risky arm never yielding any payoff. Whether my results are robust
to alternative distributional assumptions, such as a non-zero, yet low, arrival rate of a bad
risky arm, as in Keller & Rady (2010), or to the assumption of a diffusion process, as in
Bolton & Harris (1999, 2000), or even a general Le´vy process in the vein of Cohen & Solan
(2009), is an interesting question for future research.
Furthermore, while Chapter 1 explores the robustness of their results to certain kinds
of asymmetries between players, all the strategic experimentation papers out to date as-
sume players are perfectly symmetric with respect to their “innate” learning abilities, as
parameterized by the Poisson arrival rate of breakthroughs, or the diffusion coefficient. In
the three-armed case, it could be interesting to explore the additional trade-offs that would
arise, if, say, player 1 was able to learn faster on risky arm A, while player 2 was faster with
risky arm B. Modeling these trade-offs might yield new insights into the conditions under
which there is excessive, or insufficient, specialization in equilibrium. I intend to explore
these questions in future research.
The assumption of perfect negative correlation between the two types of risky arm has
allowed me to represent beliefs as elements of the one-dimensional unit interval. Analyzing
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the case of a general correlation coefficient would imply beliefs evolving in a simplex of
dimension greater than 1, and the players’ value functions satisfying partial, rather than
ordinary, differential equations. It also remains to be investigated how the introduction of
private information would affect the analysis, and the conclusions, of the model. I hope to
investigate these questions in future work.
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Appendix
A Closed-Form Solutions And An Auxiliary Result
If ((0, 0), (0, 0)) is played, it is easy to see that u1(p) = u2(p) = s.
If ((1, 0), (1, 0)) is played, both players’ value functions satisfy the following ODE:
2λp(1− p)u′(p) + (2λp+ r)u(p) = (2λ+ r)pg,
which is solved by
u(p) = pg + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
2λ ,
where C is some constant of integration.
If ((0, 1), (0, 1)) is played, both players’ value functions satisfy the following ODE:
−2λp(1− p)u′(p) + (2λ(1− p) + r)u(p) = (2λ+ r)(1− p)g,
which is solved by
u(p) = (1− p)g + CpΩ(p)−
r
2λ .
If ((0, 1), (1, 0)) is played, player 1’s value function is linear:
u1(p) =
λ+ r(1− p)
λ+ r
g.
By the same token, player 2’s value is also linear,
u2(p) =
λ+ rp
λ+ r
g.
Symmetrically, if ((1, 0), (0, 1)) is played we have:
u1(p) =
λ+ rp
λ+ r
g,
and
u2(p) =
λ+ r(1− p)
λ+ r
g.
If ((0, 0), (1, 0)) is played, player 1’s value satisfies the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p) + (λp+ r)u(p) = rs+ λpg,
which is solved by
u1(p) = s+
λ
λ+ r
p(g − s) + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
λ ,
while player 2’s value satisfies
λp(1− p)u′(p) + (λp+ r)u(p) = (λ+ r)pg,
which is solved by
u2(p) = pg + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
λ .
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Symmetrically, if ((1, 0), (0, 0)) is played, player 1’s value satisfies the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p) + (λp+ r)u(p) = (λ+ r)pg,
which is solved by
u1(p) = pg + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
λ .
Meanwhile, player 2’s value satisfies:
λp(1− p)u′(p) + (λp+ r)u(p) = rs+ λpg,
which is solved by
u2(p) = s+
λ
λ+ r
p(g − s) + C(1− p)Ω(p)
r
λ .
If ((0, 0), (0, 1)) is played, player 1’s value satisfies the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p)− (r + λ(1− p))u(p) = −rs− λ(1− p)g,
which admits of the solution
u1(p) = s+
λ
r
g +
λ
r
p[
λ
r
g − (g − s)] + CpΩ(p)−
r
λ .
As for player 2, his value evolves according to:
λp(1− p)u′(p)− (r + λ(1− p))u(p) = −(1− p)(r + λ)g,
which is solved by
u2(p) = (1− p)g + CpΩ(p)
− r
λ .
Symmetrically, if ((0, 1), (0, 0)) is played, player 1’s value satisfies the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p)− (r + λ(1− p))u(p) = −(1− p)(r + λ)g,
which is solved by
u1(p) = (1− p)g + CpΩ(p)
− r
λ .
Player 2’s value, by contrast, satisfies
λp(1− p)u′(p)− (r + λ(1− p))u(p) = −rs− λ(1− p)g,
which admits of the solution
u2(p) = s+
λ
r
g +
λ
r
p[
λ
r
g − (g − s)] + CpΩ(p)−
r
λ .
Moreover, there are three indifference cases for player i: He might be indifferent between his
risky arm A and his safe arm, between his risky arm B and his safe arm, or between his two risky
arms of opposite types.
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If player i is indifferent between his safe arm and his risky arm A, his value function satisfies
the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p) + λpu(p) = (λ+ r)pg − rs,
which is solved by
ui(p) = s+
r + λ
λ
(g − s) +
r
λ
s(1− p) ln [Ω(p)] + C(1− p).
If player i is indifferent between his safe arm and his risky arm B, his value function satisfies
the following ODE:
λp(1− p)u′(p)− λ(1− p)u(p) = rs− (r + λ)(1− p)g,
which is solved by
ui(p) = s+
r + λ
λ
(g − s)−
r
λ
sp ln [Ω(p)] + Cp.
If player i is indifferent between both his risky arms, his value function satisfies the following
ODE:
2λp(1− p)u′(p) + λ(2p− 1)u(p) = (λ+ r)(2p− 1)g,
which is solved by
ui(p) =
r + λ
λ
g + C
√
p(1− p).
An Auxiliary Result
The logic we discussed in section 5.1 of the main text gives us the following auxiliary result, which
will be useful in the proofs of Propositions 4.3, 5.1, and 5.4.
Lemma A.1 Let P ⊂]0, 1[ be an open interval of beliefs in which the action profile remains con-
stant, and let p ∈ P.
Let kj(p) = (0, 0). Then the following statements hold:
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (0, 0), then ui(p) = s.
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (1, 0) or ki(p) = (0, 1), then ui(p) ≥ max{s,
r+λ
2r+λg}.
Let kj(p) = (1, 0). Then the following statements hold:
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (0, 0), then
λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g ≤ ui(p) ≤ 2s− pg.
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (1, 0), then ui(p) ≥ max{
λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g, 2s− pg}.
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (0, 1), then ui(p) =
λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g and p ≤ min{1−
pm, r+λ2r+3λ}.
Let kj(p) = (0, 1). Then the following statements hold:
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (0, 0), then
λ+rp
λ+r g ≤ ui(p) ≤ 2s− (1− p)g.
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• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (1, 0), then ui(p) =
λ+rp
λ+r g and p ≥ max{p
m, r+2λ2r+3λ}.
• If player i’s best response is given by ki(p) = (0, 1), then ui(p) ≥ max{
λ+rp
λ+r g, 2s− (1− p)g}.
As r+λ2r+3λ <
1
2 <
r+2λ
2r+3λ , the lemma immediately implies that in no equilibrium ((1, 0), (0, 1)) or
((0, 1), (1, 0)) can arise on an open interval. If furthermore g
s
≥ 2, and hence 2s − pg ≤ λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g
for all p ∈ [0, 1], then ((1, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (1, 0)), ((0, 1), (0, 0)) and ((0, 0), (0, 1)) cannot arise on
an open interval either.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The policy (kA, kB) implies a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The function u
satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p∗1 and 1 − p
∗
1, hence is of class C
1. It is strictly
decreasing on ]0, 1− p∗[ and strictly increasing on ]p∗, 1[. Moreover, u = s+BB − cB on [0, 1− p
∗],
u = s on [1 − p∗, p∗], and u = s + BA − cA on [p
∗, 1] (I drop the arguments for simplicity), which
shows that u is indeed the planner’s payoff function from (k1, k2).
To show that u and this policy (kA, kB) solve the agent’s Bellman equation, and hence that
(k1, k2) is optimal, it is enough to establish that BA < cA and BB > cB on ]0, 1 − p
∗[ , BA < cA
and BB < cB on ]1 − p
∗, p∗[ , and BA > cA and BB < cB on ]p
∗, 1[ . Consider this last interval.
There, u = s+BA − cA and u > s (by monotonicity of u) immediately imply BA > cA. It remains
to be shown that BA − cA > BB − cB. Using the appertaining differential equation, we have that
BA − BB = 2(u − pg) −
λ
r
(g − u). It is now straightforward to show that BA − BB > cA − cB if
and only if u > r+λ2r+λg. By the afore-mentioned monotonicity properties, we know that u > s; yet,
r+λ
2r+λg ≤ s if and only if
g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ , i.e. if and only if the stakes are low. The other intervals are
dealt with in similar fashion.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The policy (kA, kB) implies a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The function u
satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p = 12 , hence is of class C
1. It is strictly decreasing
on ]0, 12 [ and strictly increasing on ]
1
2 , 1[. Moreover, u = s+BB − cB on [0,
1
2 ] and u = s+BA− cA
on [12 , 1], which shows that u is indeed the agent’s payoff function from (k1, k2).
Note that on account of u˜11 ≥ s, it can never be the case that 0 > max{BA − cA, BB − cB}.
Thus, all that remains to be shown is that BB − cB > BA− cA on ]0,
1
2 [ and BA− cA > BB − cB on
]12 , 1[. Consider this last interval. Plugging in the relevant ODE, we have that BA−cA = u−s, and
BB − cB = (1 +
λ
r
)(g − u)− s; hence BA − cA > BB − cB is equivalent to u >
r+λ
2r+λg = u˜11 = u(
1
2),
which is satisfied on account of the afore-mentioned monotonicity properties. The other interval is
dealt with in a similar way.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
The policy (KA,KB) implies a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The function u
satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p∗2 and 1 − p
∗
2, hence is of class C
1. It is strictly
decreasing on [0, 1−p∗2] and strictly increasing on [p
∗
2, 1]. Moreover, u = s+2BB− cB on [0, 1−p
∗
2],
u = s on [1 − p∗2, p
∗
2], and u = s + 2BA − cA on [p
∗
2, 1], which shows that u is indeed the planner’s
payoff function from (k1, k2).
To show that u and this policy (KA,KB) solve the planner’s Bellman equation, it is enough to
establish that BB−
cB
2 > max{0, BA−
cA
2 } on ]0, 1−p
∗
2[, 0 > max{BA−
cA
2 , BB−
cB
2 } on ]1−p
∗
2, p
∗
2[,
BA −
cA
2 > max{0, BB −
cB
2 } on ]p
∗
2, 1[. Consider this last interval. There, u = s + 2BA − cA and
u > s (by monotonicity of u) immediately imply 2BA − cA > 0. It remains to be shown that
2BA − cA > 2BB − cB. Using the appertaining differential equation, we have that BA − BB =
u−pg− λ
r
(g−u). It is now straightforward to show that BA−BB >
cA−cB
2 if and only if u >
2λ+r
2(r+λ)g.
By the afore-mentioned monotonicity properties, we know that u > s; yet, s ≥ 2λ+r2(r+λ)g if and only
if g
s
≤ 2(r+λ)2λ+r , i.e. if and only if the stakes are very low. The other intervals are dealt with in similar
fashion.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
The policy (KA,KB) implies a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The function u
satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p = 12 , hence is of class C
1. It is strictly decreasing
on ]0, 12 [ and strictly increasing on ]
1
2 , 1[. Moreover, u = s+2BB−cB on [0,
1
2 ] and u = s+2BA−cA
on [12 , 1], which shows that u is indeed the planner’s payoff function from (KA,KB).
To show that u and this policy (KA,KB) solve the planner’s Bellman equation, it is enough to
establish that BB −
cB
2 > max{0, BA−
cA
2 } on ]0,
1
2 [, and BA−
cA
2 > max{0, BB −
cB
2 } on ]
1
2 , 1[. To
start out, note that on account of u11 ≥ s, it can never be the case that 0 > max{BA−
cA
2 , BB−
cB
2 }.
Thus, all that remains to be shown is that BB −
cB
2 > BA −
cA
2 on ]0,
1
2 [ and BA −
cA
2 > BB −
cB
2
on ]12 , 1[. Consider this last interval. Using the appertaining differential equation, we have that
BA−BB = u−pg−
λ
r
(g−u). It is now straightforward to show that BA−BB >
cA−cB
2 if and only
if u > 2λ+r2(r+λ)g = u11, which is satisfied on account of the afore-mentioned monotonicity properties
and the fact that u(12) = u11. The other interval is treated in a similar fashion.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
I shall first prove that u∗1 is a lower bound on player i’s value function u, writing B
∗
A(p) = BA(p, u
∗
1),
and B∗B(p) = BB(p, u
∗
1). Henceforth, I shall suppress arguments whenever this is convenient. Since
p∗1 is the single-agent cutoff belief for player 1, we have u
∗
1 = s for p ≤ p
∗
1 and u
∗
1 = s+b
∗
1−c1 = pg+b
∗
1
for p > p∗1. Thus, if p < p
∗
1, the claim holds by continuity, because on any open interval between
any two points of discontinuity in his opponent’s strategy,22, a player can always guarantee himself
22Note that, on account of my definition of strategies, there can be only finitely many such points of
discontinuity.
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a payoff of at least s by playing (0, 0).
Now, let p ≥ p∗1. Then, noting that B
∗
A = u
∗
1 − pg, we have B
∗
B =
λ
r
[g− u∗1]− (u
∗
1 − gp). Thus,
B∗B ≥ 0 if and only if u
∗
1 ≤
λ+rp
λ+r g =: w1(p). Let p˜ be defined by w1(p˜) = s; it is straightforward to
show that p˜ < p∗1. Noting furthermore that u
∗
1(p
∗
1) = s, w1(1) = u
∗
1(1) = g, and that w1 is linear
whereas u∗1 is strictly convex in p, we conclude that u
∗
1 < w1 and hence B
∗
B > 0 on [p
∗
1, 1[ . As a
consequence, we have u∗1 = pg +B
∗
A ≤ pg + k2,BB
∗
B +B
∗
A on [p
∗, 1].
Now, suppose u1 < u
∗
1 at some belief. Since s is a lower bound on u1, this, by continuity,
implies the existence of a belief strictly greater than p∗1 where u1 < u
∗
1 and u
′
1 ≤ (u
∗
1)
′. This
immediately yields BA > B
∗
A > cA, as well as
kj,ABA + kj,BBB +max{BA − cA, BB − cB, 0} < max{B
∗
A − cA, 0},
which, as B∗A ≥ 0 (cf. Keller, Rady, Cripps, 2005), in turn implies BB < 0 and kj,B = 1. If ki,B = 1,
then u would amount to (1− p)g + 2BB < (1− p)g, a contradiction. Therefore, we have ki,A = 1,
and u = pg +BB +BA at the belief in question. But now,
u1 − u
∗
1 ≥ pg +BB +BA − (pg +B
∗
B +B
∗
A) =
λ
r
(u∗1 − u1) > 0,
a contradiction.
An analogous argument applies for u∗2.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
First, I note that 2s − p∗2g = 2s −
rsg
(r+2λ)(g−s)+rs and
λ+r(1−p∗
2
)
λ+r g = g −
r
r+λ
rsg
(r+2λ)(g−s)+rs are
strictly bigger than s. As p 7→ 2s − pg and p 7→ λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g are both strictly decreasing in p, this
implies that either player i’s payoff function satisfies ui < min{2s − pg,
λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g} on the entire
interval ]1 − p∗2, p
∗
2[. By Lemma A.1, this rules out ((1, 0), (1, 0)), ((0, 1), (0, 1)), ((0, 0), (1, 0)) and
((1, 0), (0, 0)) on any open subinterval. Noting that p 7→ 2s − (1 − p)g and p 7→ λ+rp
λ+r g are both
strictly increasing in p, the same calculations rule out ((0, 1), (0, 0)) and ((0, 0), (0, 1)). Therefore,
((0, 0), (0, 0)) uniquely prevails almost everywhere on ]1− p∗2, p
∗
2[.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
Suppose g
s
≥ 4(r+λ)2r+3λ . What is to be shown is that the action profiles ((1, 0), (1, 0)) and ((0, 1), (0, 1))
are mutually best responses on ]12 , 1], and [0,
1
2 [, respectively. At p =
1
2 , admissibility uniquely pins
down a player’s response to the other player’s action. By the characterization of efficiency (cf.
Proposition 3.4), both players’ respective value function if efficiency prevails is given by:
u(p) =
{
(1− p)g + pΩ(p)−
r
2λ
λ
r+λg if p ≤
1
2
pg + (1− p)Ω(p)
r
2λ
λ
r+λg if p ≥
1
2 .
Now, by Lemma A.1, it is sufficient to show that u(p) > max{λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g, 2s − pg} on ]
1
2 , 1], and
u(p) > max{λ+rp
λ+r g, 2s−(1−p)g} on [0,
1
2 [. I shall only consider the former interval, as the argument
pertaining to the latter is perfectly symmetric.
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Simple algebra shows that if g
s
≥ 4(r+λ)2r+3λ , w(p) :=
λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g ≥ 2s − pg everywhere in [
1
2 , 1].
Since u(12) = w(
1
2), and u is strictly increasing while w is strictly decreasing in ]
1
2 , 1[, the claim
follows.
Suppose 2(r+λ)
r+2λ ≤
g
s
<
4(r+λ)
2r+3λ , and define w˜(p) := 2s − pg. It is now straightforward to show
that w˜(12) > w(
1
2) = u(
1
2), and, therefore, by Lemma A.1, there exists a neighborhood to the right
of p = 12 in which (1, 0) is not a best response to (1, 0).
Suppose that the stakes are very low, i.e. g
s
<
2(r+λ)
r+2λ . From our characterization of the efficient
solution (cf. Proposition 3.3), we know that BA(p
∗
2, u) =
cA(p
∗
2
)
2 , and that the players’ value function
is given by
u(p) =


(1− p)g +
2λp∗
2
2λp∗
2
+rp (Ω(p)Ω(p
∗
2))
− r
2λ g if p ≤ 1− p∗2,
s if 1− p∗2 ≤ p ≤ p
∗
2,
pg +
2λp∗
2
2λp∗
2
+r (1− p)
(
Ω(p)
Ω(p∗
2
)
) r
2λ
if p ≥ p∗2.
For the efficient actions to be incentive-compatible, it is necessary that BA ≥ cA on ]p
∗
2, 1]. Yet,
since u is of class C1, we have that limp↓p∗
2
BA(p, u) =
cA(p
∗
2
)
2 < cA(p
∗
2), as p
∗
2 < p
m.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
First, I show that pˆ as defined in the proposition indeed exists and is unique in ]p∗1, 1[. It is
immediate to verify that the left-hand side of the defining equation is decreasing, while the right-
hand side is increasing in pˆ. Moreover, for pˆ = p∗1, the left-hand side is strictly positive, while the
right-hand side is zero. Now, for pˆ ↑ 1, the left-hand side tends to −∞, while the right-hand side
is positive. The claim thus follows by continuity.
The proposed policies imply a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The function
u satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p∗1 and 1− p
∗
1, hence is of class C
1. It is strictly
decreasing on ]0, 1− p∗1] and strictly increasing on ]p
∗
1, 1[. Moreover, u = s+2BB − cB on [0, 1− pˆ],
u = s+ kBBB on [1− pˆ, 1− p
∗
1], u = s on [1− p
∗
1, p
∗
1], u = s+ kABA on [p
∗
1, pˆ] and u = s+2BA− cA
on [pˆ, 1], which shows that u is indeed the players’ payoff function from ((kA, kB), (kA, kB)).
Consider first the interval ]1− p∗1, p
∗
1[. It has to be shown that BA− cA < 0 and BB − cB < 0.
On ]1 − p∗1, p
∗
1[, we have that u = s and u
′ = 0, and therefore BA − cA =
λ+r
r
(pg − s). This
is strictly negative if and only if p < pm, which is verified as p∗1 < p
m. By the same token,
BB − cB =
λ+r
r
((1− p)g − s). This is strictly negative if and only if p > 1− pm, which is verified
as 1− pm < 1− p∗1.
Now, consider the interval ]p∗1, pˆ[. Here, BA = cA by construction, as kA is determined by
the indifference condition and symmetry. It remains to be shown that BB ≤ cB here. Using the
relevant differential equation, I find that BB =
λ
r
(g−u)+pg−s. This is less than cB = s− (1−p)g
if and only if u ≥ λ+r
λ
g − 2r
λ
s. Yet, λ+r
λ
g − 2r
λ
s ≤ s if and only if g
s
≤ 2r+λ
r+λ , so that the relevant
inequality is satisfied. The interval ]1− pˆ, 1− p∗1[ is treated in an analogous way.
Finally, consider the interval ]pˆ, 1[. Plugging in the relevant differential equation yields BA −
BB = u − pg −
λ
r
(g − u). This exceeds cA − cB = (1 − 2p)g if and only if u ≥
λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g, which is
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satisfied as p 7→ λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g is decreasing and
λ+r(1−p∗
1
)
λ+r g < s whenever 1 − p
∗
1 < p
m. The interval
]0, 1− pˆ[ is dealt with in similar fashion.
Proof of Proposition 5.4
The proposed policies imply a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. u is strictly
decreasing on ]0, 12 [ and strictly increasing on ]
1
2 , 1[. Furthermore, as limp↑12
u′(p) = lim
p↓
1
2
u′(p) = 0,
the function u is of class C1. Moreover, u = s+2BB−cB on [0, 1−p
†], u = s+kBBB on [1−p
†, 12 ],
u = s+ kABA on [
1
2 , p
†] and u = s+ 2BA − cA on [p
†, 1], which shows that u is indeed the players’
payoff function from ((kA, kB), (kA, kB)).
To establish existence and uniqueness of p†, note that p 7→ λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g and p 7→ 2s − pg are
strictly decreasing in p, whereas W is strictly increasing in p on ]12 , 1[. Now, W(
1
2) =
r+λ
λ
g − 2r
λ
s.
This is strictly less than
λ+ r
2
λ+r g and 2s −
g
2 whenever
g
s
<
4(r+λ)
2r+3λ . Moreover, W(
1
2) strictly exceeds
λ+r(1−pm)
λ+r g = g −
r
r+λs and 2s− p
mg = s whenever g
s
> 2r+λ
r+λ . Thus, I have established uniqueness
and existence of p† and that p† ∈]12 , p
m[.
By construction, u > max{λ+r(1−p)
λ+r g, 2s − pg} in ]p
†, 1], which, by Lemma A.1, implies that
((1, 0), (1, 0)) are mutually best responses in this region; by the same token, u > max{λ+rp
λ+r g, 2s−
(1−p)g} in [0, 1−p†[, which, by Lemma A.1, implies that ((0, 1), (0, 1)) are mutually best responses
in that region.
Now, consider the interval ]12 , p
†]. Here, BA = cA by construction, so all that remains to be
shown is BB ≤ cB. By plugging in the indifference condition on u
′, I get BB =
λ
r
(g − u) + pg − s.
This is less than cB = s− (1− p)g if and only if u ≥
λ+r
λ
g− 2r
λ
s =W(12) = u(
1
2), which is satisfied
by the monotonicity properties of u. An analogous argument establishes BA ≤ cA on [1−p
†, 12 [.
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I analyze the case of a principal who wants to give an agent proper incentives
to investigate a hypothesis which can be either true or false. The agent can shirk,
thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to
manipulate the data. If the hypothesis is false, a proper investigation never yields
a success. I show that if, in the case the hypothesis is true, a proper investigation
yields successes with a higher intensity than manipulation would, the option of faking
a success creates no distortions. In the opposite case, honest investigation is impossible
to implement.
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1 Introduction
Instances abound when a principal, e.g. society, is interested in the investigation of a certain
hypothesis. Indeed, important policy decisions may depend on whether, say, there is a
causal link between passively inhaling other people’s cigarette smoke and the occurrence of
cancer, or whether global warming trends are caused by certain emissions related to specific
kinds of economic activity. Often, though, it will not be practical for “society” to carry out
the necessary research itself; it will rather have to delegate the investigation to a group of
scientists, or, as is the case in my model, to a single scientist. The problem with that, of
course, is that this scientist will typically have interests of his own, some of which may even
be endogenously generated by society’s incentive scheme.
As is well known from the principal-agent literature, when an agent’s actions cannot
easily be monitored, his pay must be made contingent on his performance, so that he have
proper incentives to exert effort. Thus, the scientist will get paid a substantial bonus, or
will be afforded high peer recognition if, and only if, he proves his hypothesis. While this
may well provide him with the necessary incentives to work, unfortunately, it might also give
him incentives to fabricate, or manipulate, his data, in order to make it appear as though
his hypothesis was proved. In a setting involving Bayesian learning on the agent’s part, my
model investigates how optimally to achieve the dual objective of providing the agent with
the right incentives to work, while also making sure that he not be tempted to engage in
manipulations and trickery, even if said manipulations were not verifiable in a court of law,
or even completely unobservable.1
Or think of the owners of a firm, who might be interested in its long-term prospects.
Depending on the incentive scheme they offer management, they may endogenously create
an incentive for the latter to induce a short-term bubble in the price of the firm’s stock.2
Alternatively, one could interpret my model as a model of technology adoption: An agent is
1A case in point, where a scientist’s untoward behavior was eventually discovered, might be provided
by (in)famous South Korean stem cell researcher Hwang Woo-Suk. Mr. Hwang was considered one of the
world’s foremost authorities in the field of stem-cell research, and was even designated his country’s first “top
scientist” by the South Korean Government. He purported to have succeeded in creating patient-matched
stem cells, which would have been a major breakthrough that had raised high hopes for new cures for hitherto
hard-to-treat diseases, and that I am told had been the source of considerable pride in South Korea. Yet, a
university panel found that “the laboratory data for 11 stem cell lines that were reported in the 2005 paper
were all data made using two stem cell lines in total,” forcing Mr. Hwang to resign in disgrace, and causing
a major shock to people in South Korea and throughout the scientific community. I am indebted to Tri-Vi
Dang for alerting me to this story; see e.g. the report by the Associated Press from December, 23, 2005.
2Bolton, Scheinkman, Xiong (2005) analyze a setting where even owners might have an interest in creating
such short-term bubbles, and thus wittingly give incentives to this effect.
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hired expressly to test some new production method, or some new way of doing business, yet
his boss cannot monitor whether the successes he observes are really due to the new method,
or whether the agent has surreptitiously availed himself of an old established method to
produce the observed results.
In my model, the agent can either shirk, in which case he will never have a success, but
which gives him some flow benefit, or he can cheat, which gives him an apparent success
according to some known distribution, or he can do the risky thing, and be honest. If the
hypothesis is incorrect, honesty never yields a success. The principal can only observe if
there has been a success or not; he cannot observe the agent’s actions, and, in particular, he
does not observe if a success has been achieved by honest means or whether it is the result
of manipulation.
I show that if even the investigation of a correct hypothesis yields breakthroughs at a
lower frequency than manipulation, honesty is not implementable at all. If, however, inves-
tigating a correct hypothesis yields breakthroughs at a higher intensity than manipulation,
I characterize the optimal incentive schemes making sure that the agent is always honest up
to the first breakthrough at least.
While actually investigating the hypothesis, the agent increasingly grows pessimistic
about the thesis being true as long as no breakthrough arrives. At the first breakthrough,
though, all uncertainty is resolved, and the agent will know for sure that the hypothesis is
true. Thus, depending on the incentive scheme, this learning aspect might give the agent
additional incentives for investigating the hypothesis. The principal himself has no learning
motive as he is only interested in the first breakthrough achieved on arm 1; however, when
designing the incentive scheme, it will be one of his goals to make information valuable to
the agent as a way of providing incentives.
If honesty is implementable, I show that even though the principal is only interested
in the first breakthrough the agent achieves, he will reward the agent for the (m + 1)-st
breakthrough, with m ≥ 1, in order to deter the agent from engaging in manipulation,
which otherwise might seem expedient to him in the short term. Now, m will be chosen
high enough that even for an off-path agent, who has achieved his first breakthrough via
manipulation, m breakthroughs are so unlikely to be achieved by cheating that he will prefer
to be honest after his first breakthrough. This will put the cheating off-path agent at a
distinct disadvantage, as, in contrast to the honest on-path agent, he will not have had a
discontinuous jump in his belief. This difference in beliefs between on-path and off-path
agents in turn can be leveraged by the principal, who enjoys full commitment power; thus,
the principal can induce investigation of the hypothesis by endogenously creating a high
value of information for the agent.
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To provide adequate incentives in the cheapest way possible, the principal will endeavor
to give the lowest possible value to a dishonest agent, given the continuation value he has
promised the on-path agent. While paying only for the (m + 1)-st breakthrough ensures
that off-path agents will not continue to cheat, they will nevertheless continue to update
their beliefs after their first success, and might be tempted to switch to shirking once they
have grown too pessimistic about the hypothesis, a possibility that, as is well known from
the literature on strategic experimentation with bandits, gives them a positive option value.
When designing his incentive scheme, it will be one of the principal’s goals to reduce this
additional option value. As a matter of fact, I will show that it is possible for the principal to
structure incentives in such a way that cheating will be dominated even by shirking. Thus,
in an optimal scheme, the agent only needs to be compensated for his outside option of
shirking.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows: Section 2 reviews some relevant literature;
Section 3 introduces the model; Section 4 analyzes the provision of a certain continuation
value; Section 5 characterizes the optimal mechanism before the first breakthrough, Section 6
analyzes when the principal will optimally elect to stop the project, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Holmstro¨m & Milgrom (1991) analyze a case where, not unlike in my model, the agent
performs several tasks, some of which may be undesirable from the principal’s point of view.
The principal may be able to monitor certain activities more accurately than others. They
show that in the limiting case with two activities where one activity cannot be monitored
at all, incentives will only be given for the activity which can in fact be monitored; if the
activities are substitutes (complements) in the agent’s private cost function, incentives are
more muted (steeper) than in the single task case. While their model could be extended to
a dynamic model where the agent controls the drift rate of a Brownian Motion signal,3 the
learning motive I introduce fundamentally changes the basic trade-offs involved. Indeed, in
my model, the optimal mechanism extensively leverages the fact that only an honest agent
will have had a discontinuous jump in his beliefs.
Bergemann & Hege (1998, 2005), as well as Ho¨rner & Samuelson (2009) examine a
venture capitalist’s provision of funds for an investment project of initially uncertain quality;
the project is managed by an entrepreneur, who might divert the funds for his private ends.
The investor cannot observe the entrepreneur’s allocation of the funds, so that, off-path, the
3See Holmstro¨m & Milgrom (1987).
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entrepreneur may accumulate some private information about the quality of the project. If
the project is good, it yields a success with a probability that is proportional to the amount
of funds invested in it; if it is bad, it never yields a success. While Bergemann & Hege (2005)
and Ho¨rner & Samuelson (2009) analyze the game without commitment, Bergemann & Hege
(1998) investigate the problem under full commitment. These papers differ from my model
chiefly in that there is no way for the entrepreneur to “fake” a success; any success that is
publicly observed will have been achieved by honest means alone.
Gerardi & Maestri (2008) investigate the case of a principal who, in order to find out
about the binary state of the world, has to employ an agent. The agent can decide to
incur private costs to exert effort to acquire an informative binary signal, one realization of
which is only possible in the good state. As for the principal, he can monitor neither the
agent’s effort choice nor the realization of the signal. The game ends as soon as the agent
announces that he has had conclusive evidence in favor of the good state. They show that
the agent needs to be left an information rent because of both the Moral Hazard and the
Adverse Selection problems. In my model, by contrast, the game does not end after the
first breakthrough; much to the contrary, I show that in my model, in order to give optimal
incentives, it is absolutely vital that they be provided via the continuation game that follows
the first breakthrough rather than via an immediate transfer.
One paper that is close in spirit to mine is Manso (2010), who analyzes a two-period
model where an agent can either shirk, try to produce in some established manner with a
known success probability, or experiment with a risky alternative. He shows that, in order to
induce experimentation, the principal will optimally not pay for a success in the first period,
and might even pay for early failure,4 while a success in the second period is always rewarded.
My continuous-time investigation confirms Manso’s (2010) central intuition that it is better
to give incentives through later rewards; furthermore, the richer action and signal spaces in
my fully-fledged dynamic model yield additional insights into the structure of the optimal
incentive scheme. Moreover, the dynamic structure allows me to analyze the principal’s
optimal stopping time.
De Marzo & Sannikov (2008) also incorporate private learning on the agent’s part into
their model, where current output depends both on the firm’s inherent profitability and on
the agent’s effort, which is unobservable to the principal. Thus, off-path, the agent’s private
belief about the firm’s productivity will differ from the public belief. Specifically, if the agent
4This is an artefact of the discrete structure of the model and the limited signal space; indeed, in Manso’s
(2010) model, early failure can be a very informative signal that the agent has not exploited the known
technology, but has rather chosen the risky, unknown alternative. In continuous time, by contrast, arbitrary
precision of the signal can be achieved by choosing a critical number of successes that is high enough, as will
become clear infra.
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withholds effort, this depresses the drift rate of the firm’s Brownian motion cash flow. They
show that the firm will optimally accumulate cash as fast as it can until it reaches some
target level, after which it starts paying out dividends; the firm is liquidated as soon as it
runs out of cash. De Marzo & Sannikov (2008) show that one optimal way of providing
incentives is to give the agent an equity stake in the firm, which is rescindable in the case of
liquidation, and that liquidation decisions are efficient, agency problems notwithstanding.
To capture the learning aspect of the agent’s problem, I model it as a bandit problem.5
Bandit problems have been used in economics to study the trade-off between experimentation
and exploitation since Rothschild’s (1974) discrete-time single-agent model. The single-
agent two-armed exponential model, a variant of which I am using, has first been analyzed
by Presman (1990). Strategic interaction among several agents has been analyzed in the
models by Bolton & Harris (1999, 2000), Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005), Keller & Rady (2010),
who all investigate the case of perfect positive correlation between players’ two-armed bandit
machines, as well as in Chapter 1, where the cases of perfect, as well as imperfect, negative
correlation are investigated. Chapter 2 analyzes the case where bandits have three arms, with
the two risky ones being perfectly negatively correlated. While the afore-mentioned papers
all assumed that players’ actions, as well as the outcomes of their actions, were perfectly
publicly observable, Rosenberg, Solan, Vieille (2007), as well as Murto & Va¨lima¨ki (2009),
analyze the case where actions are observable, while outcomes are not. Bonatti & Ho¨rner
(2010) analyze the case where actions are not observable, while outcomes are. Bergemann
& Va¨lima¨ki (1996, 2000) consider strategic experimentation in buyer-seller interactions. My
contribution to this literature is to introduce the question of optimal incentive provision into
a fully-fledged dynamic bandit model.
Rahman (2009, 2010) deals with the question of implementability in dynamic contexts,
and finds that, under a full support assumption, a necessary and sufficient condition for
implementability is for all non-detectable deviations to be unprofitable under zero transfers.
The issue of implementability turns out to be quite simple in my model, and is dealt with
in Proposition 3.1.
3 The Model
There is one principal and one agent. The agent operates a bandit machine with three arms,
i.e. one safe arm yielding the agent a private benefit flow of s, one that is known to yield
breakthroughs according to Po(λ0) (arm 0), and arm 1, which either yields breakthroughs
5See Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2008) for an overview of this literature.
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according to Po(λ1) (if the time-invariant state of the world θ = 1, which is the case with
initial probability p0 ∈]0, 1[) or never yields a breakthrough (if the state is θ = 0). It is
commonly known that λ1, λ0 > 0. The principal only observes if, and at what time, there
has been a breakthrough; he does not observe on which arm the breakthrough has been
achieved. The agent in addition observes on which arms the breakthroughs have occurred.
The principal and the agent share a common discount rate r.
The principal, only being interested in the first breakthrough achieved on arm 1, chooses
an end date Tˇ (t) ∈ [t, T ] (where T ∈]T,∞[ is arbitrary), in case the first breakthrough occurs
at time t. Conditional on there having been no breakthrough, the game ends at time T <∞.
I the first half of this paper, I take T to be exogenously given, and assume the principal
always wants to incentivize the agent to use arm 1 up until the first breakthrough at least.
In the second half, the principal optimally chooses the end date T .6 There, I shall assume
that the first breakthrough achieved on arm 1 at time t gives the principal a payoff of e−rtΠ.
Formally, I consider the point processes {N it}0≤t≤T (for i ∈ {0, 1}), where N
i
t measures
the number of breakthroughs achieved on arm i up to, and including, time t. In addition, I
define the point process {Nt}0≤t≤T , where Nt := N
0
t +N
1
t for all t. Moreover, I consider the
filtrations F := {Ft}0≤t≤T and F
N :=
{
FNt
}
0≤t≤T
generated by the processes {(N0t , N
1
t )}0≤t≤T
and {Nt}0≤t≤T , respectively.
By choosing which arm to pull, the agent affects the probability of breakthroughs on
his several arms. Specifically, if he commits a constant fraction k0 of his unit endowment
flow to arm 0 over a time interval of length ∆ > 0, the probability of achieving at least one
breakthrough on arm 0 in that interval is given by 1 − e−λ0k0∆. If he commits a constant
fraction of k1 of his endowment to arm 1 over a time interval of length ∆ > 0, the probability
of achieving at least one breakthrough on arm 1 in that interval is given by θ
(
1− e−λ1k1∆
)
.
Formally, a strategy for the agent is a process k := {(k0,t, k1,t)}t which satisfies (k0,t, k1,t) ∈
{(a, b) ∈ R+ : a+ b ≤ 1} for all t, and is F-predictable, where ki,t (i ∈ {0, 1}) denotes the
fraction of the agent’s resource that he devotes to arm i at instant t. The agent’s strategy
space, which I denote by U , is given by all the processes k satisfying these requirements.
I denote the set of abridged strategies kT prescribing the agent’s actions before the first
breakthrough by UT .
A wage scheme offered by the principal is a non-negative, non-decreasing process {Wt}0≤t≤T
which is FN -adapted, where Wt denotes the discounted time 0 value of the cumulated pay-
6I am essentially following Grossman & Hart’s (1983) classical approach to principal-agent problems in
that I first solve for the optimal incentive scheme given an arbitrary T (sections 4 and 5), and then let the
principal optimize over T (Section 6).
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ments the principal has consciously made to the agent up to, and including, time t. I
assume the agent is protected by limited liability; hence {Wt}0≤t≤T is non-negative and
non-decreasing.7 I furthermore assume that the principal has full commitment power, i.e.
he commits to a wage scheme {Wt}0≤t≤T , as well as a schedule of end dates {Tˇ (t)}t∈[0,T ], at
the outset of the game.
Over and above the payments he gets as a function of breakthroughs, the agent can
secure himself a safe payoff flow of s from the principal by pulling the safe arm; the principal,
however, can do nothing about this, and only observes it after the end of the game. The
idea is that society cannot observe its scientists shirking in real time, as it were; only after
the lab e.g. is shut down, such information might come to light, and society will only learn
ex post that it has been robbed of the payoff flow of s during the operation of the research
lab.
It is the principal’s goal to induce the agent to use arm 1 at least up to the first
breakthrough, and to do so in the most cost-efficient manner possible. Thus, I shall denote
the set of full-experimentation strategies by K := {k ∈ U : ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] : Nt = 0⇒ k1,t = 1}.
Clearly, as the principal wants to minimize wage payments subject to implementing a full-
experimentation strategy, it is never a good idea for him to pay the agent in the absence of
a breakthrough; moreover, since the principal is only interested in the first breakthrough,
the notation can be simplified somewhat. Let {Wt}0≤t≤T be the principal’s wage scheme,
and t the time of the first breakthrough: In the rest of the paper, I shall write ht :=
ert (Wt − limτ↑tWτ ) for the instantaneous lump sum the principal pays the agent as a reward
for his first breakthrough. By wt I denote the expected continuation value of an agent who
has achieved his first breakthrough on arm 1 at time t, given he will behave optimally in the
future; formally,
wt := sup
{(k0,τ ,k1,τ )}t<τ≤Tˇ (t)
E
[
ert
(
WTˇ (t) −Wt
)
+s
∫ Tˇ (t)
t
e−r(τ−t) (1− k0,τ − k1,τ ) dτ |Ft, N
1
t = 1, lim
τ↑t
N1τ = 0, N
0
t = 0, {(k0,τ , k1,τ )}t<τ≤Tˇ (t)
]
,
i.e. the expectation conditions on the agent’s knowledge that the first breakthrough has been
achieved on arm 1 at time t. The corresponding expected continuation payoff of an off-path
7If the game ends at time Tˇ < T , we set W
Tˇ+∆ =WTˇ for all ∆ > 0.
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agent, who achieves his first breakthrough on arm 0 at time t, I denote by ωt; formally,
ωt := sup
{(k0,τ ,k1,τ )}t<τ≤Tˇ (t)
E
[
ert
(
WTˇ (t) −Wt
)
+s
∫ Tˇ (t)
t
e−r(τ−t) (1− k0,τ − k1,τ ) dτ |Ft, N
0
t = 1, lim
τ↑t
N0τ = 0, N
1
t = 0, {(k0,τ , k1,τ )}t<τ≤Tˇ (t)
]
.
The state of the world is uncertain; clearly, whenever the agent uses arm 1, he gets
new information about its quality; this learning is captured in the evolution of his (private)
belief pˆt that arm 1 is good. Formally, pˆt := E [θ|Ft, {(k0,τ , k1,τ )}0≤τ<t]. On the equilibrium
path, the principal will correctly anticipate pˆt; formally, pt = pˆt, where pt is defined by
pt := E
[
pˆt|F
N
t ,k ∈ K
]
.
The evolution of beliefs is easy to describe, since only a good arm 1 can ever yield a
breakthrough. By Bayes’ rule,
pˆt =
p0e
−λ1
∫ t
0 k1,τ dτ
p0e
−λ1
∫ t
0 k1,τ dτ + 1− p0
,
and
˙ˆpt = −λ1k1,tpˆt(1− pˆt)
prior to the first breakthrough. After the agent has achieved at least one breakthrough on
arm 1, his belief will be pˆt = 1 forever thereafter.
As, in equilibrium, the agent will always operate arm 1 until the first breakthrough, it
is clear that if on the equilibrium path Nt ≥ 1, then pt+∆ = 1 for all ∆ > 0. If Nt = 0,
Bayes’ rule implies that
pt =
p0e
−λ1t
p0e−λ1t + 1− p0
.
In the following, I shall write pt whenever pt = pˆt, even when analyzing the agent’s opti-
mization problem.
Now before the first breakthrough, given an arbitrary incentive scheme g := (ht, wt)0≤t≤T ,
the agent seeks to choose kT ∈ UT so as to maximize∫ T
0
{
re−rt−λ1
∫ t
0 pτk1,τ dτ−λ0
∫ t
0 k0,τ dτ [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt) + k1,tλ1pt(ht + wt)]
}
dt.
subject to p˙t = −λ1k1,tpt(1− pt).
The following impossibility result is now immediate:
Proposition 3.1 If λ0 ≥ λ1, there does not exist a wage scheme {Wt}0≤t≤T implementing
any strategy in K.
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Proof: Suppose λ0 > λ1. Then, any distribution over {Nt}0≤t≤T that can be generated
by a good arm 1 can be generated by a combination of arm 0 and the safe arm that puts
strictly positive weight on the safe arm. As the safe arm gives the agent an instantaneous
flow utility of s > 0, the latter option strictly dominates the former. If λ0 = λ1, arm 0
dominates arm 1 since pˆt < 1 before the first breakthrough.
In the rest of the paper, I shall therefore assume that λ1 > λ0. When we denote the set
of solutions to the agent’s problem that is implemented by an incentive scheme g as k∗(g),
the principal’s problem is to choose g = (ht, wt)0≤t≤T so as to minimize his wage bill∫ T
0
re−rt−λ1
∫ t
0 pτ dτptλ1(ht + wt) dt
subject to k∗(g) ∩ K 6= ∅ and pt =
p0e
−λ1t
p0e
−λ1t+1−p0
.
In the next two sections, I shall consider the end date T as given. In Section 6, the
principal will optimally choose this end date T . Thus far, we have been silent on how the
continuation value of wt is delivered to the agent after his first breakthrough. It will turn
out, though, that the manner in which the principal gives the agent his continuation value
will matter greatly, as we will see in the next section.
4 Incentives After The Breakthrough
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to analyze how the principal will deliver a promised continua-
tion value of wt given a first breakthrough has occurred at time t. His goal will be to find a
scheme which maximally discriminates between an agent who has achieved his breakthrough
on arm 1, as he was supposed to, and an agent who has been “cheating”, i.e. who has achieved
the breakthrough on arm 0. Put differently, for any given promise wt to the on-path agent,
it is the principal’s goal to push the off-path agent’s continuation value ωt down, as this
will give him a bigger bang for his buck in terms of incentives. As an off-path agent always
has the option of imitating the on-path agent’s strategy, we know that ωt ≥ pˆtwt, where
pˆt ∈ [pt, p0] denotes his (off-path) belief at time t. The following proposition summarizes
the main result of this section; it shows that, as a function of pˆt, ωt can be pushed arbitrarily
close to this lower bound.
Proposition 4.1 For every ǫ > 0, wt ≥ 0, there exists a continuation scheme such that
ωt(pˆt) ≤ pˆtwt +
s
r
(1− e−rǫ) for all pˆt ∈ [pt, p0].
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Proof: Proof is by construction, see infra.
The construction of this wage scheme relies on the assumption that λ1 > λ0, implying
the variance in the number of successes with a good risky arm 1 is higher than with arm 0.
Therefore, the principal will structure his wage scheme in such a way as to reward realizations
in the number of later breakthroughs that are “extreme enough” that they are very unlikely
to have been achieved on arm 0 as opposed to arm 1. Thus, even the most pessimistic of
off-path agents would prefer to bet on his arm 1 being good rather than pull arm 0. Yet, now,
in contrast to the off-path agents, an on-path agent will know for sure that his arm 1 is good,
and therefore has a distinct advantage in expectation when facing the principal’s payment
scheme after a first breakthrough. The agent’s anticipation of this advantage in turn gives
him the right incentives to use arm 1 rather than arm 0 before the first breakthrough occurs.
4.2 Construction of An Optimal Continuation Scheme
My construction proceeds in several steps. First, the principal will only pay the agent for
the m-th breakthrough after time t, where m is chosen large enough that any, even the most
pessimistic of off-path agents will deem m breakthroughs more likely to occur on arm 1 than
on arm 0. Then, for a given ǫ > 0, I make sure that even the most pessimistic of off-path
agents, whose belief pˆt = pt, will not switch to playing safe with more than ǫ time left to go.
This requires a certain minimum lump sum reward for the m-th breakthrough. Then, given
this reward, the end date Tˇ (t) is chosen appropriately so that the on-path agent exactly
receives his promised continuation value of wt in expectation.
Specifically, the agent is only paid a constant lump sum of V 0 after his m-th break-
through after time t, where m is chosen sufficiently high that even for the most pessimistic
of all possible off-path agents, arm 1 dominate arm 0. As λ1 > λ0, such an m exists, as the
following lemma shows:
Lemma 4.2 There exists an integer m such that if the agent is only paid a lump sum reward
V 0 > 0 for the m-th breakthrough, arm 1 dominates arm 0 for any type of off-path agent
whenever he still has m breakthroughs to go before collecting the lump sum reward.
Proof: See appendix.
Intuitively, the likelihood ratio of m breakthroughs being achieved on arm 1 vs. arm 0 on the
time interval (t, Tˇ (t)], pˆt
(
λ1
λ0
)m
e−(λ1−λ0)(Tˇ (t)−t), is unbounded in m. The proof now shows
that when m exceeds certain thresholds, it indeed never pays for the agent to use arm 0.
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Now, given m, Tˇ (t), and V 0, I recursively define the auxiliary functions Vi(.;V 0) :
[t, Tˇ (t)] −→ R for i = 1, · · · ,m according to
Vi(t˜;V 0) := max
{ki,τ}∈M(t˜)
∫ Tˇ (t)
t˜
e−r(τ−t˜)−λ1
∫ τ
t˜
k1,χ dχ
[
s+ ki,τ
(
λ1Vi−1(τ ;V 0)− s
)]
dτ,
whereM(t˜) denotes the set of measurable functions ki : [t˜, Tˇ (t)]→ [0, 1], and I set V0(τ ;V 0) :=
V 0 +
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−τ)
)
. Thus, Vi(t˜;V 0) denotes the agent’s continuation value at time t˜
given the agent knows that θ = 1 and that he has i breakthroughs to go before being able
to collect the lump sum V 0.
The following lemma notes that, once the agent knows that θ = 1, a best response
for him is given by a cutoff time t∗i at which he switches to the safe arm given he has i
breakthroughs to go. It also takes note of some useful properties of these functions Vi:
Lemma 4.3 Let V 0 >
s
λ1
. A best response for the agent is given by a sequence of cutoff
times t∗m ≥ · · · ≥ t
∗
2 > t
∗
1 = Tˇ (t) (with all inequalities strict if t
∗
m−1 > t), such that he use
arm 1 at all times t˜ ≤ t∗i , and the safe arm at times t˜ > t
∗
i , when he still has i breakthroughs
to go before collecting the lump sum V 0. For i = 2, · · · ,m, there exists a constant Ci such
that for V 0 > Ci, the cutoff time t
∗
i is strictly increasing in V 0. The functions Vi(.;V 0) are of
class C1 and strictly decreasing; for t˜ < t∗i , Vi(t˜;V 0) is strictly increasing in V 0. Moreover,
limV 0→∞ t
∗
i = Tˇ (t), and limV 0→∞ Vi(t˜;V 0) = ∞ for any t˜ ∈ [t, Tˇ (t)). The functions Vi
satisfy
Vi(t˜;V 0) = max
tˆ∈[t˜,Tˇ (t)]
∫ tˆ
t˜
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)λ1Vi−1(τ ;V 0) dτ +
s
r
e−(r+λ1)(tˆ−t˜)
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−tˆ)
)
,
and Vi(t˜;V 0) ≤ Vi−1(t˜;V 0), with the inequality strict for t˜ < t
∗
i .
Proof: See appendix.
In our next lemma, I shall derive a sufficient condition on Vm−1(t˜;V 0) for any type of
off-path agent always to play risky up to some given time t˜ < Tˇ (t). This will then allow me,
in a next step, to choose V 0 in a way that makes sure that the sufficient condition holds at
Tˇ (t)− ǫ, in case Tˇ (t)− t ≥ ǫ.
Lemma 4.4 If Vm−1(t˜;V 0) ≥
s(r+λ1)
p
T
rλ1
, any type of (off-path) agent who has not yet collected
the lump sum V 0 will use arm 1 a.e. on (t, t˜].
Proof: See appendix.
98
In what will follow, it will be crucial that my choice of V 0 be independent of Tˇ (t). To
make this clear, I shall now use the transformation V˜i(α;V0), which is defined by
V˜i(α;V0) := max
αˆ∈[0,α]
∫ αˆ
0
e−(r+λ1)τλ1V˜i−1(α− τ ;V 0) dτ +
s
r
e−(r+λ1)(α−αˆ)
(
1− e−rαˆ
)
,
with V˜0(α;V0) = V 0+
s
r
(1− e−rα). It is immediate to verify that V˜i(α;V 0) = Vi(Tˇ (t)−α;V 0)
for any given Tˇ (t) ∈ [t+α, T ]; in other terms, the value Vi at any point in time t˜ only depends
on the remainder of time, α = Tˇ (t)− t˜.
Now, by Lemma 4.3, one can choose a reward V 0 such that, for given ǫ > 0, V˜m−1(ǫ;V 0) ≥
s(r+λ1)
p
T
rλ1
. By Lemma 4.4, this guarantees that all types of agents will play risky at the very
least until there is only ǫ time left to go (or they have collected the prize).
Thus, through our choice of m, we have made sure that the agent will never use arm 0.
Through our choice of V 0, we can make sure that the agent will use arm 1 at least through
time Tˇ (t) − ǫ. After that, he may switch to the safe arm at a time that depends on his
previous experience with arm 1. Since he will get to play the safe arm for a length of time
of at most ǫ, the option value from being able to switch to the safe arm is bounded above
by s
r
(1− e−rǫ).
As a last step, we now need to make sure that the on-path agent is indeed delivered an
expected continuation value of wt. In order to do so, I first define another auxiliary function
f : [t, T ]× R+ −→ R by f(Tˇ (t), V 0) = Vm(t;V 0; Tˇ (t)), where, in a slight abuse of notation,
I write Vm(t;V 0; Tˇ (t)) for Vm(t;V 0) given the end date Tˇ (t). Thus, f(Tˇ (t), V 0) maps the
choice of the stopping time Tˇ (t) into the on-path agent’s time-t expected payoff, given the
reward V 0. The following lemma notes some properties of f :
Lemma 4.5 f(., V 0) is of class C
1 and strictly increasing with f(t;V 0) = 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Now, if wt ≤ f(T , V 0), Lemma 4.5 implies that we can choose Tˇ (t) so that wt =
f(Tˇ (t), V 0). Otherwise, since limV 0→∞ f(Tˇ (t), V 0) =∞ for any Tˇ (t) ∈ (t, T ], we can choose
a constant δ > 0 high enough so that wt ≥ f(T , V 0 + δ); then, by Lemma 4.5, we can find a
Tˇ (t) ∈ (t, T ] so that wt = f(Tˇ (t), V 0 + δ).
Now, with Tˇ (t) chosen as described, it may well be the case that ǫ ≥ Tˇ (t) − t. In this
case, it might well happen that an off-path agent prefers to play safe all along on (t, Tˇ (t)],
in which case he collects a payoff of s
r
(1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t)) ≤ s
r
(1− e−rǫ) ≤ s
r
(1− e−rǫ) + pˆtwt. Or
otherwise, the agent might play risky for a while, and switch to safe after a period of length
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ξ ≤ Tˇ (t) − t ≤ ǫ, in which case his payoff is bounded above by s
r
(1 − e−r(Tˇ (t)−t)) + pˆtwt ≤
s
r
(1− e−rǫ) + pˆtwt.
Thus, in summary, the mechanism I have constructed delivers a certain given continu-
ation value of wt to the on-path agent; it must take care of two distinct concerns in order
to harness maximal incentive power at a given cost. On the one hand, it must make sure
off-path agents never continue to play arm 0; this is achieved by only rewarding the m-th
breakthrough after time t. On the other hand, the mechanism must preclude the more pes-
simistic off-path agents from collecting an excessive option value from switching between the
safe arm and arm 1, so as to make being an off-path agent none too attractive.
5 Before the Breakthrough–Optimal Incentive Scheme
Whereas in the previous section, I have investigated how a principal would optimally deliver
a given continuation value wt, the purpose of this section is to understand to what extent the
principal would optimally give incentives via continuation values wt, as opposed to immediate
rewards ht, which are paid out right at the moment of the first breakthrough. I shall show in
this section that, by Proposition 4.1, arm 0 can be made so unattractive that in any optimal
scheme it is dominated by the safe arm. Thus, in order to induce the agent to use arm 1, he
only needs to be compensated for his outside option of playing safe (Proposition 5.4), which
pins dow the principal’s wage costs (Corollary 5.5).
In order formally to analyze this question, we first have to consider the agent’s best
response to a given incentive scheme (ht, wt)0≤t≤T , in order to derive conditions for the agent
to best reply by always using arm 1 until the first breakthrough. In a second step, we will
then use these conditions as constraints in the principal’s problem as he seeks to minimize his
wage bill. While the literature on experimentation in bandits would typically use dynamic
programming techniques, this would not be expedient here, as an agent’s optimal strategy
will depend not only on his current belief and the current incentives he is facing but also
on the entire path of future incentives. To the extent we do not want to impose any ex
ante monotonicity constraints on the incentive scheme, today’s scheme need not be a perfect
predictor for the future path of incentives; therefore, even a three-dimensional state variable
(pt, ht, wt) would be inadequate. Thus, I shall be using the Pontryagin approach of Optimal
Control.
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The Agent’s Problem
Given an incentive scheme (ht, wt)0≤t≤T , the agent chooses (k0,t, k1,t)0≤t≤T so as to maximize∫ T
0
{
re−rt−λ1
∫ t
0 pτk1,τ dτ−λ0
∫ t
0 k0,τ dτ [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(pt)) + k1,tλ1pt(ht + wt)]
}
dt.
subject to p˙t = −λ1k1,tpt(1− pt).
It will turn out to be useful to work with the log-likelihood ratio xt := ln
(
1−pt
pt
)
,
and the probability of no success on arm 0, yt := e
−λ0
∫ t
0 k0,τ dτ , as the state variables in
our variational problem. These evolve according to x˙t = λ1k1,t (to which law of motion
I assign the co-state µt) and y˙t = −λ0k0,tyt (co-state γt), respectively. The initial values
x0 = ln
(
1−p0
p0
)
and y0 = 1 are given, and xT and yT are free. The agent’s controls are
(k0,t, k1,t) ∈ {(a, b) ∈ R+ : a+ b ≤ 1}.
Neglecting a constant factor, the Hamiltonian Ht is now given by
8
Ht = e
−rtyt[(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt))]
+ yte
−rt−xt [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt)) + k1,tλ1(ht + wt)]}
+ µtλ1k1,t − γtλ0k0,tyt.
By the Maximum Principle, the equations (1), (2), (3), together with the transversality
conditions γT = µT = 0, are necessary for the agent’s behaving optimally by setting k1,t = 1
for all t:
µ˙t = e
−rtyt
{
e−xt [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt)) + k1,tλ1(ht + wt)]
−k0,tλ0(1 + e
−xt)ω′(xt)
}
, (1)
γ˙t = −e
−rt{[(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt))]
+ e−xt [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt)) + k1,tλ1(ht + wt)]}+ γtλ0k0,t , (2)
e−rtyt
[
e−xtλ1(ht + wt)− (1 + e
−xt)s
]
+ µtλ1
≥ max
{
0, e−rtyt(1 + e
−xt)[λ0(ht + ωt(xt))− s]− γtλ0yt
}
. (3)
In the appendix, it is shown that these conditions are also sufficient for optimality of
the agent’s behavior, thus validating my first-order approach.
8In a slight abuse of notation, I now write ωt as a function of xt.
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The Principal’s Problem
Now, we turn to the principal’s problem, who will take the agent’s incentive constraint into
account when designing his incentive scheme with a view toward implementing k1,t = 1
for almost all t ∈ [0, T ]; I shall refer to incentive schemes implementing this kind of full
experimentation as incentive compatible. We note that k1,t = 1 for all t implies yt = 1 for
all t. Thus, the principal’s objective is to choose (ht, wt)0≤t≤T ∈ [0, L]
2 (for some L which I
choose large enough) so as to minimize∫ T
0
re−rt−λ1
∫ t
0 pτ dτptλ1(ht + wt) dt
subject to the constraints (1), (2), (3), and the transversality conditions µT = γT = 0.
Neglecting constant factors and using the fact that full experimentation implies that
xt = x0 + λ1t, one can re-write the principal’s objective in terms of the log-likelihood ratio
as ∫ T
0
e−(r+λ1)t(ht + wt) dt.
This can be viewed as a variational problem with the co-state variables (µt, γt) from the
agent’s problem as the state variables. As we have seen, µt and γt evolve according to
µ˙t = e
−rt−xtλ1(ht + wt),
and
γ˙t = −e
−rt−xtλ1(ht + wt) = −µ˙t.
In the following lemma, I make precise the intuition that if a plan is optimal, the agent’s
incentive constraint will bind for almost all t.
Lemma 5.1 In any optimal plan, the agent’s incentive constraint binds a.s.
Proof: Suppose (ht, wt)0≤t≤T is an optimal plan. As the plan is optimal, it must be in-
centive compatible for a.a. t. This means that either ht > 0 or wt > 0 for a.a. t, for
otherwise playing safe is a strictly dominant action for the agent. Now, suppose that, under
(ht, wt)0≤t≤T , the incentive constraint was slack on a set of positive measure. This means
that there exists an interval [t1, t2], with t1 < t2, such that the incentive constraint is slack
a.e. on [t1, t2]. Then there exists a collection (ǫt)t1≤t≤t2 with ǫt > 0 and a plan (h˜t, w˜t)0≤t≤T
satisfying (h˜t, w˜t) = (ht, wt) if t ∈ [0, t1) ∪ (t2, T ], and h˜t + w˜t = ht + wt − ǫt if t ∈ [t1, t2]
such that (h˜t, w˜t) would be incentive compatible given the old state variable µt. It follows
immediately from the explicit expression for the incentive constraint that (h˜t, w˜t) is incentive
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compatible given the new state variable µ˜t if µ˜t ≥ µt. Yet the appertaining law of motion
immediately implies that µ˜t = µt if t > t2, and µ˜t = µt + λ1
∫ t2
t
e−rτ−xτ ǫτ dτ ≥ µt otherwise,
where we set ǫt = 0 for t < t1. Hence, (h˜t, w˜t) is incentive compatible, and, as [t1, t2] has
positive measure, the principal is strictly better off under (h˜t, w˜t)0≤t≤T , contradicting the
optimality of (ht, wt)0≤t≤T .
In the next lemma, we shall see that it can never be strictly optimal for the principal
to pay for the first breakthrough:
Lemma 5.2 The principal can without loss restrict himself to plans (ht, wt)0≤t≤T with ht = 0
for all t.
Proof: Consider an incentive compatible plan (hˆt, wˆt)0≤t≤T with hˆt > 0 for some t. Con-
sider the alternative plan (ht, wt)0≤t≤T with ht = 0 and wt = wˆt + hˆt. As is apparent from
the explicit expression for µ˙t, µt is unaffected by the change; applying Proposition 4.1 for
the same ǫ in both cases, one shows that (ht, wt)0≤t≤T is incentive compatible. Moreover, it
gives the principal exactly the same payoff as the original plan (hˆt, wˆt)0≤t≤T .
The intuition for this result is that when paying an immediate lump sum for the first
breakthrough, the principal cannot discriminate between an agent who has achieved his first
breakthrough on arm 0, and an equilibrium agent who will enjoy an informational advantage
in the continuation game. Indeed, by Proposition 4.1, the principal can make sure that an
increase in wt translates into less of an increase in ωt, whereas ht is paid out indiscriminately
to on-path and off-path agents alike. Hence, incentive provision can only be helped when
incentives are given through the continuation game rather than through immediate lump
sum payments.
Now, we are ready to characterize the optimal incentive scheme, which is essentially
unique in the class of optimal schemes with ht = 0 for a.a. t, as the following proposition
shows. The characterization relies on the fact, which we have formalized in Lemma 5.1, that
it never pays for the principal to give strict rather than weak incentives for the agent to do
the right thing, because if he did, he could lower his expected wage bill while still providing
adequate incentives. This means that the agent is indifferent between doing the right thing
and using arm 1, on the one hand, and his next best outside option on the other hand. Yet,
the wage scheme we have constructed in Section 4 makes sure that the agent’s best outside
option can never be arm 0. Indeed, playing arm 0 yields the agent approximately ptwt after
a breakthrough, which occurs with an instantaneous probability of λ0dt if arm 0 is pulled
over a time interval of infinitesimal length dt. Arm 1, by contrast, yields wt in case of a
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breakthrough, which occurs with an instantaneous probability of ptλ1dt; thus, as λ1 > λ0,
arm 1 dominates arm 0. Any optimal incentive scheme now has the property that the agent
is exactly indifferent between the safe arm and arm 1. To facilitate the statement of the
next two propositions, it is judicious to define the function w˜(t), the reward that the agent
has to be paid to be kept indifferent between using arm 1 and the safe arm, given he will
use arm 1 at all future times:
w˜(t) :=
{
s
λ1pt
+ s
r
(1− e−r(T−t)) + 1−pt
pt
s
r−λ1
(
1− e−(r−λ1)(T−t)
)
if r 6= λ1
s
λ1pt
+ s
r
(1− e−r(T−t)) + 1−pt
pt
s(T − t) if r = λ1.
Before I characterize the full set of optimal wage schemes, I first take note of the
essentially unique optimal scheme with the feature that ht = 0 for all t, as doing so facilitates
our proof later on:
Proposition 5.3 An optimal wage scheme is given by ht = 0 and wt = w˜(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: By Lemma 5.2, we know that the principal can without loss restrict himself to wage
schemes (ht, wt)0≤t≤T with ht = 0 for all t. If such a scheme is optimal, Lemma 5.1 implies
that, for a.a. t, one of the following two constraints will bind almost surely:
e−rt
[
e−xtλ1wt − (1 + e
−xt)s
]
+ µtλ1 ≥ 0, (4)
e−rt
[
e−xtλ1wt − (1 + e
−xt)s
]
+ µtλ1 ≥ e
−rt(1 + e−xt) [λ0ωt(xt)− s] + µtλ0. (5)
Now, suppose that the constraint (4) is slack on a set of positive measure. This means that
there exist times t1 < t2 such that (4) is slack a.s. on [t1, t2]. Lemma 5.1 now implies that
constraint (5) will bind a.s. on [t1, t2]. Simple algebra now shows that for (4) to hold given
that (5) binds, it has to be the case that ωt ≥ ptwt +
(
1
λ0
− 1
λ1
)
s a.e. on [t1, t2]. Yet, by
Proposition 4.1, there exists an alternative scheme (h˜t, w˜t, ω˜t) with h˜t := ht = 0 and w˜t := wt
for all t, yet ω˜t < ptwt+
(
1
λ0
− 1
λ1
)
s. Clearly, (h˜t, w˜t, ω˜t) = (ht, wt, ω˜t) still satisfies (4) with
slackness a.e. on [t1, t2], since (4), as well as µt, are independent of ω˜t. Since ω˜t < ωt a.e.
on [t1, t2], it follows that (5) is now also slack a.s. on [t1, t2]. Hence, by the same argument
as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, there exists a sequence of (δt)t1≤t≤t2 with δt > 0 such that,
for wˆt := wt − δt, (ht, wˆt, ω˜t) satisfy both constraints and imply lower wage costs for the
principal on [t1, t2], a set of positive measure, contradicting the optimality of (ht, wt, ωt).
Thus, we have shown that if ht = 0 for all t, and (ht, wt) is optimal, then (4) binds a.s.
Conversely, this scheme is clearly optimal, since it is impossible further to reduce wt on any
time interval of positive measure without violating (4). Furthermore, as we have discussed,
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we have that µt = −λ1
∫ T
t
e−rτ−xτwτ dτ , which we can plug into condition (4) to solve for
wt, thus completing the proof.
That the agent will be kept indifferent between arm 1 and the safe arm is a feature of
any optimal wage scheme, as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 5.4 Any optimal wage scheme (ht, wt)0≤t≤T has the property that, prior to
the first breakthrough, it keeps the agent indifferent between arm 1 and the safe arm almost
surely.
Proof: Proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that (ht, wt)0≤t≤T is an optimal
wage scheme with the property that the agent strictly prefers arm 1 over the safe arm a.s.
on some interval [t1, t2] with 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T . In a first step, I shall show that this implies
that ht > 0 a.s. on [t1, t2], which, as I show in a second step, contradicts the optimality of
(ht, wt)0≤t≤T .
Indeed, suppose it is not the case that ht > 0 a.s. on [t1, t2]. Then, there exists a
time interval [t′1, t
′
2] ⊆ [t1, t2] such that t
′
1 < t
′
2 and ht = 0 a.s. on [t
′
1, t
′
2]. Since the agent
a.s. strictly prefers arm 1 over the safe arm on this interval, it follows by Lemma 5.1 that
the constraint (5) will bind a.s. on [t′1, t
′
2], which, by the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 5.3, contradicts optimality.
Therefore, ht > 0 a.s. on [t1, t2]. As the agent strictly prefers arm 1 over the safe arm,
Lemma 5.1 implies that the incentive constraint
e−rt
[
e−xtλ1(ht + wt)− (1 + e
−xt)s
]
+ µtλ1 ≥ e
−rt(1 + e−xt) [λ0(ht + ωt(xt))− s] + µtλ0
will bind for a.a. t ∈ [t1, t2]. Now, consider the alternative plan (hˆt, wˆt)0≤t≤T with hˆt = 0
and wˆt = wt + ht for all t ∈ [t1, t2], and hˆt = ht and wˆt = wt for all t ∈ [0, t1) ∪ (t2, T ].
Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 5.2, one shows that under (hˆt, wˆt)0≤t≤T the incentive
constraint (3) is a.s. slack on [t1, t2], and gives the principal exactly the same payoff as the
original plan (ht, wt)0≤t≤T . Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, the principal can strictly improve
over (hˆt, wˆt)0≤t≤T , and hence over (ht, wt)0≤t≤T . Thus, we have shown that if (ht, wt) is
optimal, the incentive constraint for the safe arm binds a.s. Conversely, these schemes are
clearly optimal since the principal cannot further lower ht+wt without violating the incentive
constraint (3).
Thus, an immediate implication of the preceding proposition is that the optimal incen-
tive scheme is essentially unique in that wt+ ht is a.s. uniquely pinned down in any optimal
incentive scheme:
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Corollary 5.5 If (ht, wt)0≤t≤T is optimal, then ht + wt = w˜(t) t-a.s.
6 The Optimal Stopping Time
In this section, the principal can optimally choose the end date T , which had been exogenous
thus far. As the first-best benchmark, I use the solution which is given by the hypothetical
situation in which the principal operates the bandit himself, and he decides when to stop
using arm 1, which he pulls at a flow cost of s, conditional on not having obtained a success
thus far. Thus, he chooses T so as to maximize∫ T
0
{
e−rt−λ1
∫ t
0 pτ dτ (ptλ1Π− s)
}
dt (6)
subject to p˙t = −λ1pt(1 − pt) for all t ∈ (0, T ). Clearly, the integrand is positive if, and
only if, ptλ1Π ≥ s, i.e. as long as pt ≥
s
λ1Π
=: pm. As the principal is only interested in the
first breakthrough, information has no value for him, meaning that, very much in contrast
to the classical bandit literature, he is not willing to forgo current payoffs in order to learn
something about the state of the world. In other words, he will behave myopically, i.e. as
though the future was of no consequence to him, and stops playing risky at his myopic cutoff
belief pm, which is reached at time T FB = 1
λ1
ln
(
p0
1−p0
1−pm
pm
)
.
Now, when the principal delegates the investigation to an agent, his goal is to choose T
so as to maximize ∫ T
0
{
e−rt−λ1
∫ t
0 pτ dτptλ1 (Π− (ht + wt))
}
dt (7)
subject to p˙t = −λ1pt(1− pt) for all t ∈ (0, T ).
Thus, all that changes with respect to the first best problem (6) is that the opportunity
cost flow s is now replaced by the wage costs ht + wt, which only have to be paid out in
case of a success, which happens with an instantaneous probability of ptλ1dt. After plugging
in the optimal wage costs, which we have computed in Proposition 5.4, one finds that the
first-order derivative of the objective with respect to T is given by
e−(r+λ1)T
(
λ1Π−
s
pT
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal effect
−e−rT
s
pT
(
1− e−λ1T
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra-marginal effect
. (8)
The marginal effect captures the benefit the principal could collect by extending experimen-
tation for an additional instant at time T . Yet, the choice of an end date T also entails an
intra-marginal effect at times t < T . Indeed, for him to use arm 1 at time t, the agent has
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to be compensated for the opportunity cost of the potentially forgone rewards for having his
first breakthrough at some future date, an effect that is the stronger “the more future there
is,” i.e. the more distant the end date T is. Hence, by marginally increasing T , the principal
also marginally raises his wage liabilities at times t < T . This creates a distortion, so that
the following proposition comes as no surprise:
Proposition 6.1 Let p0 > p
m. The principal stops the game at the time T ∗ ∈ (0, T FB)
when pT ∗ = p
meλ1T
∗
, i.e.
T ∗ =
1
λ1
ln
(
−pmp0 +
√
(pmp0)2 + 4pmp0(1− p0)
2pm(1− p0)
)
.
Proof: The formula for pT ∗ is gotten by setting the expression (8) to 0, and verifying that
the second-order condition holds. Now, T ∗ is the unique positive root of p0e
−λ1T
∗
p0e
−λ1T
∗
+1−p0
=
pmeλ1T
∗
.
The size of the distortion can be measured by the ratio pT∗−p
m
pm
, which is increasing both
in the stakes at play, as measured by the ratio 1
pm
= λ1Π
s
, as well as in players’ optimism, as
measured by p0. This is hardly surprising, since when delegating the project to an agent, the
principal can only appropriate part of any increase in the overall pie. The following corollary
summarizes these comparative statics:
Corollary 6.2 The wedge pT∗−p
m
pm
is increasing in the stakes at play λ1Π
s
, as well as in
players’ optimism p0.
Proof: For 1
pm
, this immediately follows from the explicit expression for the wedge
pT ∗ − p
m
pm
=
p0 − 2 +
√
p20 + 4
p0
pm
(1− p0)
2(1− p0)
.
For p0, one shows that the sign of the first-order derivative of this expression is equal to the
sign of
p0
[
1−
√
1 +
4
pmp0
(1− p0)
]
+ (1− p0)
2
pm
,
which is strictly positive if, and only if,
p0 + (1− p0)
2
pm
>
√
p20 +
4
pm
p0(1− p0)
⇐⇒
(
2
pm
(1− p0)
)2
> 0.
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Yet, also recall from the preceding sections that given the optimal incentive scheme
we have computed there, the principal only needs to compensate the agent for his outside
option of using the safe arm, which is exactly what arm 1 has to compensate the principal
for in the first-best problem. Put differently, the presence of a cheating action, arm 0, does
not give rise to any distortions; the only distortions that arise are due to the fact that high
future rewards to some extent cannibalize today’s rewards. Yet, in most applications, the
principal’s access will not be restricted to a single agent; rather, he will be able to hire several
agents sequentially if he so chooses. Now, in the limit, if the principal can hire agents for a
mere infinitesimal instant dt, he can completely shut down the intra-marginal effect we have
discussed above.9 Indeed, we can see from the formula for w˜ that the reward an agent who
is only hired for an instant of length dt would have to be promised for a breakthrough is
given by s
λ1pt
(1+λ1dt)+ o(dt
2). Hence, it pays for the principal to go on with the project as
long as ptλ1
(
Π− s
λ1pt
(1 + λ1dt)
)
dt+ o(dt3) = ptλ1
(
Π− s
λ1pt
)
dt+ o(dt2) > 0, i.e. he stops
at the first-best efficient stopping time, a result I summarize in the following proposition:
Proposition 6.3 If the principal has access to a sequence of different agents, he stops the
delegated project at the time T FB when pTFB = p
m.
Thus, while delegating the project to an agent forces the principal to devise quite a
complicated incentive scheme, it only induces him to stop the exploration inefficiently early
if he does not have access to a sequence of many different agents. In summary, if λ0 ≥ λ1, it
is impossible to have the agent use arm 1; if λ0 < λ1, with a sequence of many agents, it is
even possible to give incentives in a manner that renders the principal willing to implement
the efficient amount of exploration.
7 Conclusion
The present paper introduces the question of optimal incentive design into a dynamic single-
agent model of experimentation on bandits. I have shown that even though the principal
9Intuitively, one might think that hiring one particularly myopic agent might remedy the problem as well.
However, while it is true that the impact future rewards have on today’s incentives, and hence the intra-
marginal effect of an extended end time T , becomes arbitrarily small as the players become very impatient,
the same holds true for the marginal benefit of extending play for an instant after a given time T > 0, so
that in sum the distortion is independent of the players’ discount rate. If one were to relax the assumption
that the players share the same discount rate, the problem could conceivably be addressed by the principal’s
hiring an agent who is much more impatient than himself. However, doing so would impact our analysis in
the previous sections, in that it would introduce an additional cost to the provision of incentives through
the continuation value wt, as opposed to the immediate rewards ht.
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only cares about the first breakthrough, he only rewards later ones.
I here only investigate the case of a single agent. It would be interesting to explore
how the structure of the optimal incentive scheme would change if several agents were si-
multaneously working for the same principal. Intuition would suggest that the rationale for
only rewarding later breakthroughs should carry over to that case. Previous literature on
strategic experimentation on bandits with exogenously given rewards has found that in most
cases the efficient amount of experimentation cannot be achieved in any Markov perfect
equilibrium. It would be quite compelling to investigate under what conditions efficiency
would be sustained with several players. I intend to explore these questions in future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Fix an arbitrary Tˇ (t) ∈ (t, T ], t˜ ∈ (t, Tˇ (t)], pˆt˜ ∈ [pt˜, p0], and V 0 > 0. Consider the restricted
problem in which the agent can only choose between arms 0 and 1. Then, the agent’s reward is
given by ∫ Tˇ (t)
t˜
e−r(τm−t˜)
(
V 0 +
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−τm)
))
dF,
where F is the distribution over τm, the time of the m-th breakthrough after time t˜. As the
integrand is decreasing in τm, all that remains to be shown is that F
∗(τ ; pˆt˜), the probability of m
breakthroughs up to time τ ∈ (t˜, Tˇ (t)] when the agent always pulls arm 1, is first-order stochastically
dominated by the probability of m breakthroughs up to time τ for any alternative strategy, which
I shall denote by F˜ (τ ; pˆt˜). Fix an arbitrary τ ∈ (t˜, Tˇ (t)]. Now,
F ∗(τ ; pˆt˜) = pˆt˜
λm1
m!
(τ − t˜)me−λ1(τ−t˜).
Whatever the alternative strategy under consideration may be, F˜ can be written as
F˜ (τ ; pˆt˜) =
∫ 1
0
Fα(τ ; pˆt˜)µ(dα),
with
Fα(τ ; pˆt˜) = pˆt˜
[αλ1 + (1− α)λ0]
m
m!
(
τ − t˜
)m
e−(αλ1+(1−α)λ0)(τ−t˜)
+ (1− pˆt˜)
[(1− α)λ0]
m
m!
(
τ − t˜
)m
e−(1−α)λ0(τ−t˜)
for some probability measure µ on α ∈ [0, 1]. The weight α can be interpreted as the fraction of the
time interval [t˜, τ ] devoted to arm 1; of course, since the agent’s strategy allows him to condition
his action on the entire previous history, α will generally be stochastic. Therefore, the strategy of
the proof is to find an m such that for any t˜ ∈ (t, T ), τ ∈ (t˜, T ] and pˆt˜ ∈ [pT , p0], it is the case that
F ∗(τ ; pˆt˜) > Fα(τ ; pˆt˜) (.1)
uniformly for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Computations show that
∂Fα
∂α
=
(τ − t˜)m
m!
{
pˆt˜e
−(αλ1+(1−α)λ0)(τ−t˜)(λ1 − λ0) (αλ1 + (1− α)λ0)
m−1 [m− (αλ1 + (1− α)λ0)(τ − t˜)]
−(1− pˆt˜)e
−(1−α)λ0(τ−t˜)λ0 ((1− α)λ0)
m−1 [m− (1− α)λ0(τ − t˜)]
}
.
Further computations show that ∂Fα
∂α
> 0 if and only if
ξ(α) > 1− λ0
τ − t˜
m
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with
ξ(α) :=
pˆt˜
1− pˆt˜
e−αλ1(τ−t˜)
(
λ1
λ0
− 1
)(
αλ1 + (1− α)λ0
(1− α)λ0
)m−1 [
1− (αλ1 + (1− α)λ0)
τ − t˜
m
]
−αλ0
τ − t˜
m
.
Now, we choose m ≥ 2 high enough that
(m− 1)
(
λ1
λ0
−
λ21
λ0
T
m
)
−
λ21
λ0
T
(
1 +
1
m
)
>
1− pT
pT
λ20
λ1 − λ0
eλ1T
T
m
. (.2)
As the left-hand side of (.2) is increasing in m, and diverging for m→ +∞, such an m ≥ 2 exists.
Algebra shows that this ensures that limα↑1 ξ(α) = ∞ and ξ
′(α) > 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1). Now, if
pˆt˜λ1 ≥ λ0, it is the case that ξ(0) ≥ 1 − λ0
τ−t˜
m
, and hence ∂Fα
∂α
> 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1), so that
F ∗(τ ; pˆt˜) > Fα(τ ; pˆt˜) for all α ∈ [0, 1). In case pˆt˜λ1 < λ0, we have that ξ(0) < 1 − λ0
τ−t˜
m
; now,
there exists a unique α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂Fα
∂α
< 0 for all α ∈ (0, α∗), ∂Fα
∂α
> 0 for all α ∈ (α∗, 1),
and we can conclude that Fα(τ ; pˆt˜) is maximized either by α = 1 or α = 0. Choosing m such that
pT
(
λ1
λ0
)m
> e(λ1−λ0)T (.3)
ensures that the maximum is indeed attained at α = 1.
In summary, there clearly exists an m ∈ N ∩ [2,∞) satisfying both (.2) and (.3). Choosing m
in this manner ensures that
F ∗(τ ; pˆt˜) > Fα(τ ; pˆt˜)
for all α ∈ [0, 1). Now, for such an m, it is clearly the case that F ∗(τ ; pˆt˜) > F˜ (τ ; pˆt˜) for any τ > t˜
whenever µ 6= δ1, where δ1 denotes the Dirac measure associated with the strategy of always of
always pulling arm 1, whatever befall.
It remains to be shown that the preference ordering does not change if the agent also has
access to the safe arm. In this case, his goal is to maximize∫ Tˇ (t)
t˜
{
(1− kτ )e
−r(τ−t˜)s+
∫ Tˇ (t)
t˜
e−r(τm−t˜)
(
V 0 +
s
r
(1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−τm))
)
dF˜{kτ}(τm)
}
dν
(
{kτ}t˜≤τ≤Tˇ (t)
)
for some probability measures F˜ and ν, with the process {kτ} satisfying 0 ≤ kτ ≤ 1 for all
τ ∈ [t˜, Tˇ (t)].
First, we fix some arbitrary probability measure ν and an arbitrary τ ∈ (t˜, Tˇ (t)] such that
Probν
(∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ > 0
)
> 0. [If τ is such that Probν
(∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ > 0
)
= 0, the objective is invariant in
α.] Now, consider an arbitrary {kσ}
τ
σ=t˜
with
∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ > 0. Arguing as above, we can now write
F˜ (τ ; pˆt˜) =
∫ 1
0
Fα(τ ; pˆt˜)µ(dα)
for
Fα(τ ; pˆt˜) = pˆt˜
[αλ1 + (1− α)λ0]
m
m!
(∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ
)m
e−(αλ1+(1−α)λ0)
∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ
+ (1− pˆt˜)
[(1− α)λ0]
m
m!
(∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ
)m
e−(1−α)λ0
∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ
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and some probability measure µ. Since all that changes with respect to our calculations above
is for τ − t˜ to be replaced by
∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ ≤ τ − t˜, and our previous τ was arbitrary, the pre-
vious calculations continue to apply. In particular, any m ≥ 2 satisfying conditions (.2) and
(.3) ensures that F ∗ be first-order stochastically dominated by any F˜ , as long as µ 6= δ1. As
e−r(τm−t˜)
(
V 0 +
s
r
(1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−τm)
)
is decreasing in τm, we can conclude that α = 1 is (strictly)
optimal for all {kσ}
τ
σ=t˜
(with
∫ τ
t˜
kσ dσ > 0).
Proof of Lemma 4.3
To analyze the agent’s best responses, I shall make use of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality. Stan-
dard arguments imply that the player’s payoff function from playing a best response is once con-
tinuously differentiable, and satisfies the Bellman equation. A first-order Taylor expansion gives
that
Vi(t˜;V 0) =
[
s+ k1,t˜
(
λ1Vi−1(t˜;V 0)− s
)]
dt+ (1− rdt)(1− k1,t˜λ1dt)
(
Vi(t˜;V 0) + V˙i(t˜;V 0)dt
)
⇐⇒ rVi(t˜;V 0) = s+ V˙i(t˜;V 0) + k1,t˜
[
λ1
(
Vi−1(t˜;V 0)− Vi(t˜;V 0)
)
− s
]
. (.4)
Hence, by Bellman’s principle, k1,t˜ = 1 is optimal if, and only if,
Vi−1(t˜;V 0)− Vi(t˜;V 0) ≥
s
λ1
, (.5)
and it is uniquely optimal if, and only if, this inequality is strict.
For i = 1, setting k1,τ = 1 for all τ ∈ [t˜, Tˇ (t)] implies
V1(t˜;V 0) =
λ1
λ1 + r
(
1− e−(r+λ1)(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)(
V 0 +
s
r
)
−
s
r
e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
(
1− e−λ1(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
.
V˙1 exists, and, because V 0 >
s
λ1
, satisfies
V˙1(t˜;V 0) = −λ1e
−(r+λ1)(Tˇ (t)−t˜)V 0 − se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
(
1− e−λ1(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
≤ −se−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜) < 0.
By simple algebra, one finds that
V0(t˜;V 0)− V1(t˜;V 0) =
(
r
r + λ1
+
λ1
r + λ1
e−(r+λ1)(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
V 0 +
s
r + λ1
(
1− e−(r+λ1)(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
,
which one shows strictly to exceed s
λ1
for all t˜ ∈ (t, Tˇ (t)] if V 0 >
s
λ1
. We conclude that for i = 1,
a cutoff strategy with t∗1 = Tˇ (t) is optimal, and that V1 is of class C
1 and strictly decreasing with
V˙1(t˜;V 0) ≤ −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜) for all t˜.
Now let i > 1. As my induction hypothesis, I posit that Vi−1 is of the following structure:
Vi−1(t˜;V 0) =


∫ t∗i−1
t˜
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)λ1Vi−2(τ ;V 0) dτ + e
−(r+λ1)(t∗i−1−t˜) s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i−1)
)
if t˜ ≤ t∗i−1
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
if t˜ > t∗i−1
for some t∗i−1 ≤ Tˇ (t). It is furthermore assumed that Vi−1 is C
1, and that V˙i−1(t˜;V 0) ≤ −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
for all t˜ ∈ (t, Tˇ (t)).
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Now, if Vi−1(t;V 0) <
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t)
)
, I set t∗i = t. Otherwise, I define t
∗
i as the lowest
t∗ satisfying Vi−1(t
∗;V 0) =
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗)
)
. Since V˙i−1(t˜;V 0) ≤ −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜) for all
t˜ ∈ (t, Tˇ (t)), Vi−1 is continuous, and Vi−1(Tˇ (t);V 0) = 0, it is the case that t
∗
i exists, and t
∗
i < Tˇ (t).
Fix an arbitrary t˜ ∈ (t, Tˇ (t)). If Vi−1(t˜;V 0) ≤
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
, i.e. t˜ ≥ t∗i , condition
(.5) implies that setting k1,τ = 0 for all τ ∈ [t˜, Tˇ (t)] is a best response (since V˙i−1(τ ;V 0) ≤
−se−r(Tˇ (t)−τ)), and Vi(t˜;V 0) =
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
. This establishes that k1,t˜ = 0 is a best response
for all t˜ ≥ t∗i .
Now, let us assume that Vi−1(t˜;V 0) >
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
. Yet, suppose that Vi−1(t˜;V 0)−
Vi(t˜;V 0) ≤
s
λ1
. This implies that Vi(t˜;V 0) >
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
; hence, it follows that there exists
some tˆ ∈ (t˜, Tˇ (t)) when k1,tˆ = 1 is a best response. Let tˆ1 be the lowest such tˆ.
10 First, suppose that
tˆ1 > t˜. Then, for all t
† ∈ (t˜, tˆ1), Vi(t
†;V 0) >
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
†)
)
, and hence, by (.4), V˙i(t
†;V 0) >
−se−r(Tˇ (t)−t
†) ≥ V˙i−1(t
†;V 0) for all t
† ∈ [t˜, tˆ1]—contradicting Vi−1(tˆ1;V 0)− Vi(tˆ1;V 0) ≥
s
λ1
. Now,
suppose tˆ1 = t˜, and Vi−1(t˜;V 0) − Vi(t˜;V 0) =
s
λ1
. In this case, limτ↓t˜ V˙i(τ ;V 0) > −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜) ≥
V˙i−1(t˜;V 0). Hence, k1 = 0 is a strict best response to the immediate right of t˜, and hence, by our
previous step, at all t‡ > t˜. By continuity of Vi, this contradicts Vi(t˜;V 0) >
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
.
This establishes that k1,t˜ = 1 is a best response for all t˜ ≤ t
∗
i .
Thus, I have shown that
Vi(t˜;V 0) =


∫ t∗i
t˜
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)λ1Vi−1(τ ;V 0) dτ + e
−(r+λ1)(t∗i−t˜) s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
if t˜ ≤ t∗i
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
if t˜ > t∗i
.
This implies that V˙i(t˜;V 0) = −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜) if t˜ > t∗i , and
V˙i(t˜;V 0) = −λ1e
−(r+λ1)(t∗i−t˜)Vi−1(t
∗
i ;V 0) +
r + λ1
r
e−(r+λ1)(t
∗
i−t˜)
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
s
+ λ1
∫ t∗i
t˜
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)V˙i−1(τ ;V 0) dτ
for t˜ < t∗i . Hence, using Vi−1(t
∗
i ;V 0) =
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
, one shows that limt˜↑t∗i
V˙i(t˜;V 0) =
−se−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i ) = limt˜↓t∗i
V˙i(t˜;V 0), implying that Vi is of class C
1.
It remains to prove that V˙i(t˜;V 0) ≤ −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜) for t˜ < t∗i . Yet, this is easily shown to follow
from the fact that, by induction hypothesis, V˙i−1(t˜;V 0) ≤ −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜), and hence
λ1
∫ t∗i
t˜
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)V˙i−1(τ ;V 0) dτ ≤ −se
−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
(
1− e−λ1(t
∗
i−t˜)
)
,
which completes the induction step.
Now, consider some i ∈ {1, · · · ,m − 1}. Having established that the agent’s best response is
given by a cutoff strategy, I shall now show that t∗i+1 ≤ t
∗
i . Consider an arbitrary time t˜ ≥ t
∗
i , and
10Since I am looking at weak best responses here, tˆ1 exists as a proper minimum. If Vi−1(t˜;V 0)−Vi(t˜;V 0) =
s
λ1
, tˆ1 = t˜.
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suppose the agent still has i+1 breakthroughs to go. By stopping at an arbitrary time t∗ ∈ (t˜, Tˇ (t)],
the agent can collect∫ t∗
t˜
λ1
s
r
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−τ)
)
dτ +
s
r
e−(r+λ1)(t
∗−t˜)
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗)
)
=
s
r
[
λ1
λ1 + r
(
1− e−(r+λ1)(t
∗−t˜)
)
− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
(
1− e−λ1(t
∗−t˜)
)]
+
s
r
e−(r+λ1)(t
∗−t˜)
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗)
)
.
By stopping immediately at time t˜, he can collect s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t)
)
. Thus, since
1−e−r(Tˇ (t)−t) >
λ1
λ1 + r
(
1− e−(r+λ1)(t
∗−t˜)
)
−e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
(
1− e−λ1(t
∗−t˜)
)
+e−(r+λ1)(t
∗−t˜)
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
⇐⇒ 1 >
λ1
r + λ1
+
r
r + λ1
e−(r+λ1)(t
∗−t˜),
the agent strictly prefers to stop immediately at t˜. For t˜ = t∗i in particular, we can conclude that
t∗i+1 ≤ t
∗
i ; if t
∗
i > t, we have that t
∗
i+1 < t
∗
i .
Clearly V1 is strictly increasing in V 0 for all t˜ < t
∗
1 = Tˇ (t), with limV 0→∞ V1(t˜;V 0) = ∞. A
simple induction argument now establishes that Vi is strictly increasing in V 0, with limV 0→∞ Vi(t˜;V 0) =
∞ for all i = 1, · · · ,m whenever t˜ < t∗i .
Suppose t∗i+1 > t. Then, t
∗
i+1 is defined by Vi(t
∗
i+1;V 0) =
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i+1)
)
. By our
previous step, we furthermore know that t∗i > t
∗
i+1, implying Vi is strictly increasing in V 0 at t
∗
i+1.
Hence, the cutoff t∗i+1 is strictly increasing in V 0.
Now, suppose that t∗i+1 = t. Then, Vi(t;V 0) ≤
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t)
)
. Let
j := min {ι ∈ {1, · · · ,m} : t∗ι = t}. Since t
∗
1 = Tˇ (t) > t, we have that j ≥ 2. Now, Vj−1(t;V 0)
is strictly increasing in V 0 with limV 0→∞ Vj−1(t;V 0) = ∞. Hence, there exists a constant Cj−1
such that for V 0 > Cj−1, we have that Vj−1(t;V 0) >
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t)
)
, and hence t∗j > t.
Iterated application of this argument yields the existence of a constant Ci such that V 0 > Ci implies
that t∗i+1 > t. Hence, by our previous step, t
∗
i+1 is strictly increasing in V 0 for V 0 > Ci.
Now, consider arbitrary t˜ ∈ [t, Tˇ (t)) and i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. Let σ be defined by
σ := max
{
ι ∈ {1, · · · ,m} : t∗ι > t˜
}
. As t˜ < Tˇ (t) = t∗1, σ ≥ 1. As t˜ < t
∗
σ, Vσ(t˜;V 0) is strictly in-
creasing in V 0 with limV 0→∞ Vσ(t˜;V 0) =∞. Hence, there exists a constant C˜σ such that V 0 > C˜σ
implies Vσ(t˜;V 0) >
s
λ1
+ s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
, and hence t∗σ+1 > t˜. Iterated application of this argu-
ment yields the existence of a constant C˜i−1 such that V 0 > C˜i−1 implies t
∗
i > t˜. As t˜ ∈ [t, Tˇ (t))
was arbitrary, we conclude that limV 0→∞ t
∗
i = Tˇ (t), and that limV 0→∞ Vi(t˜;V 0) = ∞ for any
t˜ ∈ [t, Tˇ (t)).
For t˜ ≥ t∗i , we have that Vi(t˜;V 0) =
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
≤ Vi−1(t˜;V 0). It remains to be shown
that for t˜ < t∗i , Vi(t˜;V 0) < Vi−1(t˜;V 0). Since Vi−1 is strictly decreasing, we have that
Vi(t˜;V 0) =
∫ t∗i
t˜
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t˜)λ1Vi−1(τ ;V 0) dτ + e
−(r+λ1)(t∗i−t˜)
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
≤
λ1
λ1 + r
Vi−1(t˜;V 0)
(
1− e−(r+λ1)(t
∗
i−t˜)
)
+ e−(r+λ1)(t
∗
i−t˜)
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
.
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Now, suppose that Vi(t˜;V 0) ≥ Vi−1(t˜;V 0). Then, the above inequality implies that(
r
r + λ1
+
λ1
r + λ1
e−(r+λ1)(t
∗
i−t˜)
)
Vi(t˜;V 0) ≤ e
−(r+λ1)(t∗i−t˜)
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
.
Yet, as Vi(t˜;V 0) ≥
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
> s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
i )
)
, this implies
r
r + λ1
+
λ1
r + λ1
e−(r+λ1)(t
∗
i−t˜) < e−(r+λ1)(t
∗
i−t˜),
a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let t and pˆt be given. The agent now chooses {k1,τ}t<τ≤Tˇ (t) (with k1,τ ∈ [0, 1] for all τ) so as to
maximize ∫ Tˇ (t)
t
{
re−r(τ−t)−λ1
∫ τ
t
pˆτk1,τ dτ
[
(1− k1,t)s+ k1,tλ1pˆtVm−1(τ ;V 0)
]}
dτ.
subject to ˙ˆpτ = −λ1k1,tpˆτ (1− pˆτ ).
As in Section 5, it is again convenient to work with the log-likelihood ratio xτ := ln
(
1−pˆτ
pˆτ
)
.
Since x˙τ = λ1k1,τ (co-state variable µτ ), the Hamiltonian for this problem is now given by
H˜τ = e
−r(τ−t)
[
k1,τλ1e
−xτVm−1(τ ;V 0) + (1− k1,τ )(1 + e
−xτ )s
]
+ µτλ1k1,τ .
Clearly, the agent’s choice set is closed, bounded and convex, the set of admissible policies is
non-empty, and the state variable is bounded. Moreover, the objective and the law of motion are
linear in the choice variable; thus, existence of an optimal plan follows from the Existence Theorem
of Filippov-Cesari (Thm. 8 in Seierstad & Sydsæter, 1987, p. 132).
To show sufficiency of the first-order Pontryagin conditions, I use the same variable trans-
formation as Bonatti & Ho¨rner (2010), qτ := e
−xτ . The maximized Hamiltonian is then clearly
concave in qτ , so that sufficiency follows from Arrow’s Sufficiency Theorem (Thm. 5 in Seierstad &
Sydsæter, 1987, p. 107).
Now, Pontryagin’s conditions are given by µTˇ (t) = 0,
µ˙τ = e
−r(τ−t)−xτ
[
k1,τλ1Vm−1(τ ;V 0) + (1− k1,τ )s
]
.
Furthermore, the agent prefers arm 1 over the safe arm at time τ if, and only if,
e−r(τ−t)
[
e−xτλ1Vm−1(τ ;V 0)− (1 + e
−xτ )s
]
≥ −µτλ1. (.6)
Since, by Lemma 4.3, Vm−1 is strictly decreasing, −µτ is bounded by
−µτ ≤ e
−r(τ−t)−xτλ1max
{
s
λ1
, Vm−1(τ ;V 0)
}∫ Tˇ (t)
τ
e−(r+λ1)(σ−τ) dσ
< e−r(τ−t)−xτλ1max
{
s
λ1
, Vm−1(τ ;V 0)
}∫ ∞
τ
e−(r+λ1)(σ−τ) dσ
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=
λ1
r + λ1
e−r(τ−t)−xτ max
{
s
λ1
, Vm−1(τ ;V 0)
}
.
Thus, assuming Vm−1(τ ;V 0) ≥
s
λ1
, the following condition is sufficient for (.6):
Vm−1(τ ;V 0) ≥
r + λ1
rλ1
(1 + exτ )s =
r + λ1
rλ1
s
pˆτ
. (.7)
We note that Vm−1(τ ;V 0) ≥
s
λ1
is implied by (.7). Now, suppose Vm−1(t˜;V 0) ≥
s(r+λ1)
p
T
rλ1
for some
t˜ ∈ (t, Tˇ (t)). Since, by Lemma 4.3, Vm−1 is strictly decreasing, equation (.7) holds for all τ ≤ t˜.
As equation (.7) also implies that t˜ < t∗m−1, and t
∗
m−1 < t
∗
i (i = 1, · · · ,m − 2) by Lemma 4.3, the
claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.5
By Lemma 4.3, we have that
f(Tˇ (t), V 0) =


∫ t∗m
t
e−(r+λ1)(τ−t)λ1Vm−1(τ ;V 0) dτ + e
−(r+λ1)(t∗m−t˜) s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t
∗
m)
)
if t < t∗m
s
r
(
1− e−r(Tˇ (t)−t˜)
)
if t = t∗m
.
Differentiability of f(., V 0) is thus immediate. When computing derivatives, we distinguish three
different cases: First, suppose t∗m = t. Then, it immediately follows from the explicit expression
for f that
df
dTˇ (t)
= se−r(Tˇ (t)−t).
If Tˇ (t) > t∗m > t, the Envelope Theorem implies that
df
dTˇ (t)
=
∂f
∂t∗m
dt∗m
dTˇ (t)
+
∂f
∂Tˇ (t)
=
∂f
∂Tˇ (t)
= se−r(Tˇ (t)−t)−λ1(t
∗
m−t).
If t∗m = Tˇ (t), i.e. m = 1, we get from the explicit expression for f(Tˇ (t), V 0) = V1(t;V 0; Tˇ (t)) that
df
dTˇ (t)
= λ1e
−(r+λ1)(Tˇ (t)−t)
(
V 0 −
s
λ1
)
+ se−r(Tˇ (t)−t).
f(t;V 0) = 0 immediately follows from the fact that Vm(Tˇ (t);V 0) = 0 for any Tˇ (t) ∈ [t, T ].
The Agent’s Optimization Problem
As derived in the text, the agent’s Hamiltonian is given by
Ht = e
−rtyt[(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt))]
+ yte
−rt−xt [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(xt)) + k1,tλ1(ht + wt)]}
+ µtλ1k1,t − γtλ0k0,tyt.
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with the state variables evolving according to x˙t = λ1k1,t (co-state µt) and y˙t = −λ0k0,tyt (co-state
γt), x0 given, y0 = 1, and xT and yT free, and (k0,t, k1,t) ∈ {(a, b) ∈ R
2
+ : k0,t + k1,t ≤ 1} = Uˇ .
Clearly, Uˇ is closed, bounded and convex , the set of admissible policies is non-empty, and the state
variables are bounded. Using in addition the linearity of the objective and the laws of motion in
the choice variables, one shows that the conditions of Filippov-Cesari’s Existence Theorem (Thm.
8 in Seierstad & Sydsæter, 1987, p. 132) are satisfied.
To show sufficiency of Pontryagin’s conditions, I invoke Arrow’s Sufficiency Theorem (Thm.
5 in Seierstad & Sydsæter, 1987, p. 107). To do so, I define the new state variable zt := yte
−xt
(co-state ζt). It is straightforward to verify that z˙t = −zt (λ0k0,t + λ1k1,t). Now, Ht can be written
as
Ht = e
−rtyt[(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(zt))]
+ e−rtzt [(1− k0,t − k1,t)s+ k0,tλ0(ht + ωt(zt)) + k1,tλ1(ht + wt)]}
− γtλ0k0,tyt − ζtzt(k0,tλ0 + k1,tλ1).
As Ht is linear in the control variables, the maximized Hamiltonian is given by plugging in
either k0,t = k1,t = 0, (k0,t, k1,t) = (0, 1) or (k0,t, k1,t) = (1, 0) in the above expression. We shall now
show that Ht is concave in (yt, zt) for each of these three cases, which in turn implies sufficiency of
the first-order Pontryagin conditions by Arrow’s Theorem.
If k0,t = k1,t = 0,
Ht = e
−rt(yt + zt)s,
i.e. Ht is linear.
If (k0,t, k1,t) = (0, 1),
Ht = e
−rtztλ1(ht + wt)− ζtλ1zt,
i.e. Ht is linear again.
If (k0,t, k1,t) = (1, 0),
Ht = e
−rt(yt + zt)λ0(ht + ωt(zt))− λ0(γtyt + ζtzt).
Now, after plugging in ωt(zt) =
zt
yt+zt
wt + δˆt,
11 we find that Ht is again linear:
Ht = e
−rt(yt + zt)λ0(ht + δˆtwt) + e
−rtλ0ztwt − λ0(γtyt + ζtzt),
which thus completes the proof.
11Here, I set ωt =: wt(pt + δˆt). In Proposition 4.1, we have seen that for any ǫ > 0, there exists a
continuation scheme such that ptwt ≤ ωt ≤ ptwt +
s
r
(1− e−rǫ). Equivalently, we can think of the principal
choosing δˆt ∈ (0, L] such that ωt(pt) = wt(pt + δˆt). If the proof of Proposition 4.1 goes through with m = 1,
δˆt = 0 can also be chosen.
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Chapter 4: Expert Experimentation∗
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Abstract
We analyze a dynamic game between an expert and a decision maker. In each period,
the decision maker has the option of buying cheap-talk advice from the expert, who is
merely interested in his continued employment. The expert’s quality is uncertain and
is initially unknown to either of the parties. We characterize properties of the optimal
decision rules, describing the effects of the expert’s strategic reporting behavior. If the
price of the expert’s advice is low, the optimal decision rule calls for more employment
as compared to the first best, and does so after bad news about the expert’s quality.
If the decision maker can commit to this rule, the expert reports his information
truthfully. Yet even if the decision maker lacks commitment power, there exists an
equilibrium in which the expert is always truthful when the price of advice is low. Yet,
without commitment the decision maker may be better off in an alternative equilibrium
in which the expert is allowed to accumulate some private information about his type.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a model of a decision maker (she) experimenting with employing an
expert (he) whose quality is uncertain and is unknown to either of them. The expert is
strategic and is only interested in his continued employment. The core issue in the model
is the following: If the expert were not strategic, the decision maker would like to employ
the expert if and only if the expert continued to prove his competence. Yet, if this decision
rule were in fact followed, the expert might have incentives to suppress a priori unlikely
information to maximize his chances of appearing competent; this would slow down learning
about the quality of the expert. In this paper, we are interested in the effect the expert’s
concern for reputation has on the structure of the optimal decision rules and, in particular,
on the amount of experimentation by the decision maker.
To motivate the question, think of a legislator, for instance, who wants to find out
whether the people she represents would prefer a vote in favor of, or against, a particular
bill under consideration. Knowing the ideological bent of her district, she would have some
initial belief on which position her constituents would tend to favor. Still, she might want to
hire a pollster, the quality of whose analyses she will only gradually learn to ascertain over
time. While, initially, she may trust her own instincts more than the pollster’s judgment,
she may still find it worthwhile experimenting with a particular polling firm, as information
on how good they are may come in handy in subsequent decision problems.1
We investigate how this trade-off between experimentation and exploitation is affected
by the presence of incentive constraints, or, equivalently, by a risky bandit arm which now
decides strategically whether to release the information it produces. Indeed, concerned about
his reputation, the pollster, unsure of how well-suited his methodology is to the district in
question, may prefer to base his recommendation on the district’s ideological tilt, which
is common knowledge, rather than on his actual polling, thus incidentally preventing the
legislator from learning about the accuracy of his polling methods. It is the goal of this
paper to analyze the effects of the dynamic interplay of the experimentation motive on the
one hand, and the presence of agency costs arising from the need to provide incentives for
1More broadly, the model applies to many instances when a decider who faces a sequence of multiple
decision problems can either follow the information she already has, or else can elect to seek the help of
outside advisors. Thus, a firm trying to gauge the demand for a new product may either trust in its own
prior belief, or seek the advice of outside consultants. People filing their income tax returns may either
follow their own information when trying to figure out if a particular set of expenses is deductible, or hire a
tax consultant, whose help may be very valuable in years to come should he turn out to be competent. Or
a college student having set aside an afternoon to study for a test may do so by herself, or spend the time
with a tutor; even if she may not initially trust the tutor’s advice, he might over time turn out to be quite
competent, thus helping her improve her performance on future tests.
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truth-telling, on the other hand.
While one’s first intuition may be that the introduction of additional agency costs
associated with pulling the risky arm would render the decision maker more reluctant to
pull her risky arm, our analysis shows that this need not be so. Indeed, if agency costs
are relatively low, the reverse happens. Now, there is optimally more experimentation with
agency costs than in the first best without agency costs, and the distortion only occurs after
bad news, while after good news, the decision maker continues to behave as in the first best
(Proposition 4.7).
By the Revelation Principle, the expert will always report his information truthfully in
the optimal decision rule. To ensure truth-telling, the decision maker has two conceptually
distinct tools at her disposal: She could penalize the expert after he has correctly announced
the state that was initially more likely in the first place, or she could reward him even
if his minority opinion turns out to be incorrect. With agency costs low, future option
values are quite high, and thus, incentive costs are minimized by encouraging the expert
to venture a minority opinion by the decision maker’s continuing to employ him with some
probability even if his information turned out to have been mistaken. This tool crucially
depends, however, on the decision maker’s enjoying full commitment power; indeed, without
commitment, she will only have the former tool at her disposal.
Regarding the concrete implementation of incentives in an optimal decision rule, we
can show that the threat of firing dominates mere temporary suspension (Lemma 4.5).
Furthermore, firing right away dominates firing later (Lemma 4.6); this is obvious in the
case where the expert has revealed himself to be of the bad type. We show that it also
holds true if firing has to occur in the context of punishment for the expert’s sticking to the
prevailing majority opinion.
Our model belongs to the class of ‘bad reputation’ models: the expert’s concern about
appearing to be competent creates incentives for the expert to distort his reports. Ottaviani
and Sørensen (2006a, 2006b) explore the effect of this type of reputation concerns on the
reporting strategy of the expert in a single-decision environment and show that, under weak
conditions, truthful reporting is not feasible; these conditions are satisfied by the static
version of our model.2
By contrast, we show that all agency problems vanish, and the first-best policy becomes
incentive compatible, as the reputation concerns grow sufficiently high, which we formalize as
the total number of periods (Proposition 4.2). While this result, which is independent of the
2Similar results are obtained in Morris (2001) and Morgan & Stocken (2003) who study cheap talk models
in which (bad) reputation concerns are about the preferences of the expert rather than his competence.
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decision maker’s commitment possibilities, may seem reminiscent of familiar folk theorems,
the fundamental mechanism underlying it is completely different and is primarily driven by
the fact that the expert is conditioning the expectation of his future continuation payoff on
different events on and off the equilibrium path. This continuation payoff effect is absent in
single-decision environments.
Furthermore, even in the presence of agency problems, truthful reporting of the expert’s
information can be supported in equilibrium. Of course, if the decision maker can commit
to a decision rule, this is implied by the Revelation Principle. Yet even without commitment
there exists an equilibrium in which the expert reports his information truthfully if the price
of advice is low (Proposition 5.1). This equilibrium is non-Markovian and conditions the
expert’s retainment both on the belief about his competence as well as on the payoff-irrelevant
features of the reporting history.
However, truthtelling should not be an end in itself for the decision maker. Without
commitment power, the decision maker can be better off in an equilibrium in which the expert
babbles in the first periods and accumulates private information about his type (Proposition
5.5). The reason is that implementing truthtelling in early periods requires firing a competent
expert with non-negligible probability; this could be excessively costly for the decision maker.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews some related literature;
Section 3 presents the model, and introduces necessary notation; in Section 4, we analyze
the game under full commitment, whereas Section 5 analyzes the case of a decision maker
who cannot commit to a specific decision rule at the outset of the game; Section 6 concludes.
Most proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our decision maker’s problem is akin to that of an economic agent operating a two-armed
bandit machine with one safe arm, whose expected payoff is known, and one risky arm,
whose expected payoff is initially unknown but can potentially be learnt through use over
time. Bandit models have been used in economics, at least since Rothschild’s (1974) discrete-
time model, to analyze the trade-off between experimentation and exploitation, providing
insights into agents’ incentives to forgo current payoffs in exchange for information which
can potentially be parlayed into better decisions, and thus higher payoffs, come tomorrow.3
The same trade-off is central to our paper, with the additional twist that our “risky arm”
is acting strategically, in the sense that the expert will choose his messages with a view to
3cf. Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (2008) for an overview of this literature.
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maximizing his expected duration of employment.
The single-agent two-armed bandit decision problem has been analyzed as early as
the 1950s (cf. e.g. Bradt, Johnson, Karlin, 1956). The analysis of the strategic interplay
between several agents operating replica bandits (cf. Bolton & Harris, 1999, 2000, Keller,
Rady, Cripps, 2005, Keller & Rady, 2010), negatively correlated bandits (cf. Chapter 1), or
three-armed bandits (cf. Chapter 2), is much more recent, by contrast.
“Strategic risky arms”, in the sense that the party about whom information is gathered
is also taking an action, have been studied by Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (1996, 2000) and
Bar-Isaac (2003). Bergemann & Va¨lima¨ki (1996) investigate the case of a single buyer
desiring to purchase a good from any one of multiple firms, which produce at different,
and initially unknown, qualities. They show that, with firms pricing the good strategically,
experimentation is at efficient levels in any Markov perfect equilibrium. In Bergemann
& Va¨lima¨ki (2000), by contrast, they show that with multiple buyers and two firms, the
firms are subsidizing experimentation to the point that it reaches inefficiently high levels
in equilibrium. In Bar-Isaac (2003), a seller of a good of initially unknown quality faces
a sequence of buyer pairs, who, in each period the seller (strategically) decides to sell,
Bertrand-compete for the good. After the transaction, the quality of the good is publicly
observed, and beliefs about the seller’s quality are updated. In contrast to these papers,
we investigate the role of long-term contracts an experimenter could potentially offer the
“risky arm” to induce behavior conducive to the experimenter’s interests. Moreover, in the
previously mentioned papers, the risky arm is deciding on a costly action—i.e. players are
engaged in a signaling, rather than a cheap-talk, game.
In a simple two-period Moral Hazard model, Manso (2010) shows that in order to induce
the agent to eschew an undesirable action, the principal will be very tolerant of, and may
even reward, early failure. Chapter 3 also shows that incentives are best provided through
later continuation values; moreover, he shows that if the optimal incentive scheme is run
there is no deadweight loss from agency. In our present setting, by contrast, the provision
of incentives through continuation values will lead to a distortion of the first-best rule.
Our model is also related to the literature on dynamic agency under gradual learning,
which has e.g. been investigated by Bergemann & Hege (1998, 2005) and Ho¨rner & Samuelson
(2009), who examine a venture capitalist’s optimal provision of funds to an entrepreneur, who
might divert the funds toward his private ends. As is the case in our model, the accumulation
of private information by an agent subsequent to a deviation from the equilibrium path
provides an interesting dynamic aspect to the strategic interaction. However, our model
is probably closest to Gerardi & Maestri (2008) who analyze the case of an expert who, in
order to receive an informative signal about the decision-relevant state of nature, has to incur
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some private effort costs. After choosing whether or not to expend effort on acquiring the
signal, the expert then sends the decision maker a cheap-talk message about the state of the
world. Our model crucially differs from all these papers, though, in that we are investigating
a problem of adverse selection, or hidden information, rather than moral hazard : Our expert
privately observes a signal without having to incur any effort costs; it is rather his innate
quality, which determines the precision of his signal, which is uncertain at first.4 Over the
course of the interaction, the parties gradually update their beliefs about the expert’s type;
as he wants to continue to be thought of highly in order to be re-employed, our expert will
have incentives strategically to manipulate the decision maker’s learning process. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the dynamic interplay between a
decision maker’s reliance on cheap-talk advice and her desire to screen out advisors of poor
quality.
The problem of testing, and discriminating between, experts of different, and uncertain,
quality has recently received considerable attention in the literature. Many contributions
stress the impossibility of fully discriminating between an expert who knows the stochastic
process about which he is called on to make predictions, and false experts who just make
wild guesses, see e.g. Olszewski & Sandroni (2008). Stewart (2009) relaxes the strong re-
quirement generally made in this literature that good experts must never be mistaken for
bad ones, constructing a test that can distinguish experts’ types with high probability, while
Olszewski & Peski (2009) construct a Bayesian test which allows the principal under certain
circumstances to overcome any potential incentive problems stemming from the informa-
tional asymmetry concerning the expert’s quality.
As our expert wants to be employed as long as possible, he cares about his reputation,
i.e. the principal’s belief that he is of the good type. Building on the seminal contribution
by Crawford & Sobel (1982), several papers have researched the implications of experts’
reputational concerns in cheap-talk games: Morris (2001), e.g., studies the effects of social
norms of political correctness on an advisor’s candor; in Ottaviani & Sørensen (2006), an ex-
pert’s perceived competence directly enters his utility function, whereas Fong (2009) studies
optimal evaluation rules for surgeons.
4While initially and on the equilibrium path, there is incomplete but symmetric information as to the
expert’s quality, private information may arise endogenously off the equilibrium path. Moreover, there is
obviously asymmetric information concerning the realized signals.
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3 Model Setup
There is a decision maker and an expert who live for N + 1 periods, t = 0, 1, . . . , N .5 In
each period, the decision maker has to choose a policy from the set {0, 1}. The optimal
policy is uncertain and is described by the state ωt ∈ {0, 1}. The value of ωt is distributed
independently across periods and is equal to 0 with a probability of p0 ∈ (0, 1/2), which is
common knowledge. The decision maker obtains a period payoff of 1 whenever the policy
matches the state and 0 otherwise; there is no discounting.
In each period, the decision maker can either consult an expert or she can simply rely
on her prior to make the decision. Our goal is to study the effect of the expert’s strategic
reporting behavior on an optimal decision rule in an environment where there is a tradeoff
between an immediate cost of employing the expert and the future benefit of learning about
the expert’s competence. To this end, we assume some exogenous cost c > 0 that is incurred
by the decision maker whenever she employs the expert.
If the decision maker decides to consult the expert, the expert observes a non-verifiable
signal, s˜ ∈ {0, 1}, about the realized state. There are two types of expert: With probability
α0 ∈ (0, 1) the expert is competent and his signal reveals the optimal policy. With comple-
mentary probability, the expert is incompetent and his signals are uninformative. We denote
the type of the expert by θ ∈ {0, 1} where θ = 1 denotes the competent expert.
This assumption implies that the decision maker will learn with certainty that the expert
is incompetent whenever he is expected to tell the truth and makes a mistake. Similar full-
revelation assumptions are commonly made for reasons of tractability, e.g. in the strategic
experimentation literature, where it is often assumed that one instance of good (or bad)
news resolves all uncertainty about the value of the risky arms.6 It is also concordant with
the assumptions often made in the literature on repeated games with reputation and perfect
monitoring, where a single deviation from the behavior expected from a Stackelberg leader
reveals that the player is strategic.7
The type of the expert is uncertain and not known to either of the players. The expected
probability that the expert’s signal is correct at time t = 0 is β0 = α0 + (1 − α0)/2. The
belief of the decision maker that the expert is competent given the information available in
5Alteratively, we could assume infinitely many periods with discounting. Yet, end-of-game effects are not
much of a concern in our model, because the uncertainty about the expert’s quality will gradually resolve
over time, so that players’ preferences will eventually become aligned. The same would be true in a model
with infinitely many periods, so that we would expect similar qualitative results.
6See e.g. Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) or Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
7See Mailath & Samuelson (2006) for a review of the (non-cheap talk) literature on repeated games with
reputations.
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period t is denoted by αt and is called the reputation of the expert. We use βt to denote the
probability that the expert’s signal is correct in period t.
We introduce reputational concerns on the expert’s part into our dynamic setting by
assuming it is the expert’s objective to be employed for as many periods as possible. Hence,
we assume that the expert gets a payoff of 1 per period whenever he is employed and 0
otherwise. Again, there is no discounting.
To rule out uninteresting cases, we assume that it is commonly believed that β0 < 1−p0;
i.e. the decision maker obtains a higher payoff if she follows her prior beliefs than if she
follows the signals of the expert with reputation α0. Thus, employing the expert in the early
periods of the game entails a cost of c per period while providing the decision maker with
an opportunity to learn about his type and to screen out a bad expert. Our assumption
also implies that an expert with a reputation of α0 will believe that state 1 is more likely
to occur regardless of his signal. This can create an incentive for the expert to lie about his
signal, thus impeding learning about his type.
The timing of the interaction in each period is as follows. First, the decision maker
decides whether to hire the expert. If he is employed, the expert then observes a signal and
sends a subsequent cheap-talk report to the decision maker, after which the decision maker
chooses a policy. Then, at the end of the period, the actual state of the world is publicly
observed, and payoffs are realized.
We will consider two variants of the model. In the game with full commitment, the
decision maker can commit to her strategy at the outset of the game in period 0. In the
game without commitment, the decision maker has no commitment power and her choices
must be sequentially rational in each period. Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Whether the expert is employed or not, the signal reported by the expert (if any)
and the realized state are common knowledge in each period. Hence, the public history at
the beginning of period t ≥ 1, denoted by hpt , is a sequence of t triples ν
p
τ = (ϕτ , sˆτ , ωτ ),
τ = 0, . . . , t − 1, where we set ϕτ = 1 if the expert is consulted in period τ and ϕτ = 0
otherwise, and where sˆτ denotes the expert’s message in period τ .
8 We extend our definition
of a public history to t = 0 by setting hp0 = ∅. In addition, we will use the notation
hpt+1 = (ν
p
t , h
p
t ) and h
p
t+1 = (ϕt, sˆt, ωt, h
p
t ). Also, let h
p
t+τ = h
p
th
p
τ denote a public history of
length t + τ in which the first t periods are described by history ht and the last τ periods
are described by history hτ . We set h
p
t = h
p
t∅.
Because he privately observes his signals, the expert’s information partition is finer.
8We set sˆτ = ∅ if the expert is not consulted in period τ .
125
Therefore, the private history of the expert at the beginning of period t ≥ 1, denoted by
hat , is a sequence of t four-tuples ν
a
τ = (ϕτ , s˜τ , sˆτ , ωτ ).
9 We define ha0 = ∅. As in the case
of public histories, we will use the notation hat+1 = (ν
a
t , h
p
t ), h
a
t+1 = (ϕt, s˜t, sˆt, ωt, h
a
t ), and
hat+τ = h
a
τh
a
t .
LetHp andHa respectively denote the set of all public and private histories. In addition,
we define the set of private histories in which the expert reports his signals truthfully in all
previous periods:
H˜a := {hat ∈ H
a|sˆτ = s˜τ , τ ≤ t} .
Hp is partitioned by Hp0, the subset of histories in which there is a report inconsistent
with the state, and Hp1, the subset of histories in which all reports coincide with the realized
states.
In our environment, the decision maker faces two objectives. The first objective is the
choice of an optimal policy in each period given the available information. The second objec-
tive is choosing optimally when to consult the expert given the history of his performance.
Achieving the first objective is straightforward and will not be the focus of our analysis:
If the expert is employed, the decision maker will follow her recommendation if and only if it
is sufficiently informative. Otherwise, the decision maker will comply with her prior beliefs
and choose policy 1. If the expert is not consulted, the decision maker will follow her prior
belief.
The focus of our analysis is the second objective of the decision maker. Therefore, our
definition of the decision maker’s rule only considers whether the expert will be employed
in a given period. Specifically, a (behavioral) decision rule is a function mapping the public
history in period t into the probability of consulting the expert in this period:
ρ : Hp → [0, 1].
Every decision rule induces a decision problem for the expert, in which the expert maximizes
his expected payoff. A (behavioral) strategy of the expert is a function that maps the private
history in period t and the observed signal into a distribution of reports to the decision maker:
sˆ : Ha × {0, 1} → [0, 1], (hat , s˜t) 7→ sˆ(h
a
t , s˜t),
where we set sˆ(hat , s˜t) to be the probability of report 1. A strategy is truthful if
sˆ(hat , s˜t) =

1, if s˜t = 1;0, otherwise.
9We set s˜τ = sˆτ = ∅ if the expert is not consulted in period τ .
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We denote the truthful strategy by sˆ∗. Let S be the set of all strategies sˆ.
Given decision rule ρ, let uρ(hat ) denote the expert’s expected payoff in period t after the
private history hat , conditional on being employed in this period. Similarly, let u
ρ(sˆ, s˜, hat )
denote the expert’s expected payoff given ρ in period t after private history hat conditional on
being employed in this period and after observing signal s˜ and using a strategy sˆ. A decision
rule ρ is incentive compatible after the signal s if it is optimal for the expert to report his
signals truthfully given that he did not lie in any of the preceding periods:
uρ(sˆ∗, s, hat ) ≥ u
ρ(sˆ′, s, hat ), for all h
a
t ∈ H˜
a, sˆ′ ∈ S, s ∈ {0, 1} (1)
Let ρ be an incentive compatible decision rule. Then, on the equilibrium path after any
history in Hp
∅
the public posterior belief is that the expert is certainly incompetent, αpt = 0.
By contrast, after a history in Hp1, t ≥ 1, the public posterior belief about the competence
of the expert increases in the number of periods
αpt =
α0
α0 + (1− α0)
1
2t
=
αt−1
αt−1 + (1− αt−1)
1
2
for any history hpt ∈ H
p
1.
If αt ≥ 1− 2p0 or, equivalently,
t ≥ K := log2
1− 2p0
2p0
1− α0
α0
.
the expert’s signals become sufficiently informative for the decision maker to match her
action to the signal. Let K0 be the largest integer that is smaller than K. As β0 < 1 − p0,
the value of K0 ≥ 0.
4 Optimal Decision Rule
Throughout this section, we shall assume that the decision maker can commit to whatever
decision rule she would like to at the outset of the game.
Let vρ(hpt ) denote the expected payoff of the decision maker at the beginning of period
t given history hpt and decision rule ρ, from which we subtract the payoff she can obtain if
she always relies on her own information, (N + 1 − t)(1 − p0), by way of normalization. A
decision rule is optimal if it maximizes the ex-ante expected payoff of the decision maker
among all incentive compatible decision rules:
(P0) : max v
ρ(∅)
s.t. (1).
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In the game with full commitment, the Revelation Principle implies that we can without
loss of generality restrict our attention to incentive compatible rules. Any optimal decision
rule is an equilibrium outcome in the game with full commitment; an optimal decision rule
exists because the set of incentive compatible decision rules is compact in the weak topology
and vρ is continuous on this set.
We denote by V (α) the ex-ante expected payoff of the decision maker in an optimal
decision rule where we make explicit that it depends on the prior reputation of the expert.
The value of V (α) is non-negative for any α ∈ [0, 1] because the decision maker can always
ensure the payoff of 0 by not employing the expert and following her prior. Furthermore,
V (α) is positive and increasing in α if the expert is employed in the optimal decision rule.
Consider a hypothetical environment in which the expert’s signals are observed by the
decision maker. In this environment, the (first-best) optimal decision rule is either never to
buy the signal, and thus to realize a payoff of 0, or to continue buying the signal as long as
it has been correct and to stop doing so after a first incorrect forecast. In the latter case,
this rule yields a payoff of
vFB(α0, N + 1) = α0 [(N −K)p0 − (N + 1)c]
+ (1− α0)
{(
1
2
)K [
1 + 1
2
+ · · ·+
(
1
2
)N−K−1] (1
2
− (1− p0)
)
−
[
1 + 1
2
+ · · ·+
(
1
2
)N]
c
}
In order to avoid the uninteresting case in which buying the signal would not be optimal
even in a first-best world, we impose the following
Assumption 4.1
vFB(α0, N + 1) > 0.
The agency problem in our model arises because the first best decision rule might not
be incentive compatible if the expert’s signals are not observable. Let, for instance, N = 2
and imagine that the expert observes s˜0 = 0 in period 0. Then, the expert believes that the
state ω0 = 1 is more likely because his signals are not sufficiently informative to outweigh his
prior beliefs.10 Thus, the probability of employment in the second period is maximized by
reporting sˆ0 = 1. As a result, the expert’s best response to the first best decision rule would
entail “babbling” in period 0, i.e., for instance, a report of 1 irrespective of the observed
signal. Thus, there is no learning about the expert’s type, and the decision maker would
find herself compelled to revert to her prior in either period, thus realizing her outside option
of 0.
10This is so because p0β0 < (1− p0)(1− β0).
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Nevertheless, the first best decision rule becomes incentive compatible if the duration of
the interaction between the expert and the decision maker is sufficiently large. This result is
based on the observation that, as N increases, the rate of growth of the payoff from telling
the truth in any given period t exceeds the rate of growth of the payoff from lying in that
period.
Although there is an obvious analogy, the proof is not a folk theorem type of argument.
First of all, there is no discounting in our environment and the number of periods is finite.
More importantly, the reason behind the different rates of growth of the payoffs from lying
and from telling the truth is that the two parties are conditioning on different events. If the
expert lies and his report turns out to be correct, he privately learns that he is incompetent.
By contrast, if he reports his signal truthfully and it is correct, then the expert believes
that he is more likely to be competent. While deciding about his report, the expert’s
expectation about how likely he is to continue to be correct in the future if retained is,
therefore, conditioned on two distinct events. This conditioning is the reason why the rates
of growth of the payoffs from lying and telling the truth differ.
Proposition 4.2 (Vanishing Concerns for Reputation) For any given c, p0, α0, there
exists an integer N0 such that the first best decision rule is incentive compatible if and only
if N ≥ N0.
Proof: A formal version of the argument expounded above proves that for any t there
exists an integer N ′(t) such that for all N ≥ N ′(t) there is no profitable (possibly, multi-
period) deviation from truth-telling that starts in period t. It is left to show, then, that
there exists an N0 such that N(t) ≤ N0 for all t or, in other words, that as we increase N the
incentive constraints are not violated in the newly added periods. This, however, holds true
because, if the expert is employed toward the end of the relationship under the first best rule,
then his reputation is necessarily high, the expert considers his signals very informative, and
truth-telling is his strict best response. A complete proof is provided in the appendix.
If N < N0, the first best decision rule is not incentive compatible. The decision maker
will want to fire the expert if he reveals himself to be incompetent, which can potentially
create incentives for the expert to report a signal of 1 more frequently than he observes
it. Thus, incentive compatibility requires adjusting the decision rule to make reporting 0
relatively more attractive. A priori, there are two options: To encourage reports that go
against the grain of received prior wisdom, one may want to promise the expert that he will
be retained (with some probability) after such a report even if it does not match the state.
An alternative is to discourage sticking with the majority opinion by promising to fire the
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expert (again, with some probability) after such a report even if the report turns out to be
correct in the end. Whether the decision maker is better off relying on the carrot or on the
stick will depend on the parameters; in the latter case, she will under-employ the expert as
compared to the first-best benchmark, whereas, in the former case, the expert will be over-
employed, an option, which, as we shall see in Section 5, crucially relies on the assumption
that the decision maker has full commitment power.
In order to characterize certain properties of the optimal decision rule, we proceed in
several steps, progressively restricting the class of decision rules the decision maker will
want to consider. Our first lemma shows that there is no gain for the decision maker in
conditioning on the different histories that may arise after the expert has made a mistake.
The intuition for this is that, as long as the players are on the equilibrium path, both will
know that the expert is of the low type for sure after he has made a mistake; conditioning
the rule in the manner proposed could thus only be leveraged by a privately informed expert,
who, by lying, had erroneously convinced the decision maker that he was no good. Affording
off-equilibrium experts who lied such opportunities can only encourage lying, and therefore
cannot be in the decision maker’s best interests.
Lemma 4.3 Within the class of incentive compatible decision rules, the decision maker can
without loss restrict herself to rules that do not condition on the continuation histories that
occur after the expert makes an incorrect report.
Proof: Let ρ be an incentive compatible decision rule and hp ∈ H∅ be a public history
after which the decision rule retains the expert with positive probability that depends on the
continuation history. Then, consider a decision rule ρ′ that (i) coincides with ρ everywhere
except hp and (ii) after history hp retains the expert for the same expected number of periods
as ρ regardless of the continuation history, where the expectation is taken with respect to a
probability distribution induced by truthful reporting of the incompetent expert.
By construction, ρ′ is incentive compatible at all private histories that induce hp and
their successors. Furthermore, the expert’s payoff along the equilibrium path is the same in
both rules at all other private histories. Furthermore, off the equilibrium path, the expert’s
payoff is affected only for the private histories that are predecessors and successors of private
histories that result in public history hp and for which at the node corresponding to hp the
expert believes that he is competent with a positive probability.
Let ha be such a history. In ρ′, the expert’s expected payoff at ha is constant in his
private belief and coincides with that of the incompetent expert. By contrast, in ρ, the
expert’s payoff at ha is non-decreasing in his private belief and is not lower than that of the
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incompetent expert; the expert can guarantee himself the expected payoff of an incompetent
expert by using the latter’s strategy conditioning, if necessary, his reports on a coin flip
rather than his signals. Hence, the expert’s payoff at history ha in ρ′ is not greater than
in ρ. Furthermore, by construction of ρ′, truth-telling is a best response in this rule for
any successor history of ha regardless of the continuation history. It follows then that ρ′ is
incentive compatible.
By construction, both decision rules induce the same expected payoff for the decision
maker.
Iterated application of the preceding construction proves the claim.
Our next observation is that we can focus on the decision rules that do not condition
on the realization of the state in periods in which the expert is not employed. Let h0
∅
and
h1
∅
denote one period histories in which the expert is not employed and the state is 0 and 1
respectively.
Lemma 4.4 Within the class of incentive compatible decision rules, the decision maker can
without loss restrict herself to rules that satisfy
ρˆi(h
p
th
0
∅h
p
τ ) = ρˆi(h
p
th
1
∅h
p
τ ) for any h
p
t′ , h
p
τ ∈ H
p, (2)
where t+ τ + 1 ≤ N .
Proof: Consider any incentive compatible decision rule ρ. We will construct, by induction,
another incentive compatible decision rule ρˆ.
Step 1. Set ρˆ0 = ρ.
Step 2. For any i = 1, · · · , N let t′ = N − i and define ρˆi as follows.
1. ρˆi(h
p
t ) = ρˆi−1(h
p
t ) for all histories of length less than or equal to t
′ (t ≤ t′) and for
histories of any length t > t′ in which the expert is employed in period t′+1 (φt′+1 = 1);
2. ρˆi(h
p
t′h
0
∅
hpτ ) = ρˆi(h
p
t′h
1
∅
hpτ ) := p0ρˆi−1(h
p
t′h
0
∅
hpτ )+(1−p0)ρˆi−1(h
p
t′h
1
∅
hpτ ) for any h
p
t′ , h
p
τ ∈ H
p,
where τ ≤ N − t′ − 1.
Define ρˆ = ρˆN . Decision rule ρˆ is incentive compatible. To see this, note that ρˆ0 is triv-
ially incentive compatible as it coincides with ρ. Furthermore, if ρˆi−1 is incentive compatible,
then ρˆi is also incentive compatible: This follows from the following two observations: (a)
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The expert who finds it optimal to report truthfully after history hpt′h
0
∅
hpτ and after history
hpt′h
1
∅
hpτ in ρˆi−1 will also find it optimal to report truthfully after either of these histories in
ρˆi, as beliefs are the same after both histories. (b) Moreover, the expert’s expected payoff
in period t′ after histories considered in step 2.2 of construction is the same in both rules.
By construction, ρˆ satisfies (2) and generates the same expected payoff for the decision
maker as ρ.
Let C˜ denote the set of incentive compatible decision rules that satisfy the conditions
of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4. Our next lemma shows that when the decision maker wants
to penalize the expert even though his forecast had been correct, it is best to fire the expert
for good with a certain probability rather than to suspend him for a limited amount of time.
Its proof formalizes the intuition that the decision maker can always exactly reproduce
the incentives provided by the threat of temporary suspension with the threat of complete
termination with the appropriate probability. Indeed, termination is a much sharper and
fearsome tool; moreover, since we allow for stochastic decision rules, the decision maker can
exactly fine-tune the dosage of this threat as she needs to in any given situation. While our
lemma only proves that the decision maker can always do at least as well by threatening to
fire the expert as by temporarily suspending him, she may often be able to do strictly better
with the sharper tool, as it can enforce compliance where the mere threat of temporary
suspension may fail.
Lemma 4.5 (No Temporary Suspensions) Within C˜, the decision maker can without
loss neglect such rules ρˆ for which there exist a time period t˜ and a history h˜p
t˜
such that
ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
) < 1 and ρˆ(0, ∅, ωt, h˜
p
t˜
) > 0.
Proof: The idea of the proof is to construct a decision rule that instead of suspending the
expert in period t˜ and employing him in the next period employs the expert in period t˜ and
suspends him in the next period. As the actual time of employment of the expert is payoff
irrelevant for either of the parties, the constructed decision rule is incentive compatible and
generates the same expected payoff for the decision maker. The full proof is provided in the
appendix.
Let C˜ ′ be the subset of the decision rules in C˜ that satisfy the conditions of Lemma
4.5. Our next lemma uses a somewhat related argument: The decision maker can never gain
by waiting to exact a penalty that is due. For one thing, the expert will with a positive
probability have revealed himself to be of poor quality, and hence have gotten fired, before
the “penalty period”; therefore, if the firing is to take place later, it must occur with a higher
132
probability to give the same incentives. Conversely, conditional on the expert’s reaching the
“penalty period”, his expected ability is higher than it is today, and hence firing him with
the same given probability would already be costlier for the decision maker. As our previous
lemma, Lemma 4.6 merely shows that it is always possible to reproduce the incentives
imposed by a decision rule that fires the expert later by one which fires him earlier.
Lemma 4.6 (No Delay in Firing) Within C˜ ′, the decision maker can without loss neglect
such rules ρˆ for which there exists a history h˜p
t˜
∈ Hp1 such that ρˆ(h˜
p
t˜
) > 0 and such that
ρˆ(hp
t˜+1
) < 1 for all successor histories hp
t˜+1
and ρˆ(hp
t˜+1
) > 0 for some successor history hp
t˜+1
.
Proof: The proof again proceeds by construction. The idea behind the construction is
to decrease the probability of retainment in period t˜ and simultaneously to increase the
probability of retainment in the subsequent period in a manner that will uniformly increase
the expert’s continuation payoffs in the next period on the equilibrium path. We prove that
this construction will not disturb incentive compatibility of the decision rule and will not
decrease the expected payoff of the decision maker. Details are provided in the appendix.
While we are providing the full proof in the appendix, we here illustrate the construction
underlying our proof with an example. Let N = 1 and assume that ρˆ(∅) = 1, ρˆ(hp1) = γ ∈
(0, 1) for all hp1 ∈ H
p
1, and ρˆ(h
p
1) = 0 for all h
p
1 ∈ H
p
∅
. In the new decision rule ρ′, we set
ρ′(hp1) = 1 if h
p
1 ∈ H
p
1 and ρ
′(hp1) = 1− γ otherwise. Finally, we let ρ
′(∅) = γ.
It is clear that ρ′ is incentive compatible as the continuation payoffs of the expert after
each history in the first period are increased by 1 − γ. Furthermore, in the first period the
decision maker’s payoff is decreased by 1− γ times the expected value of the expert, whilst
in the second period the decision maker’s payoff is increased by 1 − γ times the expected
value of the expert after the first period history. The former is necessarily not bigger than
the latter as the decision maker can condition her later action on additional payoff relevant
information. Hence, the decision maker is weakly better off under ρ′.
Several additional issues arise when we generalize this argument. First, the expression
for the amount by which we should increase the probability of employment in the consequent
period is more complex and depends on the continuation payoff of the expert as well as the
probability of employment in the current period. Second, the degree by which the payoffs
of the expert are affected will depend on his private belief; this requires some additional
arguments to prove incentive compatibility of the constructed rule. Finally, extending the
argument to show that the decision maker is better off with the new rule is not immediate
because the amount of increase in the probability of the expert’s employment in latter periods
is not necessarily constant across histories.
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The following proposition shows that whenever employment costs are low, the risky arm
will be over-used in the optimal decision rule, as compared to the first-best benchmark; in
order to give proper incentives for truthtelling, the expert is kept on for some time even after
a mistake.
Proposition 4.7 (Optimal decision rule, low costs) There exists c > 0 such that for
all c < c in the optimal decision rule
1. the expert is always retained after a correct report;
2. incentives to report truthfully are provided by a promise to retain the expert for a certain
amount of time even if his report turns out to be incorrect.
Proof: See appendix.
5 No Commitment
A decision maker’s option of continuing to employ the expert after he has mistakenly an-
nounced the less likely state crucially depends on the assumption that she can credibly
commit to doing so ex ante. Indeed, after the expert has made a mistake in an equilibrium
where he is supposed always truthfully to reveal his signal, he is commonly known to be of
poor quality, and it is not sequentially rational for the decision maker to keep him on. By
the same token, a decision maker would not fire the expert after he correctly forecast the
state, albeit the more likely one, unless she is bound to do so. Indeed, after the expert has
correctly forecast the state, even though it be the more likely one, his reputation increases,
so that his services become more, rather than less, valuable to the decision maker.
This brief discussion shows that many of the tools the decision maker may be using
in the optimal decision rule may no longer be available to her in the absence of long-term
commitment possibilities. However, she could still try and enforce truth-telling by threat-
ening to fire the expert with some probability after he has correctly forecast the more likely
state, a threat made incentive compatible for her by the expert’s off-equilibrium threat to
send but uninformative messages if he continues to be employed and the decision maker has
randomized with an off-equilibrium probability.11 Of course, this construction relies on the
assumption that the decision maker’s randomizing probability is perfectly observable to the
expert.
11This is incentive compatible for the expert, because the decision maker does not condition his continued
employment on the reports.
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One result from the commitment case readily extends, however. If, in response to the
decision maker’s pursuing her first-best policy, the expert maximizes his reputation by being
truthful, then it is the decision maker’s (sequentially rational!) best response to pursue her
first-best policy; therefore, if the number of sequential decision problems is large enough,
the first-best policy becomes incentive compatible, by the same argument as in the problem
with full commitment. We summarize this finding in the following remark:
Remark For any given c, p0, α0, there exists an integer N0 such that the first-best decision
rule is incentive compatible if and only if N ≥ N0.
Proof: Identical to Proposition 4.2, and therefore omitted.
5.1 Fully Revealing Equilibria
Even without commitment, it is still possible to construct equilibria in which the expert
always truthfully reveals his information.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose assumption 4.1 holds. Then, for any N , α0 and p0, there exists
a cˆ > 0 such that for all c < cˆ, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in the game without
commitment.
Proof: Let the principal pursue her first-best policy after tFB, and let her always fire the
expert after he has made a mistake, while always keeping him on after he has announced
state 0 correctly. After he has forecast state 1 correctly, he is kept on with a probability ρs1,t
such that, before time tFB, the incentive constraint for a signal of 0 exactly bind. From the
explicit expression for the incentive constraint, it is immediate that ρs1,t >
p0
1−p0
. Hence, the
probability of reaching period tFB, µ˜tFB , is bounded below by α0 (2p0)
tFB > 0. Thus, the
principal’s payoff from this policy is bounded below by
α0 (2p0)
tFB vFB(αtFB , N − t
FB)− tFBc.
As the first term is positive by Assumption 4.1, as well as increasing in c, the verification of
the mutual best response property, as indicated in the text, completes the proof.
However, without commitment, the Revelation Principle no longer applies, which means
that we do not know ex ante that full revelation will necessarily be optimal. Indeed, below,
we shall construct an equilibrium which entails the accumulation of endogenous private
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information on the agent’s part; it can be shown that for any fully revealing equilibrium,
there exists a threshold c > 0 such that the equilibrium with private information dominates
it for all c < c. In the following proposition, we show that whenever the first-best solution
is not incentive compatible at time 0, the decision maker’s payoff in any fully revealing
equilibrium is bounded away from vFB(α0, N + 1).
Proposition 5.2 Let tFB ≥ 1, and let V , and ρ, be the decision maker’s payoff, and strategy,
in a fully revealing equilibrium. Then, there exists a time t < tFB, a constant µt and a history
ht ∈ H1 such that
V ≤ vFB(α0, N + 1)− µt(1− ρ(ht))v
FB(αt+1, N − t) < v
FB(α0, N + 1).
Proof: Since tFB ≥ 1, there exists some t < N and some history ht ∈ H1 with ρ(ht) < 1 and
µt > 0, where µt denotes the probability of the expert’s still being employed in period t, and
history ht realizing, in this equilibrium. The upper bound is then given by the hypothetical
situation where the first best became implementable after period t. By assumption 4.1,
vFB(αt+1, N − t) > 0; hence V is bounded away from v
FB(α0, N + 1).
As an illustration, we give the following corollary pertaining to a particularly intuitive
class of fully revealing equilibria:
Corollary 5.3 Suppose there exists a fully revealing equilibrium which has the feature that
after tFB, the first-best decision rule is played. Then, there exists a constant µtFB−1 > 0 such
that the principal’s payoff in this equilibrium is bounded above by
vFB(α0, N + 1)− µˆtFB−1(1− p0)βtFB−1v
FB(αtFB , N − t
FB)
×
[
1−
p0βtFB−1
(1− p0)(1− βtFB−1)
1 + βtFB−1 + · · ·+ β
N−tFB
tFB−1
1 + (1− p0) + · · ·+ (1− p0)N−t
FB
]
< vFB(α0, N + 1).
Proof: Let µˆtFB−1 denote the probability of the expert’s still being employed in period
tFB − 1. Then, the upper bound on the principal’s payoff is derived by computing the
loss in payoffs as compared to the first-best from the binding incentive constraint in period
tFB−1, given the first-best decision rule is played starting from the next period onward. By
assumption 4.1, vFB(αtFB , N − t
FB) > 0; moreover, µˆtFB−1 > 0, since otherwise the decision
maker would be better off not employing the expert at all in period 0.
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5.2 Equilibrium With Endogenous Private Information
A quite natural way for the decision maker to handle the expert’s incentive problem would
be for her to grant him an initial “grace period”, during which he was allowed to send
uninformative signals each period, and to gain confidence in his abilities, finding his mark
in his new job. Once this probationary period, which lasts for tFB periods, ends, though,
he is expected to be right every time, i.e. the first-best policy will be implemented. The
expert will then report his signals truthfully if, and only if, his signals have all been correct
during the first tFB periods; otherwise, he will best respond by continuing to babble, i.e. to
announce state 1 no matter what his signal may have been.
Of course, for the decision maker to be willing to extend such initial leniency, it has to
be the case that the overall length of this probationary period, during which she incurs a
per-period loss of c, is sufficiently small relative to the expected gains in the later stages of
the relationship. Specifically, the following condition must hold:
vFB(α0, N + 1) ≥
(1−α0)c
{
tFB − 1− 1
2
− · · · −
1
2N
+
(
1−
(
1
2
)tFB) [
(1− p0) + (1− p0)
2 + · · ·+ (1− p0)
N−tFB
]
+
(
1
2
)tFB [1
2
+
(
1
2
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
2
)N−tFB]}
. (3)
We summarize this equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.4 Let (3) hold. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which no information
is transmitted, and the expert is never fired during the first tFB periods; thereafter, the expert
truthfully reveals his signals if, and only if, his first tFB signals were correct. Moreover, he
will only be fired as soon as he has made an incorrect forecast after the first tFB periods.
Proof: The expert’s equilibrium strategy is for him always to report state 1, unless t ≥ tFB,
and he has been employed, and has received correct signals, in all previous periods, in which
case he truthfully reveals his signal. The decision maker’s equilibrium strategy calls for
employing the expert in t = 0, and for retaining him if he reports 1 during the first tFB
periods. In all other cases, she retains the expert if, and only if, his current prediction
turns out to be correct. Optimality of the expert’s behavior immediately follows from the
definition of tFB. Optimality of the principal’s behavior follows from (3).
In this equilibrium, experts are costly but harmless, in the sense that it is always optimal
for the decision maker to follow the expert’s advice. Indeed, suppose the expert has privately
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learned that he is of the bad type; he then maximizes his expected employment duration by
always reporting state 1. For a decision maker who knew that she cannot rely on a high-
quality expert’s advice, it is also optimal always to stick with her prior, and to implement
policy 1. Hence, as compared to the first-best solution, babbling only imposes an employment
cost on the decision maker; there is no cost in terms of inefficient decision making. Thus,
for low c, the decision maker’s payoff in this babbling equilibrium is arbitrarily close to the
first best, something we explore in more detail in the following subsection.
5.3 Welfare Comparison
We shall now show that if c is below a certain threshold it pays for the principal to allow
the agent to accumulate private information on the equilibrium path, as doing so dominates
any given fully revealing equilibrium. Specifically, we shall show that the equilibrium we
have constructed in the previous subsection dominates our fully revealing equilibria for low
enough c. We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.5 Let tFB ≥ 1. Then, there exists a threshold c > 0 such that for all c ∈]0, c[
the principal is strictly better off in the equilibrium with babbling (see Proposition 5.4) than
in any fully revealing equilibrium.
Proof: By construction, the equilibrium exhibited in Proposition 5.4 yields the principal
a value of V p, with
V p = vFB − (1− α0)c
× {tFB − 1− 1
2
− · · · −
1
2N
+
(
1−
(
1
2
)tFB) [
(1− p0) + (1− p0)
2 + · · ·+ (1− p0)
N−tFB
]
+
(
1
2
)tFB [1
2
+
(
1
2
)2
+ · · ·+
(
1
2
)N−tFB]
},
while, by Proposition 5.2, the payoff in any fully revealing equilibrium is bounded above by
vFB(α0, N + 1)− µt(1− ρ(ht))v
FB(αt+1, N − t).
Clearly, any fully revealing equilibrium for some given value of c remains an equilibrium
for all c < c; moreover, vFB(αt+1, N − t) is decreasing in c. Furthermore, as the agent’s
incentives are independent of c, any new fully revealing equilibria that appear as we lower
c are dominated by the original equilibrium. Thus, as c decreases, the equilibrium from
Proposition 5.4 achieves a payoff arbitrarily close to the first-best, whereas the payoff in any
fully revealing equilibrium remains bounded away from it.
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Thus, whereas with full commitment the Revelation Principle tells us that there is no
loss for the principal to restrict herself to fully revealing decision rules, we have shown that
this is no longer true without commitment. Indeed, while in the game with commitment,
incentives may be given through rewards for minority opinion, this tool is no longer available
without commitment. Thus, absent commitment, it may become too costly for the principal
to extract the agent’s information; he may in fact be better off forgoing learning for a while,
thus endogenously allowing the expert to build up private information, which will then, in
turn, facilitate the transmission of information.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the dynamic interaction between a decision maker and an expert of
unknown quality who privately observes a potentially decision-relevant signal. As he only
cares about his reputation insofar as it translates into a longer expected duration of em-
ployment, the expert may have an incentive strategically to manipulate his cheap-talk relay
of the signal to the decision maker. We have shown that when the number of periods is
large enough, the expert’s reputational concerns vanish, and the first-best becomes imple-
mentable. We have shown that in the game with commitment, agency costs may lead to a
situation where the risky arm is being over-used as compared to the first-best benchmark.
In the game without commitment, the decision maker may be better off letting the expert
accumulate some private information during an initial grace period than he would be in any
fully revealing equilibrium.
While we have assumed a simple binary type space for the expert, one could of course
imagine richer type spaces. While analytical results will likely be rather difficult to get in
that setting, as the number of relevant incentive constraints increases, we should expect the
qualitative results of our analysis to continue to hold. Moreover, it seems interesting to
introduce multiple, possibly even a continuum of, experts into our setup. One could imagine
that the introduction of competition amongst experts would make them more inclined to
gamble on the initially less likely state, thus easing incentive constraints, as there will be
pressure favorably to surprise the decision maker with an unlikely success, especially in the
early stages of the game. We intend to explore these questions in future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Suppose the principal pursues the first-best policy of immediately firing the expert if, and only if,
the expert has made a mistake. Then, the agent is willing to reveal a signal indicating the less
likely state 0 truthfully at any time t, if at all times 0 ≤ t ≤ N , the following incentive constraint
holds:
p0
[
αt(N − t) +
1− αt
2
(
1 + 1
2
+ · · ·+
1
2N−t−1
)]
≥ (1− p0)
1− αt
2
[
1 + (1− p0) + · · ·+ (1− p0)
N−t−1
]
. (A.1)
To understand the right-hand side of the incentive constraint, the reader should note that if, upon
lying, the expert finds out ex post that his message was in fact correct, he then privately learns
that he is of the low type and will maximize his continuation payoff by reporting the a priori more
likely state in all subsequent periods.
It is now immediate to verify that, as N → ∞, the left-hand side diverges to +∞, whereas
the right-hand side converges to 1−p0
p0
1−αt
2
<∞. Let N0 be the smallest value of N for which this
constraint is satisfied for all t ≤ K. By our assumption that β0 < 1− p0, we have N0 ≥ 2.
It is left to check that the constraint is also satisfied for all t > K. It is direct to verify that
the constraint holds for any N if αt = 1− 2p0. Furthermore, the left hand side of the constraint is
increasing in αt while the right hand side is decreasing in αt. Therefore, the constraint is satisfied
for all αt ≥ 1− 2p0, which is equivalent to t ≥ K.
As is straightforward to verify, the left-hand side of the incentive constraint conditional on a
signal indicating the more likely state 1, is 1−p0
p0
> 1 times the left-hand side of the above constraint,
whereas the right-hand side is p0
1−p0
times the above right-hand side. Therefore, this constraint also
holds for all N ≥ N0.
Proof of Lemma 4.5
Consider an incentive compatible decision ρˆ that satisfies the conditions of the lemma. We show
that there exists an incentive compatible decision rule ρ′ in which
ρ′(h˜p
t˜
) > ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
),
ρ′(0, ∅, ω, h˜p
t˜
) = 0
and this rule yields the same payoffs as ρˆ to both parties. Iterated application of this construction
proves the claim.
To make the argument more transparent, we offer separate constructions for deterministic and
stochastic decision rules, even though the former construction is a special case of the latter.
Let hp
∅
and hp
1
be any one period public history with φ = 0 and φ = 1 respectively. The
argument for a deterministic decision rule is straightforward: We have ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
) = 0 and ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
) = 1
and construct ρ′ as follows:
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(i) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
) := 1 (compare with ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
) = 0);
(ii) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
hp
1
) := 0 (observe that h˜p
t˜
hp
1
is reached with 0 probability under ρˆ);
(iii) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
) := 0 (compare with ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
) = 1);
(iv) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
hp
1
hp
∅
hpτ ) := ρˆ(h˜
p
t˜
hp
∅
hp
1
hpτ ) for any h
p
1
, hp
∅
and hpτ with τ ≥ 0,
For the remaining histories, we set ρ′ = ρˆ.
By construction of ρ′, the expected payoff of the decision maker is the same in both rules.
Furthermore, the expert’s payoff is affected only at the histories that are successors of h˜p
t˜
.
The incentive compatibility after any private history on the equilibrium path that is a successor of
h˜p
t˜
hp
1
hp
∅
follows from the incentive compatibility at the corresponding successor history of h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
hp
1
in ρˆ. The incentive compatibility in period t˜ + 1 after histories h˜p
t˜
hp
1
and h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
is not relevant
as the expert is not employed in this period. The incentive compatibility of ρ′ in period t˜ after
history h˜p
t˜
follows from the incentive compatibility in period t˜+ 1 after history h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
under ρˆ. For
other successor histories of h˜p
t˜
, both decision rules coincide and hence incentive compatibility is
immediate.
For stochastic decision rules, the argument is a bit more tedious as we make sure that the
new rule generates the same distribution of payoff relevant events. By Lemma 4.4, it holds that
ρˆ(0, ∅, 1, h˜p
t˜
) = ρˆ(0, ∅, 0, h˜p
t˜
) =: r. We construct ρ′ as follows:
(i) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
) := ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
) + (1− ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
))r;
(ii) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
hp
1
) := γρˆ(h˜p
t˜
hp
1
);
(iii) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
hp
∅
) := 0;
(iv) ρ′(h˜p
t˜
hp
1
hp
∅
hpτ ) := γρˆ(h˜
p
t˜
hp
1
hp
∅
hpτ ) + (1− γ)ρˆ(h˜
p
t˜
hp
∅
hp
1
hpτ ) for any h
p
1
, hp
∅
and hpτ with τ ≥ 0,
where
γ =
ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
)
ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
) + (1− ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
))r
.
For the remaining histories, we set ρ′ = ρˆ.
By construction of ρ′, the expected payoffs of the decision maker is the same in both rules.
Verifying incentive compatibility of ρˆ is direct and we omit it.
Proof of Lemma 4.6
Assume that t ≤ K0. Define H
′ to be the set of all private histories in H˜a whose corresponding
public history is a one period successor history of h˜p
t˜
. With some abuse of notation, let hp(hat )
denote the public history induced by a private history hat .
Set h∗ to be a private history for which uρˆ(hat )(1/ρˆ(h
p(hat ))−1) is minimized among all h
a
t ∈ H
′
and define δ := uρˆ(h∗)(1/ρˆ(hp(h∗)) − 1). In addition, denote by h′ ∈ H˜a the private history that
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induces h˜p
t˜
and let u∗ be the expert’s expected payoff under ρˆ after h′ conditional on being employed
in period t˜.
We construct ρ′ as follows: First, define ρ′(h˜p
t˜
) = ρˆ(h˜p
t˜
) u
∗
u∗+δ
. Next, pick any public history h
that is a one period successor of h˜p
t˜
. If ρˆ(h) > 0, we set ρ′(h) = ρˆ(h)(uρˆ(hat ) + δ)/u
ρˆ(hat ), where
hat is the private history in H˜
a that corresponds to h. (Observe that ρ′(h) ≤ 1 by definition of δ.)
If ρˆ(h) = 0, we define ρ′ at h and any successor of h such that (a) ρ′ does not condition on the
continuation history after h and (b) generates for the expert the expected payoff u(hat ) = δ, where
hat is any private history that induces h. (This construction is feasible by definition of δ.) Finally,
we keep ρ′ = ρˆ at any other public history.
By construction, the expert’s payoffs on the equilibrium path are either unaffected or, at
history h˜p
t˜
and conditional on retainment are increased uniformly by δ for all continuation histories.
Now, consider any out of equilibrium path private history that corresponds to the public history
h˜p
t˜
. Then, the expert knows that he is incompetent.12 Observe that the continuation payoffs of the
expert for all two period successor private histories are not affected. Furthermore, all payoffs for
one period successor histories that result in a public history in Hp
∅
are increased by δ. Furthermore,
since a competent expert can always ensure the same expected payoff as a bad expert,13 the payoffs
of the incompetent expert are smaller than, or equal to, the payoffs of the expert who is competent
with a positive probability, after any history, and the incompetent expert’s payoffs after all one
period successor private histories do not increase by more than δ. Thus, ρ′ is incentive compatible.
It remains to be shown that the decision rule ρ is in the class of decision rules that do not
satisfy the conditions of the lemma. This follows, however, from the observation that ρ′(h˜p(h∗)) = 1
by the definition of δ.
Finally, from an ex ante perspective, the expected number of periods of employment of the
expert is the same under both rules, and hence the payoff of the decision maker is weakly higher
under ρ′ as she is better informed about the expert’s type in future periods, and her payoff in future
periods is bounded below by −c, the payoff in period t˜.
The argument for t˜ > K0 is different and simpler. The new decision rule can be constructed
by increasing the probability of employment in period t˜+1 after correct reports and decreasing the
probability of employment in t˜ to keep the expected payoff of the expert on the equilibrium path
at the node corresponding to h˜p
t˜
constant in both rules. The new rules delivers a strictly higher
payoff for the decision maker; incentive compatibility of the new rule follows from t˜ > K0.
Iterated application of the preceding construction proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 4.7
Proof is by contradiction. Suppose ρ is an optimal decision rule and suppose there exists a history
hˆ ∈ H1 such that ρ(hˆ) < 1. Let hˆt∗ be the longest such history. If there are more such histories
12By Lemma 4.3, we need not consider histories after which the expert privately thinks he might be of the
good type, while, according to the public belief, he is certain to be of the bad type.
13The competent expert can always play the strategy of the incompetent expert by using the outcome a
fair coin toss to generate the signal of the incompetent expert.
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of equal length t∗, we choose any one of them. We shall now recursively construct an alternative
decision rule ρ′, which is incentive compatible and performs better than ρ, thus contradicting the
optimality of ρ.
For all histories h of length greater than t∗, we set ρ′(h) ≡ ρ(h); hence ρ′ is incentive compat-
ible after all these histories, as the optimality of ρ implies its incentive compatibility. Moreover,
we set ρ′1(hˆt∗) ≡ 1; in order to preserve incentive compatibility after an immediate predecessor
history ht∗−1, the employment probabilities may have to be adjusted after other successor histo-
ries of hˆt∗−1 that are of length t
∗. Define ∆ := [1 − ρ(hˆt∗)]u
ρ(hˆt∗), where u
ρ(hˆt∗) denotes the
expected duration of the expert’s employment under ρ conditional on his being re-employed after
hˆt∗ . It follows from the explicit expression of the incentive constraints after any given predecessor
history hˆt∗−1 that an upper bound on the ex interim cost, as evaluated at period t
∗ − 1, from
readjusting the employment probabilities to restore incentive compatibility after history hˆt∗−1 is
given by Pr(hˆt∗ |hˆt∗−1, ρ)
1−p0
p0
∆c. Call δt∗ the overall increase in the expert’s expected employment
conditional on his being re-employed after history hˆt∗−1.
Now, consider hˆt∗−2, any given immediate predecessor history of hˆt∗−1. Again, the ex-
plicit expression for the incentive constraint after history hˆt∗−2 shows us that the cost of restor-
ing incentive compatibility in period t∗ − 2 is bounded above by Pr(hˆt∗−1|hˆt∗−2, ρ)
1−p0
p0
δt∗c ≤
Pr(hˆt∗ |hˆt∗−2, ρ)
(
1−p0
p0
)2
∆c. By iterating these steps, one shows that the overall cost of making ρ′1
incentive compatible is bounded above by Pr(hˆt∗ |ρ)
(
1−p0
p0
)t∗+1
(t∗ + 1)c∆.
If t∗ > K, the benefit of moving from ρ to ρ′1 is bounded below by
Pr(hˆt∗ |ρ
′
1)(1 − ρ(hˆt∗)) (βt∗+1 − (1− p0)− c); if t
∗ ≤ K, it is bounded below by Pr(hˆt∗ |ρ
′
1)(1 −
ρ(hˆt∗))[αt∗(N −K)(p0− c)− (K− t
∗)c], which, by assumption 4.1, is strictly positive. By construc-
tion, we have that Pr(hˆt∗ |ρ) = Pr(hˆt∗ |ρ
′
1). Thus, for ρ
′
1 to dominate ρ, it is sufficient that
αt∗(N −K)(p0 − c)− c(K − t
∗) ≥
(
1− p0
p0
)t∗+1
(t∗ + 1)c.
Since the left-hand side is bounded away from zero by assumption 4.1, this holds for c below a
certain threshold.
If there exists a history h˜ ∈ H1 such that ρ
′
1(h˜) < 1, we repeat the above procedure for ρ
′
1. As
the number of periods and histories is finite, there exists some finite n such that h ∈ H1 ⇒ ρ
′
n(h) =
1. Setting ρ′ ≡ ρ′n completes the proof.
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